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“Abnormal Tongues” is an analysis of the sexual politics of style.  Many 
interpretive strategies of modern Western thought, it contends, are shaped by a poorly 
understood, yet powerful sexual technology we call “style.”  What seems to circulate as a 
neutral, even scientific term in literary criticism is instead a supple ideological force that 
saturates academic and popular culture as one of the most powerful, because one of the 
most subtle, ways we understand how literary expression makes individuals legible to 
others as “normal” or as “deviant” sexual subjects.  The ancient concept of style is 
transformed by the expert discourses of modernity in order to secure heterosexuality’s 
authorized use of language through what it figures as its “natural” condition of clarity and 
to disqualify homosexuality’s use of language as what it terms excessive stylization. 
The project examines the major theoretical texts of literary stylistics and 
psychoanalysis – the two most important modern discourses of style that together 
v 
produced its sexualization – focusing on the cases of three important modernist stylists 
who have each been appropriated by literary criticism as exemplary instances of style’s 
presumed expression of authorial sexuality.  Ernest Hemingway’s reception both as 
masculine icon and as a simple and direct writer allow him and his partisans to partake of 
the privilege and acclaim awarded to the heterosexually-inflected notion of clarity.  For 
Henry James and Gertrude Stein the opposite is the case: each has been understood to 
produce overly stylized writing that is often read as an expression of the author’s 
shameful homosexuality.  Each of these readings is fuelled by a normalizing demand in 
the modern West to apply to style what Foucault terms “a hermeneutics of desire.”  In 
opposition to this largely unrecognized practice, “Abnormal Tongues” argues that literary 
criticism needs a new, non-disciplinary understanding of style that will liberate critique 










Introduction: Abnormal Tongues 
 
 
Nothing is more essential to a society than the classification of its languages.  To change 
this classification, to relocate its discourse, is to bring about a revolution. 
Roland Barthes, Criticism and Truth 
 
Style has always contained within itself a sort of fifth column, the extraordinary 
sensitivity to shame that is its basic operating equipment. 
D.A. Miller, Jane Austen or, The Secret of Style 
 
The question then, as now is: How can you recognize one?  Then as now we were 
supposed to betray ourselves, give ourselves away.  We exhibited symptoms of our 
condition. 
Neil Bartlett, Who Was That Man? A Present for Mr Oscar Wilde 
 
 
 When French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan finally published his most famous and 
influential collection Écrits in 1966, he began it not as we might expect with a discussion 
of the unconscious, dreams, Oedipus, or any number of other familiar concepts that 
populate the landscape of psychoanalysis.  Instead, he curiously used the brief overture to 
the book to issue an unexpected but urgent warning about style, a warning that has 
unfortunately in the decades that followed been largely ignored by literary critics.  Taking 
on a commonly held sentiment, Lacan repeats a familiar dictum only to argue for its 
glaring fallacy, explaining that: “‘The style is the man himself,’ people repeat without 
seeing any harm in it, and also without worrying about the fact that man is no longer so 
sure a reference point.”1  Lacan’s remark stands as a fine preamble to the present study’s 
goals, a project that means to contribute to the work Lacan pleads for by overturning both 
                                                 
1  Jacques Lacan, Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English, trans. Bruce Fink (New York: Norton, 
2006), 9. 
2 
the widespread notion that style is an infallible index of individual essence and also the 
harm that assumption is capable of causing, particularly to those (especially lesbians and 
gay men) who have for a long time been vulnerable to the asymmetrical pains inflicted by 
such an essentialist understanding and its very public revelations.  That Lacan 
inaugurates his germinal text with this protest against the way many routinely understand 
style should suggest the importance of his point and yet literary critics in particular, those 
who have been quickest in the world of Anglo-American criticism anyway to incorporate 
Lacan’s ideas into their thinking, have been slow to recognize Lacan’s important 
intervention into the question of style.  They have in fact still by and large let stand the 
problematic idea put forward by a host of modern disciplinary discourses including 
aesthetics, medicine, criminology, and psychology that style maintains a privileged 
position as a key marker of personhood – and especially sexual personhood – in the 
modern West.  Taking Lacan’s point seriously, I argue that it is crucial that we take 
another look at the complex institutional and discursive conditions that converge to make 
us continue to think, in Buffon’s famous words, that the style is the man, and that we try 
instead to see style differently as a dense but under-recognized site of ideological struggle 
that is of central importance not only for literary criticism but also, as the entrance of 
Lacan and psychoanalysis onto the scene should suggest, for the history of sexuality. 
 Many twentieth century texts testify to the contemporary urgency of Lacan’s 
neglected injunction.  One extraordinarily popular recent film, David Fincher’s Se7en 
(1995), provides an instructive example of the surprising relevance of this specialized 
literary category to our everyday lived experience of the world.  In the film, Brad Pitt’s 
Detective David Mills displays an especially astute understanding of the very particularly 
3 
sexual way that style marks the modern subject.  In one brief scene highlighting Mills’ 
aggressively heterosexual impatience with stylized writing, he reads Dante’s The Divine 
Comedy at his partner’s suggestion, searching for leads in the bizarre serial murder case 
he is investigating.  Unable to understand and frustrated by the opacity of the text, he 
explodes: “Fuckin’ Dante ... poetry-writing faggot!”, a populist remark to which we as 
audience are prompted both to laugh at as well as laugh with Mills.2  Following the 
outburst he angrily hurls his copy of Dante away as he abandons the difficulty of that 
“faggoty” text in favor of the welcome, plainspoken accessibility of a newly acquired 
CliffNotes version.  It is Dante’s style, his challenging way of writing, and not simply as 
the quote would suggest a generic dissatisfaction (“poetry”), that seems to infuriate Mills 
and solicit his disheartened epithets.  Dante is a faggot for Mills not just for writing 
poetry, after all, but for doing it in a style Mills can’t for the life of him decipher.  That 
reaction to the impenetrable excess of Dante’s style, comic and illustrative of Mills’ 
character as it is, however, is even more significant for displaying a resilient and deeply 
sedimented popular understanding about literary style and its accepted signification of 
homosexuality.  That Mills responds with frustrated anger to a difficult text comes as no 
real surprise – without a doubt many readers of Henry James’ The Ambassadors, for 
instance, might understandably have felt similar feelings while reading that book.  What 
is perhaps more surprising is that Mills, such a likeable character even to those who 
might otherwise deplore his not infrequent homophobic outbursts, so readily and so 
expertly equates Dante’s difficult style with homosexuality.  That we are led to identify 
so strongly with the photogenic Pitt and his character’s working-class, “common sense” 
approach to the world only underscores the culturally ingrained nature of his knowing 
                                                 
2  Se7en.  Videocassette.  Directed by David Fincher.  1995; New Line Home Video, 1996. 
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reading of style.  I point to this example not simply as a pop culture misunderstanding of 
literary history – after all, it would be tough I think to point out a text that is more 
relentlessly un-faggoty than The Divine Comedy.  Rather, and this is the force of the 
example, Mills’ reading of Dante is entirely commensurate with the way that modern 
Western culture has shaped and continues to (even retroactively) understand the concept 
of literary style.  The film gives voice to a convention about style so deeply held that we 
aren’t even totally conscious of it, namely that style means homosexuality. 
 Coming from such a reliably middlebrow source as Se7en makes the cultural 
position reflected in the film, I think, all the more convincing as a widely held attitude.  
High-brow or academic criticism, though, has historically had much the same unfortunate 
disposition toward style as has an uneducated tough guy like Mills.  The well respected 
critic George Steiner, for instance, has recourse in his work to a much wider academic 
vocabulary and to the precedent of aesthetic philosophy, but ultimately his conclusion 
about style is rather similar, if etiologically distinct, to the one espoused by Pitt’s filmic 
alter-ego.  In an essay called “Eros and Idiom,” Steiner suggests that “since about 1890 
homosexuality has played a vital part in Western culture and, perhaps even more 
significantly, in the myths and emblematic gestures which that culture has used in order 
to arrive at self-consciousness.”3  Among the most important of the roles that 
homosexuality has played in the West, he says, is as a narcissistic counterpoint to realistic 
modes of representation, the supposedly natural condition of healthy, communal, 
heterosexual expression.  All modern literature that violates the demands of realism, that 
exceeds it by employing a novel or unusual parlance, is for Steiner fundamentally 
                                                 
3 George Steiner, “Eros and Idiom” in On Difficulty and Other Essays (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1978), 115. 
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homosexual in its orientation.  In other words, Steiner understands homosexuality as the 
precipitating stimulant of creative style that is so self-absorbed that it divides the 
individual’s disruptively anti-social idiom from that of the community: 
So far as much of the best, of the most original in modern art and literature is autistic, i.e. 
unable or unwilling to look to a reality or ‘normality’ outside its own chosen rules, so far 
as much of the modern genius can be understood from the point of view of a sufficiently 
comprehensive, sophisticated theory of games, there is in it a radical homosexuality.  In 
other words, homosexuality could be construed as a creative rejection of the philosophic 
and conventional realism, of the mundanity and extroversion of classic and nineteenth-
century feeling.4 
 
The portrait of homosexuality as narcissism that Steiner paints here should be familiar to 
anyone who has encountered Freud and his disciples.  His reading is firmly rooted in the 
language of individual psychic deviance as in his claim that the difference from the 
mundane, realistic, or normal, which is to say “style,” is spawned by an autistic, inward-
looking, in short creatively selfish homosexuality.  Moreover, style is especially fraught 
for him from a materialist perspective because it rejects the productive, linguistically 
procreative norm of communally established forms of expression in favor of that same 
self-interested “creative rejection.”  Homosexuality becomes at once disabled, mad, self-
obsessed and anti-social, all in an argument that seems to take itself to be relatively 
sympathetic to the homosexual condition and appreciative of the creative fruit that 
condition is understood to yield.  Where heterosexuality produces “art and language that 
are centrally acts of communication, of relationship to the ‘outside’,” homosexuality “or 
… that abstraction of homosexuality which is narcissism” is rendered “unable or 
unwilling” to speak in that accessible tongue, in essence depriving homosexuals of a 
voice by reducing their language to the beautiful but impenetrable cries of madmen and 
                                                 
4 Ibid., 117. 
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madwomen.5  To put the same thing in Mills’ unapologetic vernacular: faggots write with 
a style “the rest of us” can’t understand. 
 Other critics have searched for a less pathologizing sort of explanation, attributing 
responsibility for style to homosexuality while tracing its origin not to some innate 
personal deviance but to social construction instead.  Jeffrey Meyers, for example, tries to 
rehabilitate the work of homosexual writers in Homosexuality and Literature, 1890-1930 
by explaining style as a perfectly understandable defense mechanism employed to 
covertly communicate the experience of closeted gay existence in the face of 
overwhelming societal oppression.  He reasons that “the obsessive predilections of 
homosexual novelists are both an obstacle and a stimulus to art, and lead to a creative 
tension between repression and expression.  The novels become a raid on inarticulate 
feelings, and force the authors to find a language of reticence and evasion, obliqueness 
and indirection.”6  Meyers’s gay liberationist reading comes from a recuperative 
perspective, attempting to separate homosexuality from its long history of narcissistic and 
pathological diagnosis by psychology even as it recapitulates the presumed link between 
style and homosexuality upon which, as I will show, that psychological reading depends.  
He therefore unfortunately reinscribes in his reading the familiar terms of secrecy and 
deception, the idea that homosexual persons are determined to insinuate themselves under 
false pretenses with coy and skillfully misleading language that obscures a darker 
purpose.  Part of that project, he suggests, is the adaptation to “style,” the strategic use of 
language that subterranean lesbians and gay men had to, in a sense, adapt to and learn in 
an evolutionary sense in order to survive. 
                                                 
5 Ibid. 
6 Jeffrey Meyers, Homosexuality and Literature, 1890-1930 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
1977), 1. 
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 These three readings, one popular and two critical, represent the three main forms 
of legibility that have traditionally obtained to style for over a century.  To repeat they 
break down roughly as follows: (1) the tautological, essentialist, even behavioralist 
common sense view championed by the fictional Mills that homosexuals produce style 
because that is their innate nature; (2) the psychological view derived from Freud and 
espoused by Steiner that homosexuals suffer from an unusually narcissistic psyche that 
drives them to reject established, communal forms of language in favor of private 
indulgence; (3) the social constructionist view proposed by Meyers that homosexuals are 
forced to resort to private style by the social disenfranchisement they endure.  Each of 
these readings, which are by no means entirely discrete phenomena, are collective 
testimony to the widely held, if not always openly acknowledged belief that gay and 
lesbian people are invariably the possessors and arbiters of style.  This project asks how it 
came to be that style, and literary style in particular, would be regarded as such a site at 
which deviant sexuality – and consequently the assumption of the unshakeable truth of 
individual identity – would make itself plainly visible.  This question curiously underlies, 
as we have seen, many of the endeavors of both conservative and progressive literary 
criticism in which “style” is often taken as a key term for understanding the erotic 
meanings of literary texts, on the one hand as the unmistakable sign by which to detect a 
pervert, and on the other hand as a versatile tool for subverting the acceptable forms of 
literature by “queering” texts through stylistic deviance.  How, though, did we reach a 
point at which we could even conceive of the strange notion that style and sexuality are 
one? 
8 
Abnormal Tongues argues that many of the interpretive strategies of modern 
Western thought are shaped by a poorly understood yet for that matter no less powerful 
technology that we call style.  What appears to circulate as a morally neutral, quasi-
scientific term in literary criticism (and a minor one according to the persistent claim that 
it is substance, not style, that really matters) is in fact a widely dispersed ideological 
mechanism that saturates academic and popular culture.  I argue that while the concept of 
style is most commonly deployed in the context of alleged aesthetic disinterest, it is 
actually one of the most powerful, because one of the most subtle, ways we understand 
how our expression makes us legible to others as “normal” or as “deviant” sexual 
subjects.  Moreover, because of the role that style assumes in a cluster of modern 
discourses of personhood, especially criminal, medical, and psychological, it becomes in 
the course of the nineteenth century synonymous with one emergent deviant type in 
particular – the homosexual – the personage upon whom style exercises most visibly the 
full explanatory power of its bizarrely sexual intelligibility.  What we traditionally have 
(mis)understood in literary criticism as an ethically unweighted rhetorical quality is 
transfigured by the expert discourses of modernity to subtly constrain our modes of 
articulation with real, material consequences for those who are, in Steiner’s words, 
“unable or unwilling” to manage their styles in certain culturally sanctioned, yet hazily 
defined ways. 
I. The Origins of Style 
 While the appreciation of a stylistic component to writing has been conceived 
since antiquity, the late nineteenth century – the period that according to Foucault gave 
birth to the homosexual – also gave rise to a totally original, sexualized conceptualization 
9 
of literary style.  For pre-modern thinkers style was generally believed to be an aspect of 
a piece of writing that one could objectively describe, an inherent textual fact within 
writing rather than in the writer who produced it.  By the end of the nineteenth century, 
however, literary criticism had moved away from the taxonomic approach of classical 
rhetoric – the standard view for centuries in the West – in favor of an intellectual position 
that understood style as a kind of fingerprint of its author, the unmistakable trace left 
behind by a unique, and routinely gay psychology.  The pre-modern paradigm is perhaps 
most clearly represented in its root form in the theoretical writings of the ancient world 
and the later manifestations of that view in the early modern period.  Both Plato and 
Aristotle, for instance, talk about style – lexis as they call it – as a manipulable 
component of speech, a quality residing in the language a speaker or writer chooses to 
use, and this is the important distinction, rather than originating in the psyche of the 
speaker himself.  One might be better or worse at using the techniques of language 
depending on training and skill, but ultimately style was understood as an effect of 
language’s function (knowing the right way to create a certain stylistic effect, for 
instance, would theoretically be enough to do it given the right talent), and not of some 
individual quirk or overdetermining psychological influence.7  The distinguished 
eighteenth century writer Alexander Pope in his Essay on Criticism (1711) would 
demonstrate this tradition’s longevity by famously calling expression “the dress of 
thought,” conceiving of style as external ornamentation added onto a stable core of 
protected internal meaning.  What these early examples show is that while style has of 
course always told us things about the person using it (for the ancients, for example, good 
                                                 
7 See, for instance, Aristotle, On Rhetoric, trans. George A. Kennedy (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1991), 215-57. 
10 
speech often meant good training in the art of rhetoric), it only became possible fairly 
recently, late in the second half of the nineteenth century as I’ve said, to tap style as a tool 
for extrapolating the sexual subjectivity of an individual from her stylistic residue.  The 
consequence of this change has been, as we saw in the case of Detective Mills’ reading of 
Dante, to shift the critic’s attention toward style as a mystery to solve, as the traces of an 
individual psychology bled out into the process by which a subject wields linguistic 
signs.  Style has, in short, become as it never was before a means of interpreting, 
measuring, and categorizing human sexual subjectivity.   
 It was Michel Foucault, of course, who advanced the practice of discourse 
analysis that shows us how to interrogate style as such a nexus of power and knowledge.  
Foucault shows in The History of Sexuality, in one of his most influential accounts, that 
sodomy has existed throughout human history but that it wasn’t until the nineteenth 
century that sodomy signified in the West a special kind of person with a special style of 
life.8  Following a radical cultural reorganization beginning in what he calls the classical 
period of the West and reaching its climax in the invention of the homosexual in 1869, 
sex between two people of the same gender came to signify a unique personage, a 
particular species of individual to whom this perennial act could be attributed.  Style’s 
place in this same normalizing environment is analogous and ideologically adjacent to 
Foucault’s account of the genesis of homosexuality and the birth of the homosexual as 
species.9  At the end of the nineteenth century, style, like sodomy, through what is no 
                                                 
8 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1: An Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: 
Vintage, 1990). 
9 George Chauncey’s Gay New York challenges Foucault’s definitive dating, arguing quite persuasively that 
Foucault’s dates are tied to an upper middle class medical discourse that does not correspond exactly to the 
urban subcultures of the early 20th century that followed a somewhat different timeline.  George Chauncey, 
Gay New York: Gender, Urban Culture, and the Makings of the Gay Male World, 1890-1940 (New York: 
Basic Books, 1994). 
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mere historical coincidence, acquires a systematic role in securing the forces of 
normalization by providing a new, linguistic yardstick for the assessment of sexual 
normality.   In a truly strange twist, style, for all intents and purposes a non-sexual feature 
of language, will like sodomy become inextricably associated with a particular 
discredited species of person – the homosexual. Whereas in the past style was something 
“neutral,” a morally unmarked clothing for thoughts no more or less indicative of deep 
subjectivity than a dress, by the late nineteenth century, style signifies unmistakable and 
undivestible inner perversion.10  As a consequence, in stark contrast to the popular myth, 
to be “all style” is in fact not to have no substance at all but to always already have too 
much substance – and not a good one! 
 Marking the end of the nineteenth century as a key moment in style’s genealogy is 
as I’ve said no arbitrary selection.  The aesthetic, cultural, and discursive reorganization 
of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as described in detail by Foucault in 
works like Madness and Civilization, Discipline and Punish, and The History of 
Sexuality, crystallize in an unexpected but decidedly sexual direction a notion of style 
that finds its roots in ancient rhetoric but could only comprehensively operate in a 
modern, disciplinary society that administers its subjects based on an uncertainly defined, 
culturally saturating rhetoric of style.  The discussion to follow provides a theoretical 
background for the readings of literary texts in subsequent chapters and therefore it does 
not aim to be an historically exhaustive account of a concept – style – that has been with 
                                                 
10 Joseph Litvak makes a similar argument that sophistication and perversion are virtually cognates.  He 
points out that “a glance at the dictionary is all it takes to recall that sophistication in fact means 
‘perversion.’”  My adoption of this formulation, however, is not meant to restrict my focus – style – only to 
perversion in general, for I emphasize that style has a deep affinity with one perversion – homosexuality – 
in particular.  Joseph Litvak, Strange Gourmets: Sophistication, Theory, and the Novel (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1997), 3. 
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us for thousands of years; such a history is unfortunately well beyond my ability to 
provide.11  While I hope to have sketched out some sense of the historical trajectory of 
the idea in the broadest of terms, my goal for what follows is to delineate style’s progress 
in the modern era, that is, tracing how we have come to use style – and how style has 
come to use us – in the last hundred or so years.  To put it more simply, this introduction 
provides a polemical explanation for why style signifies in the sexual way that it does and 
what interests are served by that uninterrogated signification. 
 The argument that follows operates simultaneously on two key theoretical levels.  
First, this is an argument about literary history, one that traces the development of an 
important and specialized concept in the field – style – in a fairly specific historical 
moment (and in a very specific moment in the history of sexuality).  That moment to 
some extent parallels the period of literary modernism but should not be construed as 
precisely coextensive with it.  Modernism, both with its emphasis on experimental form 
and its interest in emergent modes of novel gender and sexual subjectivities, makes the 
concerns explored in this project most visible by putting them into starkest relief, a fact 
that explains why I have drawn on so many modernist texts for examples.  Within the 
historical sweep that reaches from the earliest literary text that finds a place here, Henry 
James’s “The Author of ‘Beltraffio’” (1884) to the latest, Ernest Hemingway’s 
posthumously published A Moveable Feast (1964), the primary emphasis is on a more or 
less conventionally understood “modernist” period, roughly speaking the 1880s through 
                                                 
11 Some useful collections that address this subject include Seymour Chatman, ed. Literary Style: A 
Symposium (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971); Stanley Fish, Is There a Text in This Class? 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980); Gerard Genette, Narrative Discourse (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1980); Berel Lang, ed. The Concept of Style (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press); John Middleton Murry, The Problem of Style (London: Oxford University Press, 1960); John 
Spencer, ed. Linguistics and Style (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964); Jean Jacques Weber, ed. 
The Stylistics Reader (New York: Arnold, 1996); 
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the 1940s.  However we decide to define the limits of modernism, though, the modern 
regime of style, as the three critical examples I began with suggest, does not by any 
means begin and end with that aesthetic moment.  Not relying on strict literary 
periodization, Abnormal Tongues is also necessarily a discursive analysis, drawing as it 
does from several disciplines in order to emphasize the broad cultural resonance of what 
was initially understood by the ancients in the restricted sense of a rhetorical tool.  We 
will see that style is special among the terms of literary criticism because of the 
remarkable way that its meaning for us has been sharply molded by a cluster of 
normalizing, expert discourses.  What this means is that to understand style one cannot 
limit oneself to a purely formal and supposedly disinterested literary analysis, as has 
often been the case with literary criticism, if one wants to understand the multi-faceted 
influence culture has had on our ideas about style.  Moreover, a thorough and 
comprehensive analysis requires a special understanding of the intellectual debts literary 
criticism owes in particular to two fields that have done more than any others in 
providing us with our current understanding of style – stylistics (a branch of linguistics) 
and psychoanalysis.  I argue that these two fields liberally influence(d) and borrow(ed) 
from one another in a way that has to this point been virtually unrecognized to converge 
into our modern psychologically inflected, sexually oriented understanding of style.   
This argument, then, is also necessarily situated within a constellation of 
psychological and sexological theories that are both produced by and productive of the 
cultural regulation style helps to perpetuate, a task that stylistics could not have 
accomplished on its own.  My focus on sexuality, and homosexuality in particular, 
reveals in a way that has not yet been recognized how the expert discourses of modernity 
14 
revive and inflect much older rhetorical traditions, dramatized here in the readings of the 
two most important modern Western discourses of style (stylistics and psychoanalysis).  
The extended reading of stylistics that constitutes the opening part of the chapter first 
aims to throw into question the patina of scientific neutrality under which that project 
usually tends to operate, and instead foregrounds the ideological presuppositions and 
political implications, especially as they relate to sexuality, that enfold stylistics’ entire 
conceptualization of style.  The chapter then concludes with a long engagement with 
Freud, one of our most influential theorists of style and yet a figure who is not well 
recognized either for the major role style plays in his thinking or for the major role he 
plays in our thinking about style.  I show how these two grand discourses act together 
dynamically to renovate the ancient conceit of style and re-animate it in modernity in 
what proves a disguised but highly phobic and politically tenuous way, a way that literary 
criticism, if it intends to pursue a progressive and humane political project, must distance 
itself from in favor of a more self-aware and less deliberately normalizing stance toward 
style. 
II. Style and Truth 
 Before going any further it is important to establish a working definition of what 
we mean by the term “style.”  For the most part literary criticism has relied upon the 
authority of linguistics to define style in its technical terms.  Richard Ohmann, one of the 
most influential of these linguistically oriented critics, argues that style is at its simplest 
nothing more than “a way of writing” and that it is a way of writing that presumes only 
that the words in a given utterance can be expressed in multiple, referentially equivalent 
ways: either the words themselves (diction) or their arrangement (syntax) could be 
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different without altering the substance of the utterance.12  By this logic for style to exist 
one must be able to say “the same thing” in numerous, stylistically diverse ways.  This 
definition follows Roman Jakobson’s famously authoritative pronouncement that “the 
poetic function projects the principle of equivalence from the axis of selection into the 
axis of combination”; in other words, style is constituted by the combination of selections 
among referentially similar but formally different linguistic alternatives.13  As the style of 
a particular utterance changes because of variation in word choice or order, the substance 
remains constant, unaltered in its “equivalence” by the vagaries of stylistic fluctuation. 
 In the history of criticism this way of thinking represents what I call the classical 
model, in which style is thought to be ornamental, added to the supposedly stable content 
of a text as in Pope’s formulation of style as dress.14  The terminology is not meant to 
suggest that we only find the classical model in very old texts; critics oriented toward 
linguistics like Jakobson and Ohmann often unsurprisingly utilize this classical method in 
their work, influenced as it is by so many pre-modern sources.  According to Jonathan 
Culler, though, the defining feature of the classical model regardless of its historical 
position is its central conceptualization of style as decoration: 
Classical rhetoric defines a series of operations which enable one to move from the 
textual surface, with its metaphors and synechdoches, to the meanings which are 
essentially references. … By performing the translation which rhetoric requires we isolate 
the ornament which serves as decoration.  Indeed, one might say that debates about 
                                                 
12 Richard Ohmann, “Generative Grammars and the Concept of Literary Style” in Linguistics and Literary 
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rhetoric and the appropriateness of particular expressions in specific genres are possible 
only because there are various ways of saying the same thing: the figure is an ornament 
which does not trouble the representational function of language.15 
 
In the classical model, then, style is perceived as at a distance from substance, a way of 
expressing a given content that may be more or less aesthetically good or rhetorically 
effective, but that does not substantively affect the “representational function of 
language,” resting as it does on the surface of the text as decoration for its deeper 
meaning.  Style’s job is simply to provide the ribbons and bows to the message, to 
garnish with its figures the provided feast of meaning without disrupting is original 
flavors.  
 Although modern criticism has by now largely discredited this strictly ornamental 
definition of style and its familiar polarization of style and content, it has posed a whole 
other set of problems by moving style’s origin from language to the language user.16  
Max Nordau’s popular manifesto Degeneration (1895) was one early and influential 
source to publicize this at that time inchoate view, disseminating the notion to a receptive 
public that all modern art reflects not just the thing depicted in it but rather the artist’s 
“soul”: 
The work of art is never a document in the sense attached by naturalistic cant to this 
word, i.e., a reliable objective presentation of external facts; but it is always a confession 
of the author; it betrays, consciously or unconsciously, his way of feeling and thinking; it 
lays bare his emotions, and shows what ideas fill his consciousness, and are at the 
disposal of the emotion which strives for expression.  It is not a mirror of the world, but a 
reflection of the soul of the artist.17 
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Nordau’s appeal to the soul of the artist embeds style deeply into the author’s essence, 
positioning it as irrefutable proof of his singular nature.  Be it “consciously or 
unconsciously,” according to Nordau, the artist always makes a confession in the work of 
art, at once presenting her “external facts” but also always unburdening her truth.  
Nordau’s project, as Jonathan Freedman has shown, was heavily overdetermined by his 
attempt to deflect negative stereotypes about Jews (notably urban decadence as a 
symptom of degeneration) that were in wide circulation at the time, and that he moved to 
pass these stereotypes off onto other marginalized groups that were easy targets, 
especially artists and homosexuals.18  It is easy to dismiss Nordau’s theory out of hand 
because of its motivation but it is more productive to read Nordau’s argument as a 
cultural symptom rather than a cause strictly speaking.  Nordau is an important and often 
cited witness to the birth of the idea that literary texts testify to the state of their creator’s 
inner sexual being.  We could debate endlessly how influential Nordau’s account actually 
was on the scientific and popular audiences of his time but what is more valuable is to see 
this text as reflecting a crucial cultural shift in the reception of literary style, a shift that 
remains with us today more or less intact.  According to Susan Sontag, in fact, it has for a 
long time been quite fashionable to tell ourselves that style is on the outside and that it’s 
what’s inside that counts, but “even if one were to define style as the manner of 
appearing, this by no means necessarily entails an opposition between a style that one 
assumes and one’s ‘true’ being.  In fact, such a disjunction is extremely rare.  In almost 
every case, our manner of appearing is our manner of being.  The mask is the face.”19  
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Style is not read today nor has it been for over a century as Pope’s costume for the self – 
it has become legible as an expression of the self, as the public exhibition of the soul. 
 Perhaps the most troubling consequence of this significant literary and cultural 
shift is the constant threat of biographical scrutiny that writers currently labor under.  
Every style a writer may use has the potential to carry with it attendant, if undesired, 
meanings and identities.  Roland Barthes is among the first critics to give serious 
attention to this problematic by interrogating the dangerous political effects that our 
present, naively insidious understanding of style brings.  For Barthes, one of style’s most 
significantly problematic effects is this inescapable power of description, the knowing 
authority it lends to any reader or critic over any writer: 
Under the name of style a self-sufficient language is evolved which has its roots only in 
the depths of the author’s personal and secret mythology, that subnature of expression 
where the first coition of words and things takes place where once and for all the great 
verbal themes of his existence come to be installed.  Whatever its sophistication, style 
always has something crude about it: it is a form with no clear destination, the product of 
a thrust, not an intention, and, as it were, a vertical and lonely dimension of thought.  Its 
frame of reference is biological or biographical, not historical: it is the writer’s ‘thing,’ 
his glory and his prison, it is his solitude.20 
 
Barthes contests the notion put forward by stylistics that one can still reasonably call style 
a mere linguistic selection in the classical sense, pointing out the fallacy of the belief that 
style is just a tool one takes up to use.  Instead, every stylistic move a writer makes, no 
matter its sophistication or naiveté, is bound to reveal unexpected, even boundless depth, 
biological or biographical, nature or nurture.  Likewise, we cannot fall back on style as 
merely an impersonal indication of a writer’s incidental historical position, as reflecting 
nothing more than a writer’s conditions of historical possibility.  Style’s dangerous 
crudeness, Barthes argues, is that it compels us to read its expressions of surface as depth; 
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it takes supposedly neutral linguistic material – what we used to call ornament – and 
allows, even demands, one to infer a personage from it, a personage no doubt whose 
stylistic signature reveals a very particular sexual self. 
Barthes’ analysis provides an implicit critique of the psychological style of 
reasoning that mediates our modern understanding of style.21  That psychological 
approach poses a special challenge because it is, we must admit, virtually impossible to 
conceive of individual expression in anything but psychological terms.  To a great extent 
the psychological is inseparable from expression since, as Fredric Jameson argues, “the 
problem of expression is itself closely linked to some conception of the subject as a 
monad like character, within which things felt are then expressed by projection 
outward.”22  Such a conception invariably invites us to speculate on the mind – conscious 
or otherwise – that produced a given expression, that inked a particular stylistic signature.  
Small wonder, then, that when presented with an aesthetically queer style we would tend 
to infer, even in the absence of any other evidence, a sexually queer character.  
 What is so deeply problematic about this trend for progressive literary critics is 
that as the meaning of style has shifted from the simplistic if comparatively harmless 
classical understanding of super-added ornament – pure surface – to a mechanism for 
deciphering the subject’s true inner sexual being, it has become a normalizing, hygienic 
measure against society’s most discursively vulnerable.  Jameson’s often otherwise 
admirably progressive work also partakes of this disturbing line of thought when he 
suggests that “modern style is somehow in itself intelligible, above and beyond the 
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limited meaning of the book written in it, and beyond even those precise meanings which 
the individual sentences that make it up are designed to convey.”23  Jameson himself 
cannot account for the holistic intelligibility that style makes available – “somehow in 
itself” – but his indecision does nothing to shake his own intransigent confidence in his 
mastery over the meaning of style.  We all know what style connotes, he suggests, 
without our ever having to explain how or why we know it.  We don’t quite know how 
style means what it does but that lack of precise understanding seems not at all to limit 
what style can tell us about the individual who made it.  Style has come a long way from 
what Jameson describes as “the purely rhetorical standards of elegance and epithet-
weighing which dominated periods where all writers basically owed allegiance to a single 
type of style, setting their variants of it down to ‘temperament.’”24  Rather, in its more 
recent incarnation style is understood as what Jameson calls an “abnormal tongue,” the 
expressive mechanism by which the subject makes clear the contours of her or his 
individual sexual subjecthood.25  Need I stop to point out that Jameson’s metaphor 
evokes precisely this sexual meaning, enfolding an otherwise asexual formulation in a 
telling figure that is at once a metaphor for the poetic function (tongue) and a descriptor 
for a deviant, non-procreative sexual organ? 
 But what of this will to truth surrounding style?  Why does it matter so much that 
our culture tells us that we can figure out everything (sexual) we need to know about an 
author by reading his style?  Barthes argues that it is especially distressing that an author 
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cannot make himself over at will without being captured in the meanings that style’s 
cultural intelligibility enables.  As he explains, “what society will not tolerate is that I 
should be … nothing, or to be more exact, that the something that I am should be openly 
expressed as provisional, revocable, insignificant, inessential, in a word: irrelevant.”26  It 
is forbidden for one’s style to be inessential, for a subject to express nothing about his 
essence through the signs he uses.  Culture demands that we be legible, that we be made 
intelligible through our styles, be they the “natural” heterosexual condition of unstylized 
realism or our other more revealing, descriptive “abnormal tongues.”  This mandate is, in 
turn, particularly troubling for those subjects whose deviant signs leave them open to real 
violence, those who are most subjected to style’s immobilizing gaze.  Style, then, is most 
pressing a political concern for those sexual minorities who are its privileged object – gay 
men and lesbians – for who else so readily faces the possibility of material violence in 
response to deviant stylistic practice? 
 The capacity to incite violence is not usually something we readily associate with 
a supposedly banal trait like “style,” yet Virginia Woolf’s Between the Acts (1939) makes 
a case for the possibility of precisely such violence in response to expression.27  The 
novel begins with the assembly of guests to an annual village pageant at the country 
home of the Oliver family, Pointz Hall.   Gathering over refreshments in anticipation of 
the day’s main event, the guests are interrupted when their hostess Isa Oliver accidentally 
overturns a coffee cup, a faux pas that occasions a speedy response from one overly 
expressive guest, William Dodge, and a violent mental rebuke from Isa’s husband Oliver: 
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William Dodge caught it as it fell.  He held it for a moment.  He turned it.  From the faint 
blue mark, as of crossed daggers, in the glaze at the bottom he knew that it was English, 
made perhaps at Nottingham; date about 1760.  His expression, considering the daggers, 
coming to this conclusion, gave Giles another peg on which to hang his rage as one hangs 
a coat on a peg, conveniently.  A toady; a lickspittle; not a downright plain man of his 
senses; but a teaser and twitcher; a fingerer of sensations; picking and choosing; dillying 
and dallying; not a man to have straightforward love for a woman - his head was close to 
Isa’s head - but simply a −  At this word, which he could not speak in public, he pursed 
his lips; and the signet-ring on his little finger looked redder, for the flesh next it 
whitened as he gripped the arm of his chair.28 
 
Dodge’s manner unexpectedly, but not surprisingly, enrages Oliver, for that is style’s role 
in a culture so terrorized by sexual and expressive deviance, which are in this instance, as 
in many, one and the same.  It is Dodge’s “expression,” after all, that gives him away as 
“not a downright plain man” but something else, something downright unspeakable.  
Presumably, it is Dodge’s aesthetic sensibility, his appreciation for and knowledge of 
English porcelain, that brings down Giles Oliver’s wrath.  Indeed, the narrator notes that 
it is “his expression, considering the daggers, coming to this conclusion [that] gave Giles 
another peg on which to hang his rage.”  Yet the text emphasizes that it is not just Giles’ 
recognition of Dodge’s own recognition of the cup’s origin that inspires his revulsion but 
in particular Dodge’s mode of “expression” of that recognition.  Dodge notably becomes 
completely legible in an instant of expression, an otherwise insignificant expression that 
collapses, for Giles, the other man’s whole existence into a category of sexual species.  
He is “a teaser and twitcher; a fingerer of sensations; picking and choosing; dillying and 
dallying.”  A brief glimpse of expression, of style, reveals all that Giles needs to know 
about Dodge.29  Dodge’s essence is collapsed completely into one figure, signifying his 
disidentification, in Giles’s mind, with “a man to have straightforward love for a 
woman.”  Style disqualifies, as the example illustrates, any pretence to straightness and 
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pulls back the curtain on an inner world of duplicity, serpentine hedonism, and “spittle-
licking.”  And while Dodge may not exactly instantiate literary style in the mode of 
expression he performs, the consequences, one expects, would likely be the same no 
matter what specific medium of expression – bodily or literary – Dodge were to use.  
Woolf’s novel registers Giles Oliver as an ancestor of the critics – Mills, Steiner, Meyers 
– with whom we began, cultural agents who all know intuitively how to tap into style’s 
diagnostic potential 
III. Intuiting Style 
 Woolf’s use of the category “expression” emphasizes the way that style circulates 
as a remarkably supple, even absorbent signifier that nonetheless remains strikingly 
effective for the purposes of normalization.  “A style is a way of writing – that is what the 
word means,” Ohmann suggests.30  The simplicity of that formulation, however, belies a 
much more slippery object as Woolf attests.  For although Ohmann is able to give such a 
reassuringly concise description of style, he quickly avers, “that is almost as much as one 
can say with assurance of the subject, which has been remarkably unencumbered by 
theoretical insights.”31  Why has the concept of style remained such a pervasive yet 
undertheorized presence if we can say little about it other than that it is “a way of 
writing?”  What gives the concept its enduring appeal if it is such a vague notion?  
Seymour Chatman, another important mid-20th century pioneer and booster for a more 
rigorous theorization of style, was ultimately forced to come to terms with the defeat of 
that enterprise when he wistfully conceded that the dream of a proper science of stylistics 
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seems permanently dead.32  If the movement to produce a new literary science – stylistics 
– in the 1960s and 1970s is indeed condemned to the ash-heap of unfulfilled structuralist 
ambition, where does that leave the object of its inquiry?  Open any contemporary work 
of literary criticism today and you still might find a passing reference or even detailed 
exegesis of the “style” of a given literary text.33  If we have no true science or system for 
understanding the technical operation of style how does it continue to be deployed so 
frequently and expertly? 
 One of the claims that this project makes is that style is a porous term, one whose 
meaning remains stubbornly undecided in the service of producing the normalizing 
effects of intelligibility.  The result of this openness to meaning is that at those most 
apolitical, scientific, or purely linguistic moments, we are also always talking about style 
in the most aesthetically and socially embedded, that is in the most political of ways.  
Countless critics have remarked on the imprecision with which the term “style” is used, 
yet this very imprecision is perhaps style’s greatest strength.  For example, Tzvetan 
Todorov laments that since “the bibliography of stylistics contains thousands of titles, 
there is no lack of observed fact; however, the polysemy of concepts, the imprecision of 
methods, the uncertainty about the very goal of this research hardly make for a 
prosperous discipline.”34  One might think, based on that description, that to deploy style 
as a literary category would be a serious mistake indeed, and one not likely to take the 
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critic very far.  However, as Chatman illustrates, it is precisely by not naming its object 
that style is able to have such wide-ranging influence: 
 “‘Style’ is a ambiguous term.  Among other things, it has been used to refer to the 
idiosyncratic manner of an individual or group; or to a small scale formal property of 
texts (in the language alone, or additionally in other attendant systems like meter); or to a 
kind of extra or heightened expressiveness, present in non-literary language as well; or to 
a decorum based on social or cultural context; or to any one of a number of other 
concepts.”35   
 
Style’s explanatory power is conceived of as so vast as to exceed description.  Not only 
can style tell us about a textual detail like meter, but it has something to say about non-
literary language, social or cultural characteristics, the manner of an individual or group 
of individuals, as well as “any one of a number of other concepts.”  Style’s range depends 
upon the ambiguity of its object, an ambiguity that makes the discourse surrounding style 
a performative process, a language that creates what it claims simply to describe.  It is 
vital, therefore, to understand not what style is but what style does.  For understanding 
how style operates by presuming its own unquestioned yet credentialed expertise is 
especially pressing if, as Sontag argues, “awareness of style as a problematic and isolable 
element in a work of art has emerged in the audience for art only at certain historical 
moments – as a front behind which other issues, ultimately ethical and political, are being 
debated.”36 
 The ambiguity of style’s object, however, is only one of a pair of factors that 
enables its awesome explanatory power.  Along with that ambiguity comes what Paul 
Morrison has termed a “quasi-instinctual knowingness,” a general assumption that when 
it comes to style, we know it when we see it.  Ohmann phrases that assumption in terms 
of a reader’s “intuition.”  For him, readers have a loosely structured yet quite reliable 
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intuition for detecting style.  As evidence Ohmann cites the reliability of stylistic intuition 
to be able to hone in on style so as to enable certain people to write stylistic parodies and 
others to recognize who or what is being parodied.  Ohmann’s assesment is nonetheless 
troubling as he concludes that “in a time when linguistic theory and practice have passed 
through at least one renaissance, the most serviceable studies of style continue to proceed 
from the critic’s naked intuition.”37  Again, in spite of Ohmann’s cautionary tone, the 
implication here is that style needs no system, no set of rules to enable one to decipher it.  
It has become, in the absence of such a system, a generalizable interpretive move of 
which anyone can partake.  Moreover, stylistics is a reading practice that actively resists 
its own systematization, all the better to enable the democratic triumph of intuitive 
reading. 
IV. On Clarity 
 Just as linguistics presumes a base or essential meaning – content – that can be 
transformed in a variety of utterances as a prerequisite for style’s existence, so too does 
literary criticism require the myth of a natural, unstylized language – clarity – with which 
to contrast style’s difference.  Although critics, as I’ve said, often assume that style is not 
infused by the dynamics of power/knowledge, its very constitution depends upon the 
mechanisms of normalization, requiring as it does the premise of a clear, coherent, and 
“natural,” which is for all intents and purposes normal, way of writing as a necessary 
point of contrast against which style becomes visible.    Barthes points out the necessity 
of this implicit measure of normality by noting that in the modern era style is always 
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measured on a deceptively innocent scale of norm and deviation, a fact that on closer 
inspection implicates style deeply in the operations of power/knowledge.  Style, he says, 
“is seen here as an exception (though coded) to a rule; it is the aberration (individual, yet 
institutional) from a current usage, a usage that is either colloquial (if one defines the 
norm in terms of the spoken language) or prosaic (if one opposes poetry as ‘the other 
thing’).”38  No matter if we take the norm to be “colloquial” or “prosaic,” the moment 
style enters the scene, it is always already as a measure of variation from a given standard 
of “normal” language; style is at its core the difference from “the way people talk.”  
Barthes goes so far as to insist that style is nothing but “a distance, a difference,” that it is 
constituted entirely by its variation from some imagined communal norm.39  A zero 
degree of style, if we could even imagine such a thing, would be total fidelity to 
colloquial or prosaic clarity, a daunting if not downright impossible standard indeed.  
What is even more alarming, however, is that as Barthes reiterates, a model of language 
based on identifying deviance from a nonexistent but authoritative norm is essentially 
moral because “there is a reduction from the systematic to the sociological (the code is 
what is statistically determined by the greatest number of users), and from the 
sociological to the normal, where social discourse begins.”40  Style therefore invites us 
precipitously not only into the realm of the beautiful but also into the realm of the good.41  
This movement is deeply problematic because of that double move whereby it tells us not 
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just that language is different from “current usage” but that that difference is in itself a 
moral question. 
 Underlying Barthes’ interrogation of the discourse of style is an acute sensitivity 
to the way that Saussurian linguistics has been weirdly pressed into the service of 
normalization.  Saussure introduces the famous distinction between langue, the total 
synchronic system of linguistic possibilities that exists at a particular point in time, and 
parole, the individual diachronic speech act that is made possible by the totality of the 
system langue.  For Saussure, though, the more important of these two is langue because 
it alone is a complete system of impersonal differences ripe for scientific attention.  As 
Jameson argues, parole is mostly irrelevant for Saussure “not only to the degree that it is 
always, and of necessity, incomplete, but also insofar as it is the locus of individual 
difference, of individual personality and style.”42  Saussure himself states the case in 
similar terms: “Whereas speech is heterogeneous, language, as defined, is 
homogeneous.”43  The prevailing view of style mistakenly focuses on parole, on 
individual difference that occurs in time, and wrong-headedly measures it against langue, 
an impersonal system of internal differences that is not really understandable in time.  
Style is based, then, on a conceptual misunderstanding, a popular reading practice that 
operates under the sign of a norm – langue – that is really no norm at all.  We can 
conceive of langue only as an abstraction, as a system that makes possible individual 
instances of parole but which is not itself a gold standard of linguistic clarity against 
which we can reasonably judge individual utterances to be more or less “clear.”  So as 
Jameson says, the negative result of Saussurean linguistics is that language is no longer 
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understood as an object or as a substance “but rather as a value: thus language is a 
perception of identity.  But in language the perception of identity is the same as the 
perception of difference.”44  Of course, the linguistic classification of identity reduced to 
a perception of difference from normality is very tenuous, tied as it is in our modern era 
to moral, and more specifically sexual, classification. 
 This langue/parole infected understanding of style problematically operates 
through the privileging of an unmarked term – colloquial or prosaic clarity – that 
deceptively rules under the banner of scientific objectivity.  In reality, however, that 
“natural” standard of clarity is no more than a fiction of popular imagination.  Barthes 
points out that criticism, by which he means both academic as well as popular judgment, 
thrives on a model of what he calls “critical verisimilitude,” a common sense model that 
violently excludes language (and dissent) that does not meet its imaginary standards of 
clarity.  “Criticism based on verisimilitude,” he says, “is very fond of ‘evident truths.’  
These evident truths are, however, essentially normative.  By a habitual process of 
confused logic, the unbelievable proceeds from the forbidden, that is to say from the 
dangerous: disagreements become divergences, divergences become errors, errors 
become sins, sins become illnesses, illnesses become monstrosities.”45  In other words, 
even a disinterested judgment of beauty rapidly swings to a moral evaluation.  Style is 
deployed as a subtle moral weapon, protesting all the way as to its own neutrality.  It is 
through reading style while feigning disinterested evaluation, Barthes complains, that one 
can slip easily from a disagreement over expression into denouncing moral failure and 
sickness.  The association of style and sickness, then, is the shameful fate of those who 
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do not adhere to the dominant mode of expression, a mode that proudly wears the mask 
of universal clarity.46  One who deviates from the stylistic norm can always proceed from 
harmless eccentric to unhygienic danger.  Style is, therefore, similar to sexuality as 
Foucault comes to understand it in that for the Foucault of the final volumes of The 
History of Sexuality, the central preoccupation is why sexuality, in particular, as just one 
of any number of everyday experiences has become a matter of moral and ethical 
concern.47  Barthes’ understanding of how culture regulates discourse by moving it into 
the space of the moral displays an awareness of the functioning of power in many ways 
similar to Foucault’s.  That is, why should an utterly banal issue like style take on an 
ethical or moral meaning and what interests are served by such a process? 
 That banal question might seem a relatively trivial one in light of some major 
battles in the history of literary criticism, particularly in the wake of the politicization of 
literary criticism in the 1980s and 90s.  Yet as D.A. Miller points out, power in its most 
insidious, effective and undetectable form is most often exercised on what he calls “little 
things,” that is, power operates at maximum efficiency, to use Foucault’s terms, in a 
capillary fashion, spreading discipline through society’s seemingly unimportant banalities 
in order to capture us all the better in its cognitive web.  “The sheer pettiness of 
discipline’s coercions,” Miller says,  
Tends to keep them from scrutiny, and the diffusion of discipline’s operations precludes 
locating them in an attackable center.  Disciplinary power constitutively mobilizes a 
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tactic of tact: It is the policing power that never passes for such, but is either invisible or 
visible only under the cover of other, nobler or simply blander intentionalities (to 
educate, to cure, to produce, to defend).48 
 
And so it goes with style.  While we view style to be a matter of bland evaluation, as 
simply a judgment of beauty or taste, in fact the manifest intentionality of such 
evaluations (to educate, to cultivate, to develop taste) helps power pass for insignificance.  
Yet as Barthes and Miller are most aware, “power has taken hold where hold seems least 
given: in the irrelevant.”49  In other words, the manifest banality of style’s deployment in 
Western culture conceals the discursive and material violence against gays and lesbians 
that style authorizes, harming not only those sexual subjects who are its objects or who 
are perceived to be its objects but also doing discursive violence to everyone who is 
unable to step outside its cognitive framework which tells us all exactly what to think 
when we encounter a producer of excessive style. 
 Barthes’ initial solution to the problem of power’s hold on the “insignificance” of 
style is to praise the arrival of what he calls “white writing,” an écriture different in kind 
from normal writing that aspires to a zero degree of style.  It seems to me, however, that 
the Barthes of Writing Degree Zero is prematurely conciliatory, a Barthes who surrenders 
much too quickly to the normalizing forces that saturate the discourse of style.  In rushing 
to embrace a zero degree of writing, writing that claims to banish the personality of the 
author from the literary signs of her text, Barthes is both giving up the fight and 
proposing a solution that now seems quite impossible.50  White writing is just another 
self-deluding fantasy since as Sontag points out, “everyone knows or claims to know, 
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there is no neutral, absolutely transparent style.”51  What we need instead of a different 
kind of writing is a different kind of critical practice.  We need a reading practice that 
does not flee from style, that does not seek to change the objects of its focus but that re-
examines its own dubiously complacent relation to style.  What we need is a reformed 
critical practice that values the eccentricities of individual style but does not reproduce 
and reinforce the operations of power/knowledge over it.  What we need, in short, is to 
decouple style from normalization while also seeking to understand the powerful 
influence of readerly desire on how we experience the phenomenon we call style. 
 At this point, it may be useful to sum up the conclusions so far before moving on 
to a consideration of the most important discourse – psychoanalysis – that has helped to 
give rise to these conditions in which style finds itself an active player.  We began with 
the proposition that the concept of style underwent a radical change in the latter half of 
the 19th century, changing from an understanding in which style is conceived as surplus 
ornament added onto content to a new model under which style is seen to reveal the 
subject’s truth.  We also saw how style has increased its influence in a wide expanse of 
culture through a double movement of veiling its object and of making that ambiguous 
object simultaneously transparent to “common sense.”  Common sense, however, proves 
to be just another instance of the familiar unmarked norm, the provisional term in 
contrast to which every instance of style is an instance of deviance.  Barthes, in 
particular, shows the insidious way the reign of the linguistic norm is used to discredit 
those linguistic modes or styles that are not representative of clarity, differentiating one 
individual from another while insisting in the final reckoning on a moral hierarchy.  Style 
is a tool that, to adopt Foucault’s terminology, “measures in quantitative terms and 
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hierarchizes in terms of value the abilities, the level, the ‘nature’ of individuals.”52  But 
by what means precisely does style become linked not only with excess and moral 
transgression but with sexual deviance?  In the remainder of the chapter I discuss the 
sexual inflection that style has undergone in the course of the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries, focusing in particular on psychoanalysis’ powerful intervention into the origin 
and sexual meaning of style. 
IV. Psychologizing Style 
 Criticism’s reliable figuration of style as sexual deviance and moral failure falls 
squarely under what Arnold Davidson terms the “psychiatric style of reasoning.”53  This 
psychiatric style of reasoning, what others including Foucault have often called simply 
“the psychological,” positions sexuality as the cornerstone of understanding of the subject 
and creates a new “conceptual space” dedicated to an intellectual project dedicated to 
classifying and explaining perversion.  Within that epistemological orientation, arising as 
it does in the latter part of the 19th century, one discourse in particular – psychoanalysis – 
participates most relentlessly in the interweaving of style and perversion, ultimately 
going on to inject its psychiatric prerogatives into a wide range of discourses including, 
of course, stylistics.   
 Whatever our personal opinions about the efficacy of psychoanalytic therapy or 
the value of psychoanalytic hermeneutics, it is ultimately impossible to understand 20th 
century criticism without accounting for the influence Freud has had in shaping our 
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culture-wide psychiatric style of interpretation.54  Joan Copjec is right to insist, therefore, 
that “psychoanalysis is the mother tongue of our modernity and that the important issues 
of our time are scarcely articulable outside the concepts it has forged.”55  Our most 
pressing concerns and critical preoccupations cannot but be engaged in the vernacular of 
psychoanalysis, so deeply has it infiltrated our very ways of knowing and being.  Though 
we may critique the often troubling effects of psychoanalysis as a therapeutic endeavor, 
we cannot fail to account for the profound conceptual shift psychoanalysis has been 
instrumental in producing and, as Freud says, “employ the currency that is in use in the 
country one is exploring – in our case a neurotic currency.”56  So ingrained is 
psychoanalysis in our modes of thinking that we must meet psychoanalysis on its own 
terms, we must use our culture’s neurotic currency (psychoanalysis itself) if we have any 
hope of understanding how we create and understand our cultural artifacts. 
 The psychiatric shift is especially hard to detect because psychoanalysis has 
become so powerful under the sign of its own weakening.  As a discourse that is 
continually under attack from all sides, psychoanalysis would seem to be a battered and 
bruised epistemological system.  However, “the historical good fortunes of 
psychoanalysis,” as Paul Morrison writes, “are in no way contingent on anyone’s 
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conscious commitment to it.”57  Psychoanalysis has become all the more effective an 
interpretive enterprise precisely because we need no longer subscribe in any official way 
to its orthodoxy for it to sustain its hold over our imaginations – better, in fact, for 
psychoanalysis that we do not.  For in that case “what begins as a therapeutic practice is 
quickly liberated from the specific context of its exercise; what emerges is a general 
hermeneutic only tenuously bound to its theoretical premises; what triumphs is a 
ubiquitous, exculpatory, and quasi-instinctual form of sexual knowingness.”58  If 
psychoanalysis is in fact the mother tongue of our modernity, Morrison suggests that it is 
a tongue spoken not just in the high-minded sense that Copjec means, as a language that 
reveals to us the deepest theoretical insights about our modern condition, but that it is all 
the more importantly also a common tongue, a vulgar argot that we all even 
unknowingly speak.  Psychoanalysis “becomes all the more powerful for its 
vulgarization,” all the more powerful for the way it saturates every aspect of culture, the 
way it has made vulgar Freudians of us all.59  The psychoanalytic perpective requires not 
at all that any individual choose it; instead psychoanalysis is an ambient phenomenon, 
infecting, as Freud himself prophesied, Western thought and its modes of intelligibility.60 
 Psychoanalysis is, as I’ve been arguing, especially important for our present 
purposes in that it is a discourse that helps create and that depends upon the two 
constructions at the heart of this project: homosexuality and style.  Psychoanalytic theory 
is a laboratory, then, that in a double move, both constitutes how we understand the two 
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categories – style and homosexuality – and collides the two, associating them so that each 
becomes a symptom of the other.  These two central psychoanalytic concepts also share 
the role of what Diana Fuss has called “an indispensable interior exclusion,” an exclusion 
that constitutes the authoritative, unmarked norms from which style and homosexuality 
are excluded.61  Freud, as we know, provides the model for culturally sanctioned forms of 
articulation entirely through his analysis of the illegitimate modes.  He pieced together 
the operations of the normal mind only by listening to the speech of the ill: the hysteric, 
the obsessional, the madman, the homosexual.  Freud’s psychology, and by extension 
modernity as an effect of his writings, is therefore built on top of a norm (call it 
colloquial or prosaic, heterosexual or genital) whose contours are visible only negatively, 
known through its difference from those abnormalities that it is not.  The norm is that 
way of speaking, as Barthes suggests, that coincides with an undefined, in some 
fundamental way non-existent, yet generally accepted mode of representation we call 
“clarity.”62  Yet as he points out, “universality, which is nothing but current usage, is 
faked.”63  Universality is a fake, a fraud, but a fraud that is nonetheless extremely 
powerful in its regulatory force.  The style-less, heterosexual norm is a fantasy to which 
we cling, a fantasy that depends for its very life on creating those “others,” those with 
style, those perverts who in turn verify its illusory straightness.64  Clarity, like 
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heterosexuality, is the culturally privileged yet dependent term; its immanence is 
fraudulent. 
 To point out that Freud’s model of stylistic clarity is a fake would seem to 
undermine psychoanalysis’s powerful conception of style.  That this fake exists precisely 
as an unmarked, unrepresented standard, however, is what makes it so effective a 
regulatory device.  As Morrison reminds us, “exclusion from representation is 
conventionally held to be the unhappy fate of the socially marginal or the sexually 
aberrant.  Exemption from representation, Foucault counters, is the singular privilege of 
the normative.”65  Psychoanalysis’ standard of clarity, its zero degree of stylistic 
aberrance, is a normative standard precisely because the norm is itself exempted from 
representation.  Like heterosexuality, the clearly told story is the one that both need not 
and dare not speak its name.  Since Freud argues most famously in Civilization and Its 
Discontents that the mere fact of civilization makes all of us at least partly neurotic, there 
can never be anyone, it follows, whose narrative does not contain even a hint of 
symptomatic style.  To try to give representation to the standard of clarity is impossible 
since a neurotic civilization is by definition incapable of producing a “healthy,” clear 
narrative in the first place.  Instead it is by keeping quiet, remaining unseen as an intuitive 
ideal towards which each of us can advance only asymptotically that the norm secures its 
regulatory efficacy. 
 The regulatory force of the stylistic norm (zero degree: clarity) nonetheless 
requires not only a theoretical norm but more importantly the abject case in order to 
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constitute the order that limit makes possible.66  The abject is, as Fuss explains, “an 
outside which is inside interiority making the articulation of the latter possible, a 
transgression of the border which is necessary to constitute the border as such.”67  For if 
homosexuality, as I argue, is conceptually linked to those cases of stylistic excess that we 
find, for example in Freud’s case histories, then homosexuality constitutes the idea of 
style as perversion.  No mere symptom of the essence of homosexuality that lies beneath, 
style is involved in a mutually constitutive relationship with homosexuality, according to 
Freud.  The two are twin axes of deviance that in turn produce their “negative” 
counterparts.  Style is not only the opposite of clarity but it is structured as well by the 
homo/hetero divide.  In the absence of the stylistically “normal” that psychoanalysis 
cannot but omit, thrives the hyperbolically represented, omnipresent homosexual style 
that allows us to conceive of language everywhere as normal or as perverse.  While Freud 
reports an abundance of sick style that appears to be abjected from representation as that 
which obscures what it is meant to represent, homosexual style is what makes all style 
legible as style, that is as difference, in the first place by representing what is supposed to 
be outside of representation. 
 Communication full of style, Freud tells us, is communication that violates the 
rules of clarity as we find them in the case history, the autobiography, the 19th century 
novel.  (Imagine the slap in the face of the autobiography in which the author dares to not 
tell you a coherent version of his life!).  In the Dora case, Freud explains that the start of 
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analysis is always to ask “the patient to give me the whole story of his life and illness, but 
even so the information I receive is never enough to let me see my way about the case.  
The first account may be compared to an unnavigable river whose stream is at one 
moment choked by masses of rock and at another divided and lost among shallows and 
sandbanks.”68  At analysis’s beginning, the unhealthy patient cannot produce a clear 
account of her own life; clarity escapes her attempt to master it.  Instead she relates an 
incomplete story, one fragmented by the idiosyncrasies of the psyche.  Another way of 
putting it: the analysand’s style, her particular expression, hinders her ability to be clear.  
Catherine Clément, in fact, describes the unconscious’s greatest strength as its talent for 
creating style: “the unconscious is such a brilliant writer: it comes up with wonderful 
slips, endlessly makes up puns; it is an inexhaustible source of linguistic inventions.  The 
unconscious metaphorizes, metonymizes, rhetoricizes like mad, innovates, invents 
neologisms.”69  The unconscious, in short, stylizes speech.  So though the patient “can, 
indeed, give the physician plenty of coherent information about this or that period of their 
illness … it is sure to be followed by another period in which their communications run 
dry, leaving gaps unfilled, and riddles unanswered.”70  The very way that the patient 
gives voice to her story - her style - thus both hinders clear transmission and yet makes 
perfectly clear the existence of sickness in its symptomatic “gaps unfilled, riddles 
unanswered.”  A motto for psychoanalysis: where excessive style is, there too something 
is awry.  Freud puts style at the center of analytic practice when he sums up the problem 
of analysis as “the patient’s inability to give an ordered history of their life in so far as it 
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coincides with the history of their illness.”71  That problem is not one that completely 
obstructs a reader’s access to the analysand’s history, however; style makes clear that 
she’s got something to hide. 
 Central to psychoanalysis’ understanding of representation is the belief that style 
displays a shameful truth that it both confesses and resists confessing (through the 
defenses, for example).  Style covers over the social humiliation of inner deviance even 
as it makes the story of that deviance painfully clear.  Style refuses to argue, as Miller 
says, and therefore it is stuck in the position of having “almost nothing to say for itself.”72  
That almost nothing to say, however, is all the evidence we need to know that beneath 
style’s clever tricks lies a deeply shameful existence.  Style is a defense, Miller suggests, 
against the shame that comes with that identity’s unmasking; it is a technology for what 
Miller calls “shame management.”73  But that technology is faulty because it is one that 
cannot but bear the signs of the spoiled identity within.74  As always, though, style 
confesses a deeper truth.  It is, as Miller says, engaged in the “unremitting labor of 
managing and masking this encryption” of its own shame, a task at which it is ultimately 
bound to fail.75 
 The apparently self-evident truth of psychoanalysis’ understanding of style (of 
course, why shouldn’t we be suspicious of the shifty character who cannot even give us 
an understandable explanation of his life?) tells us much about how style has historically 
been used and continues to be used to deny certain subjects an equal claim to humanity 
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based on a normalizing linguistic standard, a standard that is as we have seen handcuffed 
to sexuality.76  Underlying Freud’s formulation in the Dora case is the assumption that 
every human life has a legible story, that every individual existence is at least potentially 
clear, and that every life story is assimilible to a single model of narrative coherence.77  
For those subjects who do not meet the demands of this norm, Freud suggests psychic 
disturbance, caused as always by sexuality and legible in the patient’s expression.  “Freud 
proceeds to specify,” Steven Marcus observes, precisely “what it is that is wrong with the 
stories his patients tell him.  The difficulties are in the first instance formal shortcomings 
of narrative.”78  The problem we encounter in the sick person is not simply a problem of 
narrative, though, not just that the sick person cannot tell a story, but rather a problem of 
the expression of that narrative, what we have been calling its style.  Marcus rightly 
observes that clarity and coherence are requisite for mental health and that anything less 
in unnatural: 
Freud is implying that a coherent story is in some manner connected with mental health 
(at the very least, with the absence of hysteria), and this in turn implies assumptions of 
the broadest and deepest kind about both the nature of coherence and the form and 
structure of human life.  On this reading, human life is, ideally, a connected and coherent 
story, with all the details in explanatory place, and with everything (or as close to 
everything as is practically possible) accounted for, in its proper causal or other sequence.  
And inversely, illness amounts at least in part to suffering from an incoherent story of an 
inadequate narrative account of oneself.79 
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On this reading, to have lived a truly healthy human life one must overcome the 
idiosyncrasies of style, and produce a clear, understandable, retrospective story about 
how one has come to be the person one is.  Truly these are “assumptions of the broadest 
and deepest kind” about what it means to share a common humanity. 
 What should be clear by now is that what at first glance looks to be an objective 
aesthetic category proves to have much wider ramifications.  Marcus’ reading eloquently 
shows that a simple “linguistic” problem like style’s disruption of the coherence of 
narrative actually has the effect of delimiting the field of the human and of the abject.  
Douglas Crimp reminds us that “humanity is not a universal and natural condition of 
being but a contingent and cultural construction of historical, social, linguistic, and 
psychic forces.”80  Psychoanalysis as a historical, social, linguistic and psychic force has 
been particularly effective in the case of style in producing a standard that divides the 
abnormal from the normal.  What psychoanalysis invents and installs in culture is the 
belief that there is a “normal” way of telling a story, free from the vicissitudes of 
individual style, even if we never find an example of a normal story in all of Freud.  Even 
if he insists time and again that we are all to a greater or lesser degree neurotic and 
therefore all possessed of at least some style, Freud’s insistence does little to mitigate the 
cultural normalization of which style is one particularly subtle part.  In such a 
normalizing culture, style makes us understand all too much 
 In the Dora case, however, Freud never explicitly pins the mark of sickness on 
style.  It is instead in those texts where issues of language and representation stand at the 
center of his understanding of subjectivity, those texts not coincidentally that Lacan will 
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return to time and time again, that Freud begins to elaborate a more clearly stylistic 
understanding of the psyche.  In The Interpretation of Dreams, The Psychopathology of 
Everyday Life, and Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious, we encounter an 
encyclopedia of linguistic symptomatology: parapraxes, jokes, puns, deviant syntax, as 
well as their closely related somatic iterations.  Psychoanalysis provides here a medical 
model of narrative in which the symptoms of sexual perversion are stylistic.  Freud may 
not discuss style in precisely these same terms but his grouping of these symptomatic (I 
would say stylistic insofar as they are unique, strange, individual ways of uttering a given 
content) expressions suggests that an acute sensitivity to style is at the heart of the 
analyst’s reading practice.  The analyst’s very purpose is to tune herself to the “jumble” 
of style and help the patient to steer that jumble closer to, as Clément describes it, 
“nothing but traditional story-telling, with all the loose ends tied up, at best slickly 
arranged.  Old style.”81 
 Freud’s most concentrated meditation on style comes not in his discussions of 
neurotic speech but rather in the joke book, that seemingly divergent text that attempts to 
explain the phenomenon of joking in psychoanalytic terms.  From Freud’s perspective, 
however, the joke book is no trivial matter; in it he interrogates at length the linguistic 
transformations the unconscious utilizes in order to make objectionable material 
acceptable to consciousness.  Although he takes on an unusual topic, Freud carefully 
argues for the relatedness of all mental processes, putting the psychological discoveries 
gained through his interrogation of joking (a “remote field”) at the center of mental life.   
 The joke, like the dream, makes it possible for the individual to express what 
cannot be expressed – material barred from consciousness.  By condensing its linguistic 
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material, say for instance in a pun or double entendre, the joke circumvents the obstacle 
to its expression, for example, the pressures of institutions, individuals, morality or 
religion.  The joke technique, more specifically, gives novelty to language in order to 
express through condensation two thoughts in a single form.  In other words, as in a 
dream or slip of the tongue, a single expression conveys plural meanings.  The joke 
works by finding: 
The one word which covers the two thoughts.  Indeed, it must often first transform one of 
the thoughts into an unusual form which will provide a basis for its combination with the 
second thought.  Would it not have been simpler, easier, and, in fact, more economical to 
have expressed the two thoughts as they happened to come, even if this involved no 
common form of expression?82 
 
In place of the straightforward utterance of the two thoughts, forbidden in their 
connection with each other, the unconscious substitutes an economically disadvantageous 
but psychically advantageous stylization of the material.  What Freud’s formulation 
assumes, it follows, is that there is a clear, unambiguous way to communicate the two 
thoughts, albeit one that the conscious mind cannot face.  The mechanisms of the 
unconscious, however, distort that clear expression by giving it style and making it 
sayable.  That stylization is, in fact, precisely what makes a joke a joke: 
A joke is not anything that resides in its thought, we must look for it [what makes a joke] 
in the form, in the wording in which it is expressed.  We have only to study the 
peculiarity of its form of expression to grasp what may be termed the verbal or expressive 
technique.83 
 
In essence, the medium of the joke is the message; peculiarity of expression is the joke’s 
hallmark. 
 If it is true as Freud claims that the joke technique is analogous to the other 
mental processes, then the conclusions he draws about formal expression should apply as 
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well to other indexes of unconscious operation: symptoms, dreams, and especially the 
speech of the neurotic.  For if we re-consider what Freud has to say in the Dora case 
about speaking to neurotics, it should be clear that the “peculiarity of its form of 
expression” is the unconscious’ means of communicating forbidden or repressed material 
in an acceptable way, in Dora’s case, her unconscious desire for the lecherous Herr K.  
Just as the unconscious stylizes the joke, so too does the unconscious stylize the 
neurotic’s language.  If the constitutive feature of the joke is peculiarity of form, that is to 
say style, then so too is it the constitutive feature of pathological language, language as 
an effect of sexual deviance. 
 What is perhaps most peculiar about Freud’s understanding of style is the way in 
which he seems at once to want to generalize style as an effect of sublimation that is 
common to all people, as in the mechanism of humor or the joke, and the way he also 
cordons style off as a special domain of homosexuality.  Clément argues that “the 
historical roots of psychoanalysis lie in certain forms of homosexuality: Dora, Schreber, 
the hysterics.  Psychoanalysis began with inversion.”84  It makes sense then that Freud 
should remain beholden to a line of thinking that returns as though compelled to 
inversion as the root from which style as a symptom of paraphillia springs.  For Freud 
and to an even greater degree his disciples, what functions as an elaborate balancing act 
cannot ultimately be sustained and collapses finally and seemingly irrevocably into a 
state in which style and homosexuality become crossed in such a way as to make them 
virtually indistinguishable from each other.  Freud often remarks, we may recall, on the 
artistic and humanitarian sensitivity that homosexual men in particular are thought to 
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share.  Yet that casual stereotyping flowers in Western thought after Freud such that what 
seemed to be mere cultural superstition in the closing years of the 19th century (as we will 
see vividly in our analysis of the work of Henry James in chapter three) takes on medico-
scientific certainty in the 20th century under the auspices of psychoanalytic expertise. 85  
Simon Watney identifies this trend in Freud, signaling out Freud’s belief that “the 
constitution of people suffering from inversion – the homosexuals – is, indeed, often 
distinguished by their sexual instinct’s possessing a special aptitude for cultural 
sublimation.”86  In this remark Watney points out “the emergence of the homosexual as 
aesthete, his sensibilities sanctioned by his sexual object-choice.”87  Yet what we also 
find is the scientific systematization of the notion embraced and extended by stylistics – 
the notion analyzed at length earlier – that style as a “special aptitude” is always an easily 
legible index of one’s sexual disposition.  A highly developed sense of literary style is no 
mere compensation for those “suffering from inversion” as Freud suggests in numerous 
places.  Rather, as psychoanalysis and the culture it has so heavily influenced conceive it, 
style is as unmistakable an indicator as any of conscious or unconscious homosexual 
object-choice. 
 If it is true that psychoanalysis scientifically certifies the understanding of 
homosexuals as those with style it is not just psychoanalysis alone that establishes this 
cultural assumption more broadly.  As Lee Edelman points out, the construction of 
homosexuality is as much dependent on psychoanalysis as it is on rhetoric, and an 
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effective political critique requires us to attend both to the psychological and rhetorical 
construction of homosexuality, that is, the psychological input of psychoanalysis and the 
rhetorical input of stylistics.  As Edelman argues, “when homosexuality is no longer 
understood as a discrete set of acts but as an ‘indiscrete anatomy,’ we are in the presence 
of a powerful tropological imperative that needs to produce a visible emblem or metaphor 
for the ‘singular’ nature that now defines or identifies a specifically homosexual type of 
person.”88  That requirement of visibility subjects homosexuality and those perceived to 
be homosexual to the ceaseless demand of what Edelman calls “inherent Textuality,” that 
they be made to be “bodies that might well bear a ‘hallmark’ that could, and must, be 
read.”89  In other words, style is one means by which the twin projects of cultural rhetoric 
and cultural psychology combine to textualize the homosexual, to trap it as that which 
always signifies in excess of itself in opposition to the untextualization – “exemption 
from representation” as Morrison styles it – of heterosexuality.  The political exigency of 
such a process is to create an environment in which 
Homosexuality has thus been able to reinforce the status of its own authority as “natural” 
(i.e., unmarked, authentic, and non-representational) by defining the straight body against 
the “threat” of an “unnatural” homosexuality – a “threat” the more effectively mobilized 
by generating concern about homosexuality’s unnerving (and strategically manipulable) 
capacity to “pass,” to remain invisible, in order to call into being a variety of disciplinary 
“knowledges” through which homosexuality might be recognized, exposed, and 
ultimately rendered, more ominously, invisible once more.90 
 
Heterosexist discourse thus effectively stylizes homosexuality, depicts it as excessively 
expressive, in order to discredit any possibility of oppositional speech by making 
homosexuality “invisible once more,” to the juggernaut of heterosexual supremacy. 
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 Harold Beaver in his seminal article “Homosexual Signs (In Memory of Roland 
Barthes)” anticipates Edelman’s incisive claims to homosexual textuality as he details the 
specific way in which stylistics and psychoanalysis collude to shape style as the specific 
province of queers.  As Beaver says, explaining the more short-sighted claims of George 
Steiner, it is because of the prominence of homosexuality and style both as descriptive 
categories in Freud’s thinking that the two so repeatedly come to signify together in 
Western thought and the reason they so often seem to be together at the center of our 
cultural galaxy: 
Like jokers, dreamers, poets, and neurotics, homosexuals too (we have seen) are 
producers of signs.  As Tzvetan Todorov has argued, it is the so-called deviants, above 
all, who are the agents of culture, actively extending the rhetoric of sign systems.  They 
are the purveyors of change.  Though relegated to the borderlands and sick ghettos of 
bourgeois culture (with other scapegoats and victims), the homosexual’s role, far from 
parasitic, is central: as index of a cultural complexity and self-awareness (in all symbolic 
activities, including language) that floods traditional discourse with irrational needs and 
desires.  It was precisely through his investigation of dreams and jokes as archetypes of 
condensation and displacement that Freud rediscovered the symbolic and rhetorical 
structures of language in general.91 
 
Beaver captures perfectly the prevailing mood represented in no less historically 
significant a figure than Todorov that homosexual deviants are the agents of linguistic 
change, a point that makes queers into avant garde figures who shake up or “flood” 
traditional discourse with their “irrational needs and desires.”  And while that may, 
depending upon one’s point of view and political inclinations sound like a good thing, it 
also explains the terrifying linguistic threat that queers pose to heteronormative culture, a 
threat that they will, as their old scientific classification implies, invert the order of 
traditional discourse and subvert the values upon which marriage, family, nation, 
capitalism, and any number of other heteronormative institutions are thought to be built.  
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For that reason alone we could expect the swift response of culture to that perceived 
threat, moving rapidly to contain its contagion in the “borderlands and sick ghettoes” 
from which it is safely removed from the homogenized traditional discourse of the West.  
Read together, style and homosexuality are defused, even castrated and rendered 
powerless as the objects rather than the subjects of knowledge, dynamic cultural agents 
that are both frantically restrained by heteronormative discourse.  However much lip 
service we pay to style (or even to homosexuality for that matter) as a sophisticated way 
of being, as Joseph Litvak makes clear, “the negative meaning persists within the 
positive, with the result that even the most celebratory invocations of sophistication as 
worldliness remain haunted by the guilty sense of sophistication as a deviation from, even 
a crime against, nature.”92  Style, like sophistication, transgresses as a crime against 
nature by threatening to linguistically transform culture – the supposedly dependent 
overlay of the natural – through its own irrational, narcissistic and self-serving desire. 
 What is the alternative to reading style as a marker of interiority, as a sign of what 
lies beneath?  Certainly I’ve argued that in our culture it is impossible to be, as they say, 
all style and no substance, and that it should be otherwise.  In the following chapter I will 
outline a different critical approach, one that values the difference that is conceived of as 
inherent to style while at the same time not reducing style to depth or falling victim to the 
seductions of normalization.  It is a reading practice that values the idiosyncrasy of 
expression and yet allows for style to be a site of play, of freedom, of pleasure and even 
of cultural transformation.  In short, in what is to come I offer an oppositional way of 
reading style that challenges the prevailing understanding of style as a signifier of desire 
and instead makes of it a category more free from the phobic restraints of normativity.
                                                 









Lacan and the Subject of Style 
 
 
At the very least, popular notions of homosexual identity and homosexual orientation 
today tend to insist on the conjunction of sexual morphology and sexual subjectivity: they 
presume a convergence in the sexual actor of a deviant personal style with a deviant 
erotic desire. 
David Halperin, “Forgetting Foucault” 
 
We know full well that the “creative mind” is always under “the jurisdiction of the 
police” and that the purpose of such policing is to protect the constitutive boundaries of 
the face by which the social order figures itself to itself; one might say that this policing 
bespeaks the extent to which the symbolic order is mobilized to defend an imaginary self-
image against those forces that are seen as threatening to unmask it as always only 
imaginary. 
Lee Edelman, Homographesis 
 
As I argued in the last chapter, both popular and critical opinions about style as a 
key marker of homosexuality have the psychoanalytic tradition and its understanding of 
the symptomatology of language to thank for giving scientific authority to what was at 
least at first only a vaguely defined stereotype.  If that is the case then one of the most 
important tasks for reformulating our culture’s understanding of style to produce a more 
progressive literary criticism is how we can set about refiguring our relationship to what 
psychoanalysis has to say about style and to try to see how psychoanalysis’s 
understanding of style is actually a lot more complex than what has trickled into popular 
ideas about style.  The work of this chapter is to complicate the too simple understanding 
that much of stylistic criticism has of style and sexual identity in order to show that 
certain branches of psychoanalytic thinking at least diverge dramatically from stylistic 
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criticism’s notion that one can indeed infer a lot about a person’s sexual identity from her 
or his style. 
It is crucial for us, first of all, to launch a counter-strike against the dominant line 
of thought that has for so long conjoined style and the presumption of the self-indulgent 
linguistic excess of homosexual narcissism.  After all, Freud – to say nothing of his 
followers – was not the least bit shy about touting the claim that style gives away, marks 
the incriminating spot, of a homosexual disposition, a theory advanced prominently both 
in the Dora case as well as in the monograph on Leonardo da Vinci; nor did he show 
much apparent restraint in disseminating the widely embraced notion – a notion that he 
himself was unable to theorize completely even in the long essay “On Narcissism” – that 
homosexuality stems from the emergence of what he calls a “secondary narcissism,” a 
love for one’s own ego that motivates the subject to seek out objects that mirror back at 
him his own idealized self-conception as embodied in same-sex partners.93   Though as 
we will see in the following chapter that these related aesthetic and psychosexual ideas 
were already at least partly taking shape in the Anglo-American West by the 1880s and 
find representation in the works of Henry James for instance, it was the psychological 
establishment that would take the incompletely formulated affiliation between style and 
sexuality that was to inform writers like James at the end of the 19th century and later 
with more certainty Ernest Hemingway and Gertrude Stein, and give that bond the 
authority of scientific, of medical, irrefutability.  The crucial point as I argued in the 
previous chapter, though, is that these two psychoanalytic ideas – style as a symptom of 
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homosexuality and homosexuality as narcissism – are frequently joined in that enterprise 
we know as stylistic analysis, a point clearly illustrated in the work of many of the 
stylistic critics we saw in the previous chapter.94  That joint results in the dangerous 
envisioning of what Lee Edelman calls in a different context the homosexual as “the 
figure associated in the popular mind with specularity or narcissism and in 
psychoanalytic discourse with the love of the imaginary as manifest in that figure’s 
identification with the mother.”95 
The work of this chapter is designed to challenge the prevailing reception of the 
psychoanalytic inheritance by stylistic criticism with its stubborn belief in the 
homosexual expression of style.  I do this not by suggesting that we divorce ourselves 
completely from psychoanalysis because, as I explain in chapter five, certain aspects of 
psychoanalysis as a theory of sexuality and sexual difference can be useful to us when 
viewed askew in a different ideological context.  In addition, I am skeptical as to whether 
a project that is as dedicated to a psychoanalytic approach – however informally – as 
stylistics can ever really be addressed except in the terms that it understands, using its 
own currency as Freud puts it so well.  What I do want to contest, however, is the easy 
and bigoted assimilation of some of Freud’s most dogmatic ideas about the relationship 
between homosexuality and style by that corrupted discipline, stylistics.  In this chapter I 
argue that psychoanalysis’ theories of style and homosexuality, especially as represented 
in the revisionary work of French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, have not only been 
misrepresented in their simplicity by many popular and literary critics but also that if we 
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look closely at what Lacan has to say on the subject that we actually end up with virtually 
the opposite understanding of style’s supposed expression of sexuality.  In fact, by 
analyzing his work we will see that Lacan himself produced an under-recognized theory 
of style at odds with much widespread Freudian doctrine and that it can be a counter-
reading of style that is of great use for the crucial goal of queer critique’s challenge of 
stylistic criticism.  By way of Lacan, then, I will argue that much of stylistics’ 
understanding of sexuality is not only incoherent but is also misguided and that we can 
by following his lead in fact de-couple style from the normalizing agenda of much 
stylistic critique while still valuing the individual, even eccentric richness of stylistic 
expression. 
Freud was no stranger to a thesis of homosexual narcissism that crops up time and 
again over the years in his work.  Among the earliest instances is in a 1910 footnote 
added to Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality in which he declares that inverts “take 
themselves as their sexual object.  That is to say, they proceed from a narcissistic basis.”96  
Freud would develop this theory further in an aesthetic context, though, in his study of da 
Vinci.  There he writes of the male homosexual that as a child,  
The boy represses his love for his mother: he puts himself in her place, identifies himself 
with her, and takes her own person as a model in whose likeness he chooses the new 
objects of his love.  In this way he has become a homosexual.  What he has in fact done is 
to step back to auto-erotism: for the boys whom he now loves as he grows up are after all 
only substitute figures and revivals of himself in childhood – boys whom he loved in the 
way in which his mother loved him when he was a child.  He finds the objects of his love 
along the path of narcissism.97 
 
Countless critics, of course, have written about the degree to which Freud considers this 
homosexual narcissism a “bad” thing or not, analyzing everything from the notorious 
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1915 footnote to Three Essays that argues that everyone is capable of and has already 
unconsciously made a homosexual object-choice to the letter Freud wrote to a concerned 
American mother of a gay son trying to put her worries about his sexuality at ease.98  
What is clear, though, is that even if Freud only considered homosexuality just one kind 
of variation of human sexuality, many of his followers had more sinister motives.  And at 
any rate, as Juliet Mitchell points out, the very selection of the term “narcissism” implies 
a disastrous fate, one in which it is tough “for the person not to end up in the vicious 
circle in which Narcissus found himself.”99 
 What is especially significant about the appearance of this discussion of the 
narcissistic etiology of homosexuality in Freud’s analysis of da Vinci – though we must 
point out that Freud seems to think this theory holds true only for the male variety – is 
that it is a text that sets out to explain da Vinici’s artistic greatness.  Freud admires da 
Vinci and in fact attributes his artistic achievement precisely to his homosexuality, a 
sexuality that Freud claims da Vinci repressed and that re-emerged positively into his art 
and other work.  As Freud explains, “in Leonardo’s case we have had to maintain the 
view that the accident of his illegitimate birth and the excessive tenderness of his mother 
had the most decisive influence on the formation of his character and on his later fortune, 
since the sexual repression which set in after this phase of childhood caused him to 
sublimate his sexual libido.”100  In this remarkable piece of writing Freud makes the case 
that it is homosexuality that is responsible for empowering da Vinci with the ability to 
make artistic gains.  For if Leonardo were not the narcissistic homosexual Freud believes 
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him to have been then he would presumably have not sublimated his sexuality in the 
same way.  It is one early version, then, of the popular modern notion of the innate 
artisticness of gay men.  But as a treatise on aesthetics it also implicates homosexuality 
directly in the material production of the work of art.  This is important because as we 
saw in the last chapter in a discussion of Freud’s formulation of stylized language as a 
symptom of homosexuality, it is clear that there is an attempt on Freud’s part to argue 
that homosexuality is responsible for the production of style by the individual.  It is 
unclear to what extent Freud has any conscious motive for suggesting this idea but I am 
inclined to think that for whatever reasons Freud tried to theorize along these lines, the 
real damage was done not by Freud, who seems to genuinely respect da Vinci, but rather 
by those critics and other agents of popular culture who would seize on this point and 
hypostatize it in Western discourse.  Regardless of Freud’s intentions, then, he made 
available a scientifically certified theory of style’s narcissistically homosexual origin to 
those agents who would later release it as a more free-floating and “common sense” 
intuition. 
 One of the most effective ways to challenge this culturally saturating presumption 
would be to interrogate the theory of narcissism upon which it depends.  Michael Warner 
begins this work by analyzing the internally incoherent nature of psychoanalytic notions 
of narcissism even as he provides a polemical explanation of how that idea has been used 
to marginalize gay people and to protect straight ones.  For example, Warner points out 
that “psychoanalytic theory has from the beginning described homosexuality – especially 
among men – as a version of narcissism … [b]ut there has never been a sustained critique 
of the premises behind Freud’s judgment, on this issue so widely taken as common 
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sense.”101  Warner complains of Freud’s theory that in it he only ever describes 
homosexuality in a condescending and normative way even while he is unable to 
recognize its logical self-contradictions.  For the homosexual, Warner argues, is 
interested in people and objects outside of himself in exactly the way that a true narcissist 
is not.  For all their stereotypical promiscuity, homosexuals do have relations with 
outside objects and therefore this homophobic stereotype strangely returns to refute 
logically the Freudian charge of narcissism.  As the precipitating condition for the 
creation of style, then, homosexuality would not qualify as narcissism and therefore 
would not in and of itself create the self-involved and therefore only private, self-
indulgent language that means to speak only to, for, and about the narcissist’s self-love.  
The homosexual, in fact, would presumably write with the same motives as any other sort 
of object-directed person: to communicate, to entertain, to persuade, to woo, etc. 
 In Lacan there is a similarly radical de-emphasis of the moral distinction between 
homosexuality and heterosexuality as a result of his expansion rather than contraction of 
the notion of narcissism.  Lacan describes the homosexual not as the pathetic creature 
consumed by an endless self-love but as no more or less narcissistic than any old straight 
person.  “In doing so,” Warner explains, “he definitively removed any possibility of 
making narcissism a basis for a normative hierarchy between hetero- and homosexuality.  
Homosexuality may indeed be a way of loving one’s own ego, but so is heterosexual 
romance.”102  This universalizing of narcissism by Lacan is perversely one of the most 
liberating theoretical contributions he makes to overthrowing stylistic critique’s single-
minded association between style and homosexuality.  If, as stylistics often believes but 
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rarely admits, the love of one’s own ego that is supposed to be characteristic of the 
homosexual narcissist is one of the most powerful motivations for the creation of style, 
that belief collapses under its own weight in the light of Lacan’s theory.  We are all 
narcissists, Lacan says, heterosexual and homosexual alike.  But that revelation dissolves, 
then, the stylistic distinction made by any number of critics that would attribute a sexual 
identity of any kind to the creation of style. 
 The ideological purposes for wanting to ignore Lacan’s claim that narcissism is 
the rule rather than the exception when it comes to humans of all sexual stripes may not 
be immediately clear.  But, as Warner rightly points out, psychoanalysis’s raison d’etre 
has historically often been the perpetuation of heteronormative supremacy.  “If the 
equation between homosexuality and narcissism in psychoanalysis tells us anything,” 
Warner says, “it is that the central premises and vocabulary of psychoanalysis have been 
designed for a heterosexist self-understanding.”103  That discourse of self-understanding, 
however, is one that not only punitively discredits the homosexual as a means of 
celebrating its own heterocentric world-view.  It also uses homosexuality as an excessive 
and abjected other in order oppositionally to create itself and its privileged relationship to 
language as a desirable state of being.  In other words, one of the carrots that heterosexist 
discourse offers to join its side is the guarantee that one will have a privileged 
relationship to language, and one of the ways the privilege is enforced is by the circular 
logic of heterosexuality’s claim to straight talk.  The stick heterosexist discourse 
employs, on the other hand, is the threat that one’s language will be de-certified, 
disqualified, and one of the ways that punishment is meted out is in the circular logic of 
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homosexuality’s relegation to the sphere of stylization.  The force of this discursive 
imperative, however, conceals a very different state of affairs as Warner argues: 
The theorization of homosexuality as narcissism is itself a form of narcissism peculiar to 
modern heterosexuality.  The central imperative of heterosexist ideology is that the 
homosexual be supposed to be out of dialogue on the subject of his being.  Imagining that 
the homosexual is narcissistically contained in an unbreakable fixation on himself serves 
two functions at once: it allows a self-confirming pathology by declaring homosexuals’ 
speech, their interrelations, to be an illusion; and more fundamentally it allows the 
constitution of heterosexuality as such.104 
 
Warner’s critique cleverly inverts classical psychoanalysis’s theorization of 
homosexuality to show how heterosexual discourse’s narcissistic disavowal of its own 
narcissism casts aspersions on homosexuality by accusing it of precisely that thing that it 
wants no one to know about itself.  Heterosexuality disowns its own narcissism by 
projecting that narcissism outward onto homosexuality in much the same way one might 
draw attention to a negative flaw in another person so as to distract from that same flaw 
in oneself.  A major purpose of this project, as Warner points out, is not only to protect 
the moral vanity that heterosexuality evinces in its refusal to admit its own narcissism but 
also is to de-legitimize the speech of homosexuals as illusion; and what better way to 
carry that goal out than to shut down homosexuality’s oppositional political content by 
pre-emptively undercutting its style as an exercise in excessive, perverse selfishness?  
Edelman suggests that “homosexuality, then, unforgivably, has the effect of compelling 
heterosexual masculinity to engage in the self-subverting labor of reading and 
interpreting itself, knowing full well that the more susceptible to interpretation it 
acknowledges itself to be, and the farther it gets from its ‘original’ condition as a state of 
‘natural’ self-evidence, the more aggressively it must insist on its absolute 
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indisputability.”105  One of the most effective ways that heterosexuality has of shielding 
itself, however, is by deploying its assertion of its own “natural” relation to language and 
homosexuality’s artificial, styled one.  As such, heterosexuality partly refuses what 
Edelman calls its “textualization,” meaning the opening up of it as a text to “ceaseless 
interrogation by forcing the recognition, first and foremost, that there are always only 
signifiers.”106  In the safe haven of style, heterosexuality has found a means of keeping its 
own textualization partly at bay, insisting on its own transparent, un-styled language and 
homosexuality’s ceaselessly textual one. 
 There are several aspects of Lacan’s thought that make it invaluable for 
subverting this phobic political project, the first of which is that it radically disallows the 
easy accusation of narcissism (and consequently any privileged relationship to language) 
leveled by heterosexist discourse.  For Lacan the relationship between any subject and his 
love-object, be it of the same or another sex, cannot help but be anything but narcissistic 
– “That’s what love is,” he definitively announces.107  He goes on, “Love reopens the 
door – as Freud put it, not mincing words – to perfection.”108  But it reopens the door to 
perfection because in love it always rediscovers a narcissistic love of itself: “It’s one’s 
own ego that one loves in love, one’s own ego made real on the imaginary level.”109  The 
point is that one’s love for an object, whatever its gender, is always really based, and 
perfectly so, on that subject’s love for his own ego.  In love one is captivated by the 
imaginary idealization one makes both of oneself and one’s object, the latter being loved 
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precisely because it enriches the ego’s idealization of itself.  What we so blithely call 
sexual orientation today is not a matter of who is narcissistic and who is not; whatever 
“orientation” we may evince in life, there is but one orientation, an orientation toward the 
imaginary love of our own egos.  “As distinct from other psychoanalytic theories of the 
ego,” as Shoshana Felman explains, “for Lacan the ego is not an autonomous synthetic 
function of the subject, but only the delusion of such a function.  The outcome of a series 
of narcissistic identifications, the ego is the mirror structure of an imaginary, self-
idealizing self-alienation of the subject.”110  In other words, Lacan argues that 
homosexuality has no special place when it comes to narcissism, for every ego is built 
through an accretion of narcissistic identifications and self-delusion.111  And in fact, as 
Warner suggests, it may be heterosexuality that actually evinces the more egregious 
instance of narcissism in that it is unwilling to acknowledge the pride injuring wound of 
its own narcissistic basis.112 
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This notion of the unexceptionalism of homosexuality, while it may not initially 
seem so, is actually a crucial step in arguing against stylistic criticism’s claim to 
understand sexuality.  For where Freud’s formulations were very often normative and led 
to the further stigmatization of queer people both in the medico-psychological world and 
in the public sphere, Lacan is demonstrably less interested in producing diagnostic 
categories for the marginal.  As Ellie Ragland describes it, “Lacanian structures can never 
be reduced to Freud’s positivistic categories according to which an analyst diagnoses 
developmental or cognitive deficiencies as disorders (‘disorder’ itself presupposing a 
category of normal or natural order).”113  Because Lacanian psychoanalysis has a 
different, less positivistic orientation, it has of course often been used by queer critics as a 
way of retaining the most useful insights of psychoanalysis while eschewing the 
problematic diagnostic bent of most other modern forms of psychoanalysis.  The purpose 
of Lacanian psychoanalysis, for example, is not to restore individuals to some normative 
model of mental health, which is not to say that Lacan does not also come to quite a lot of 
potentially disturbing conclusions for queer people.  However, as we saw in the previous 
chapter, where Freud conceived of the goal of the talking cure as restoring the 
analysand’s fractured and stylized speech to the smooth, orderly organization of so-called 
healthy speech, Lacan does not seek to “heal” by coaching towards a more “normal” 
standard.  Instead, as Ragland explains,  
In Lacan’s teaching, the logic of not whole or not all typifies health.  Indeed, one aim of 
analysis is to enable analysands to accept their lack(s) so they can live more 
constructively in the larger space of the social.  Lacan begins by disagreeing with the 
“and they lived happily ever after,” supposed ending to analysis.  No, “they lived 
unhappily ever after,” he says, as they deny lack.114 
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Freud conceives of his purpose as straightening out or destylizing language such that a 
“cured” patient could finally “give an ordered history of their life.”  Lacan, in contrast, 
insists that therapeutic progress consists not in eliminating style and bringing the patient’s 
speech closer to some imagined norm of clarity; therapeutic progress is made as the 
analysand accepts her lack, her inability to speak in the flawless vernacular of the one 
presumed to know.  Her speech will always be stylized and her lack will always be the 
linguistic disability Freud hopes to cure.  A Lacanian theory of style, then, is opposed to 
the normative understanding of speech employed by Freud and by stylistics.  It insists 
that all speech is already necessarily stylized and that no one type of sexual subjectivity is 
more likely to distort its possessor’s language than any other.  For the only way that one 
could attain the magical position of stylistic clarity that heterosexuality greedily imagines 
as its own is to assume the impossible place of the Other, or as Lacan puts it more 
obliquely, “there is no metalanguage that can be spoken, or, more aphoristically, that 
there is no Other of the Other.  And when the Legislator (he who claims to lay down the 
Law) comes forward to make up for this, he does so as an impostor.”115 
 In this chapter I will lay out what I describe as a queer Lacanian theory of style, a 
theory that argues not for the critic’s authoritative deciphering of style as an index of 
sexuality but a theory that understands the language of every subject – gay, straight, or 
anything else – as always already stylized.  One of the key problems that such an 
approach remedies is the dangerous tendency of stylistic criticism to assume a position of 
mastery over a text, to act as though empowered by a clinician’s eye to oversee and to 
diagnose it.  A Lacanian theory of style, in contrast, eschews as a matter of principle the 
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illusion of mastery over a text that so many critics embrace when talking about style.  It 
understands the critic herself to be always also a product of narcissism who is also never 
able to achieve the control over language towards which Freud’s theory of mental health 
orients therapy.  As a consequence, a Lacanian theory of style represents not only a more 
honest appraisal of the literary critic’s responsibility but it also will result in a more 
humane and non-pathologizing critique that doesn’t make a helpless object of literary 
style. 
 One text largely overlooked by stylistic critique is Jane Gallop’s wonderful 1985 
study Reading Lacan, one of the first texts to begin to lay out the sort of critical practice I 
have in mind in calling for a revision of literary stylistics.  Gallop’s text comes out of a 
feminist literary tradition and aims to utilize Lacanian theory in order to argue against 
many of the discursive trends that have led to the cultural disempowerment of women.  
What is exciting and still fresh about the book is that in it Gallop decides to make the 
important rhetorical decision not to pretend to understand completely Lacan or to be a 
master of his text – she cedes that authority as a pretence.  Her reason for doing so, she 
explains, is that 
Lacan’s major statement of ethical purpose and therapeutic goal, as far as I am 
concerned, is that one must assume one’s castration.  Women have always been 
considered “castrated” in psychoanalytic thinking.  But castration for Lacan is not only 
sexual; more important it is also linguistic: we are inevitably bereft of any masterful 
understanding of language, and can only signify ourselves in a symbolic system that we 
do not command, that, rather, commands us.116 
 
Gallop’s larger purpose in emphasizing Lacan’s theorization of the castration of every 
subject is a feminist one, namely a critique of classical psychoanalysis’s conception of 
women as castrated and envious of the penis.  Lacan shows us that it is a 
misunderstanding to think that only women are castrated, for castration is not simply a 
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matter of who has a penis and who doesn’t.  Instead castration is the state of any human 
being of any sex once she enters into language.  For Gallop, as for many feminist 
psychoanalytic critics, this is a rich theoretical premise that can be used to challenge the 
discursive disempowerment of women that conceives of them as always partial, inferior 
versions of men.  Women may be partial, Lacan tells us, but so too are all human subjects 
in language. 
 As I have already begun to suggest, Gallop’s reading of Lacan can be useful not 
only for feminist critique but can also be instrumental in formulating a queer critique of 
style.  While Gallop stops short at gender, her point could be extended further to include 
queer stylistic analysis.117  Gallop argues, for example, that “for women, Lacan’s 
message that everyone, regardless of his or her organs, is ‘castrated,’ represents not a loss 
but a gain.  Only this realization, I believe, can release us from ‘phallocentrism,’ one of 
the effects of which is that one must constantly cover one’s inevitable inadequacy in 
order to have the right to speak.”118  Yet this argument can also be considered not a loss 
but a gain for queer subjects who have similarly been the victims of heterosexism.  For 
queer people as the texts that stylistics so often reads can be empowered by the 
realization that we may be castrated but so too are the ones who try to read our language 
as a site of our insufficiency and who must deny their own partial grasp over language’s 
meaning in order to enter triumphant into the arena of discourse. 
 We may have seemed to have drifted a bit from style proper but Gallop’s 
understanding of how Lacan can be tapped to formulate a progressive literary criticism is 
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in fact firmly dedicated to a strategy for interpreting style.  Gallop draws attention to 
Freud’s discovery of what we now colloquially call the Freudian slip, that idea that when 
one’s words slip and one says something different from what was initially intended, the 
slip is a sign of some concealed, and perhaps even more important meaning.  “Lacan says 
of this,” Gallop explains, “that Freud discovered that truth manifests itself in the letter 
rather than the spirit, that is, in the way things are actually said rather than in the intended 
meaning.”119  And while Freud may have not fully grasped the importance of that 
discovery, his followers, at least among literary critics, were quick to take up the position 
of the psychoanalyst and explain the underlying significance of the letter, the style, in 
which literature is said.  This allows us to see the unsurprising conjunction in the 20th 
century of the superficially different projects of literary criticism and psychoanalysis: 
Literary critics learn how to read the letter of the text, how to interpret the style, the form, 
rather than just reading for content, for ideas.  The psychoanalyst learns to listen not so 
much to her patient’s main point as to odd marginal moments, slips of the tongue, 
unintended disclosures.  Freud formulated this psychoanalytic method, but Lacan has 
generalized it into a way of receiving all discourse, not just the analysand’s.  There is no 
better way to read Lacan.120 
 
Stylistics could be understood as a project already partly coextensive with a Lacanian 
orientation because it does follow Lacan’s recommendation that we attend to the style of 
language and not merely to the ideas that language consciously aims to communicate.  
Indeed, Lacan complains in “The Function and Field of Speech and Language in 
Psychoanalysis” that before his teaching, “it seem[ed] that this central field of our domain 
has been left fallow since Freud.”121  So stylistic reading could be conceived of as picking 
up where Freud left off.  And that project could proceed as something along the lines of 
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how stylistic analysis analyzes a text.  As Lacan says of the analysis of dreams, to take 
one example, “what is important is the version of the text [as opposed to the dream’s 
content], and that, Freud tells us, is given in the telling of the dream – that is, in its 
rhetoric.  Ellipses and pleonasm, hyperbation or syllepsis, regression, repetition, 
apposition – these are the syntactical displacements; metaphor, catachresis, antonomasia, 
allegory, metonymy, and synechdoche – these are the semantic condensations.”122  In 
short, then, Gallop is exactly right when she argues that “the object of psychoanalytic 
study reveals itself as ‘style,’” for Lacan himself insists on the same thing.123  Stylistics 
and Lacan are at least partially in agreement, then, in their focus on style as the proper 
object of analysis.  Only in Lacan, however, do we find a guide for how to understand 
style in a way that moves beyond the traditionally normative pseudo-Freudian approach 
of much of what passes for stylistic critique these days.  In contrast, Lacan offers an 
approach that counsels us to examine style, the “telling” of the tale, “its rhetoric,” but not 
in order to make a sexual diagnosis or provide a moral hierarchy. 
 According to Lacan, the Freudian discovery of the unconscious failed to realize 
its full potential because the master’s discovery preceded the necessary theory of 
linguistics that would have allowed Freud to understand completely the potential of his 
own work.  What Freud failed to grasp for historical reasons is the importance of 
signification, of the letter, in the practice of psychoanalysis.  Freud was brilliant in his 
theorization of the significance of dreams, jokes, and slips of the tongue, Lacan says, but 
he lacked the necessary tools to realize that it was not, for example, the dream itself that 
is of central importance in analysis but rather how the analysand relates the dream.  
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Lacan insists that Freud was following the right track and that he formulated a theory in 
advance of the emergence of linguistics which would make the Freudian promise finally 
realizable.  As he explains in “The Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious, or Reason 
Since Freud,” “right from the outset people failed to recognize the constitutive role of the 
signifier in the status Freud immediately assigned to the unconscious in the most precise 
and explicit ways.”124  Lacan’s work remedies this overlooked aspect of the Freudian 
project by refocusing on the signifier, looking to the rhetoric or style of speech as the 
proper object of analysis.  Style is important for Lacan because of “the possibility I have 
– precisely insofar as I share … language [langue] with other subjects, that is, insofar as 
this language [langue] exists – to use it to signify something altogether different from 
what it says.”125  In other words, language can always signify a meaning that is different 
from the strictly literal interpretation of what it denotes – the figure of “thirty sails,” for 
example, meaning not literally sails but rather a number of ships for which it stands in.  
Language effects this deceptive communication through the mechanism of style.  Lacan 
even invokes in his discussion the name of that ancient theorist of style Quintillian when 
he introduces what will become for him the twin stylistic poles of psychoanalytic 
signification: metaphor and metonymy.126  The crucial point is that as long as people use 
language that language’s meaning is never nailed down in its signification.  It can always 
mean something more than the literal in its style. 
 In his earlier essays, Lacan draws mainly upon two key stylistic figures from the 
ancient theory of rhetoric in order to explain how the two key mechanisms of 
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psychoanalysis – condensation and displacement – operate through language.  In 
metonymy, he says, the part is taken for the whole as in the example of “thirty sails” 
representing “ship.”  “The connection between ship and sail,” he explains, “is nowhere 
other than in the signifier, and … metonymy is based on the word-to-word nature of this 
connection.”127  For Lacan, then, an instance of metonymy operates exactly according to 
the same principle as displacement, that is through a “transfer of signification” from one 
signifier to another.  Likewise with metaphor, “one word for another,” that shares the 
same structure as condensation, or “the superimposed structure of signifiers,” one on top 
of the other.  The goal of the analyst is to zero in on these stylistic figures when they 
appear, to interrogate the style he encounters so as to understand the way in which the 
subject is saying “something altogether different” than what her language denotes in the 
strictest sense. 
 These two figures – metaphor and metonymy – are two of the most famous terms 
Lacan uses that have been imported in a technical way into literary criticism.  Criticism 
has missed the larger Lacanian insight, however, that these two figures are just two 
among many that may appear in a given style during analysis.  The proper goal of a 
Lacanian literary criticism, then, is not simply to locate instances of metaphor or 
metonymy in a text and explicate them in a Lacanian manner.  No, in fact to try to 
psychoanalyze a text, a project Lacan calls “insane,” is to miss the point completely.  
Indeed one ought to pay the strictest attention to “periphrasis, hyperbaton, ellipses, 
suspension, anticipation, retraction, negation, digression, and irony, [for ] these are the 
figures of style (Quintilian’s figurae sententiarum).”128  However, the critic must 
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understand that these figures are the way that a subject engages her into dialogue, they 
evoke responses in the critic rather than giving a transparent view of the speaker.  Lacan 
asks us, “can one see here mere manners of speaking, when it is the figures themselves 
that are at work in the rhetoric of the discourse the analysand actually utters?”129  In other 
words, the story that a given text tells is far less important for Lacan than the style in 
which it is told – it is the figures (style) that are at work in discourse and that constitute 
the proper site of engagement like peaks that rise from the flat surface of the analysand’s 
language.  The ultimate purpose of reading these stylistic quirks in a therapeutic setting, 
of course, is to help the patient come to terms with his lack and to help him accept his 
truth, or as Lacan puts it, “we cannot confine ourselves to giving a new truth its rightful 
place, for the point is to take up our place in it.  The truth requires us to go out of our 
way.  We cannot do so simply by getting used to it.”130  In other words, getting to truth is 
a journey, one we must actively seek after.  Truth is not something that approaches us in 
the words of the other and that we as critic decipher and reveal.  Truth can only be 
reached by each subject for herself, and that makes stylistic analyses that purport to 
reveal the “truth” about a writer’s sexuality irreparably flawed.  If the purpose of 
Lacanian psychoanalysis, however, is through the psychoanalytic dialogue to help the 
subject not to repress his truth but come to accept it, how can that project be used in 
literary criticism?  For the relationship between critic and text is not similarly dialogic in 
any obvious way. 
 In order to understand how a stylistic critic might put this theory into practice in 
literary criticism we must first amend stylistics’s overly psychological orientation, an 




orientation that flies directly in the face of everything Lacan worked for.  The problem 
with the way that much of literary stylistics has approached its analysis of style is that it 
places the critic in the position of psychologist and it psychologizes its analysis in that 
way Lacan calls “insane.”  That is, stylistics generally seems never to have heard of 
Lacan at all and instead relies on a psychological style of reasoning dedicated to 
protecting its own narcissistic mastery over the text’s meaning.131  That mode of reading 
enrages Lacan, for “he locates the downfall of American psychoanalysis, its betrayal of 
Freud, in its willing assimilation into a general psychology.  Psychology is the 
construction of the ideological illusion Man, nowadays armed with all the defensive 
apparati of hard data, as any illusion, the ego foremost, must be defensively armed.”132  
That assimilation into general psychology is what I called in the last chapter stylistics’s 
democratic and intuitive common sense understanding of style.  It is also, as I argued 
there, what makes stylistics’s ignorance of Lacan especially problematic because it is a 
project that can never do anything but find normative results, dedicated as it is to a 
conservative ideology that only ever wants to confirm its own truth.  Lacan, however, 
challenges that project by asking us not just to engage superficially at the level of the 
symbolic – language – but to try to use the appurtenances of the symbolic – style – in 
order to understand the critic’s implication in an imaginary relationship with the text.  In 
other words, Lacan shifts the focus from the critic’s masterful understanding of the text to 
an analysis of the critic’s own aggressive or desiring relationship toward what he reads. 
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 How can we go about overturning stylistics’s embrace of the psychological style 
of reasoning while retaining its positive pursuit of the sort of attention to what Lacan 
calls a text’s “semantic evolution: this corresponds to the stock of words and acceptations 
of [its] particular vocabulary”?133  It is difficult to do because as Felman says, we tend to 
assume “a relation in which literature is submitted to the authority, to the prestige of 
psychoanalysis.  While literature is considered as a body of language – to be interpreted 
– psychoanalysis is considered as a body of knowledge, whose competence is called upon 
to interpret.  Psychoanalysis, in other words, occupies the place of a subject, literature 
that of an object.”134  We have definitely seen this at work in stylistics in the previous 
chapter in which the presumed authority of a psychological style of reasoning is brought 
to bear by the critic upon the literary text and its author as an object.  The critic, then, acts 
as the sole subject, the master whose critical eye sees all that style can be said to mean 
and uses his profound body of knowledge to come to a conclusion deductively about his 
subject’s sexuality. 
 This critical posture is problematic on a number of fronts, not the least of which is 
that, as Lacan shows us, even in the analytic situation the analyst is not in the position of 
the god-like Other, he merely stands in its place in the analytic structure.  It is the 
analyst’s task to hear the analysand’s words and to listen for the odd stylistic moments 
that punctuate it.  It is the analysand’s faith in the analyst as the expert who 
“understands” his discourse and not any genuine knowledge of his truth that gives fuel to 
the analytic process and gives momentum to a dialogue that will help the analysand 
discover his own truth.  The analyst does not ever simply tell the patient what his words 
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mean as stylistic criticism often does in its analysis of a text.  It is the critic’s proper role, 
then, to reserve judgment and not to try to give the final solution as to what the style 
means but rather to engage it dialectically as himself – a human being in language who 
does not even have full understanding of his own words let alone those of the author. 
 Gallop illustrates why that subject/object approach to the analysis of literary style 
is not only non-Lacanain but also liable to produce reductive, regressive, and repetitive 
re-discoveries of the same old meanings.  Stylistics is still largely dedicated to an 
outmoded kind of literary analysis, one that Gallop describes as “based solely on 
interpretation.  Freudian readings interpret literary texts to show, for example, anal drives 
or negative oedipal complexes, while Lacanian readings show symbolic fathers and 
signifying chains,” as in Lacan’s didactic essay on “The Purloined Letter.”135  Yet these 
sorts of analyses do not just fly in the face of a Lacanian understanding of analysis, they 
are also likely to do nothing more than conservatively to “discover” representations of 
psychoanalytic concepts with the text, a point that might actually make some of Harold 
Bloom’s stridently polemical comments make a lot more sense: “Hamlet did not have an 
Oedipus complex, but Freud certainly had a Hamlet complex,” for example.136  A more 
innovative approach, Gallop recommends, is not to rely solely on interpretation of style 
but also to incorporate into one’s reading an analysis of transference. 
 Freud understands transference to occur within the scene of analysis as displaced 
affect.  In the relationship between analyst and analysand, not only do “infantile 
prototypes re-emerge and are experienced with a strong sense of immediacy” but also 
“the transference is acknowledged to be the terrain on which all the basic problems of a 
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given analysis play themselves out.”137  In other words, in the transference the analyst 
and analysand both find themselves caught up in a recreation of past relationships, which 
can be potentially very dangerous if the analyst does not handle the transference well but 
which is a necessary precondition for the real work of analysis to begin.  Transference is 
a key development in psychoanalytic thought because it brings the realization that the 
analyst is not the isolated master sitting in judgment and interpreting the patient’s 
thoughts.  The transference implicates the analyst, her desire, in a powerful 
intersubjective drama into which she is as certain to be drawn as her patient.  We do not 
as of yet have a comprehensive or satisfactory theory of how we might account for the 
effect of transference in a literary analysis and most certainly stylistics has resisted 
building such an understanding into its practice.  But “transference,” as Gallop explains, 
“is the repetition of infantile prototype relations, of unconscious desires in the analytic 
relation.  Without transference, psychoanalysis is simply literary criticism, by an 
unimplicated, discriminating reader, lacking either affect or effect.”138  It is vital, then, 
that we heed the advice of critics like Gallop and Felman and begin to admit to the signal 
importance that transference has for any stylistic analysis.  As I argued in the last chapter, 
stylistic critique more often than not is an exercise in the disproportionate application of 
power on the side of the critic over his object’s sexuality.  That is to be expected since 
“interpretation is always the exercise of power, while transference is the structuring of 
that authority.  To analyze transference is to unmask that structuring, interrupt its 
                                                 
137 Jean Laplanche and J.B. Pontalis, The Language of Psycho-Analysis, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith 
(New York: Norton, 1973), 455. 
138 Jane Gallop, The Daughter’s Seduction: Feminism and Psychoanalysis (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1982), 73. 
74 
efficient operation.”139  An analysis of the transferential experience that occurs in a 
stylistic reading, then, is a way to disrupt the asymmetry of power that operates within it 
and to expose the heterosexist imperatives that have for so long driven its critical 
operation. 
 Given the neglected consideration of the role of transference in stylistic criticism, 
the most important thing that a queer critique of style must include is an acknowledgment 
of that transference.  After all, it is transference, I will argue in chapter four for instance, 
that produces a dramatic misrepresentation of the style of Ernest Hemingway, a reading 
of his style as falsely straight that works not only to the author’s advantage but which 
also satisfies the critic’s own narcissistic embrace of Hemingway’s style as a defense 
against the impossibility of any truly “straight” style.  Including that line of thinking into 
a new kind of stylistic critique, however, requires us to relinquish the supreme authority 
over language that the critic desperately clings to, to accept, as Gallop earlier suggested, 
our own lack.  As Gallop says, 
In the relation of transference, the critic is no longer analyst but patient.  The position of 
patient can be terrifying in that it represents, to the critic who in her transference believes 
in the analyst’s mastery, a position of nonmastery.  The critic escapes that terror by 
importing psychoanalytic “wisdom” into the reading dialectic so as to protect herself 
from what psychoanalysis is really about, the unconscious, as well as from what literature 
is really about, the letter.  The psychoanalytic critic in her refusal to confront literature is 
like the patient who, in his resistance to his analysis, intelligently discusses 
psychoanalytic theory on the couch.140 
 
Our goal must be to re-imagine our relationship to the text as one in which not only is the 
style of the author relevant as an object of inquiry to be studied and appreciated but 
crucially it is a relation, a relation of power in which our desires and aggressions as 
readers are implicated too.  As Felman argues, “dialogue is not an accident, a 
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contingency of the reading, but its structuring condition of possibility.  The reading 
[proposed by Lacan] is revolutionary in that it is essentially, constitutively dialogic.  It is 
grounded in a division; it cannot be synthesized, summed up in a monologue.”141  We 
must not therefore use an analysis of style in an attempt to master a text and its author’s 
desires because any attempt to do so is an illusory one, a corrupted enterprise in which 
the critic acts, as Lacan says, as an “impostor,” the false lawgiver who assumes for 
herself access to a pure metalanguage that can, in fact, only be accessed by the Other.  
Stylistic analysis, as we saw in the last chapter and will see in the following chapters in 
the critical responses to Henry James, Ernest Hemingway, and Gertrude Stein, pr,imarily 
proceeds from exactly this position of impersonation, repeating psychoanalytic “wisdom” 
such as the claim that ornate style is a symptom of an exceptional homosexual 
narcissism.  Gallop refuses that goal, showing how that assertion of mastery is a 
defensive measure that protects the critic from having to confront her own transferential 
relationship with the text. 
 The theory I offer here does not aim to attack individual critics for failing to 
accept the role of their own desire in reading style.  For that is the Lacanian insight, that 
we buy into the imaginary conditions of our situation and use the symbolic resources at 
our disposal to try desperately to confirm those illusions.  I do, however, offer a rejoinder 
to critics who allow the homophobic logic of stylistic critique to overpower their analyses 
as they surely are responsible for accepting the political message to which their texts are 
committed.  What I want to offer instead is a theory of style that is focused on 
deciphering how and why the social order has seized upon style as a site by which to 
adjudicate sexuality and how we might, perversely, disempower the critic’s authority 
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over language as a con-game.  The end result of such a project would be a generalization 
of lack to all critics, one that would in a sense bring us all down to the same level but that 
would also shine a light on the ideological motivations – in particular phallocentrism and 
heterosexism – that drive stylistics’s denial of its own incomplete grasp of language. 
 In the overture to Ecrits Lacan guides us in this task by offering a reformulation 
of the classic dictum “style is the man himself [Le style est l’homme même], replacing it 
with a new and shocking formula: “style is the man to whom one addresses oneself” [Le 
style c’est l’homme à qui l’on s’adresse].  This revision is tough to get one’s head around 
but it is a substitution that has dramatic consequences for how we think about a queer 
critique of style as it does a lot of work to advance that goal.  In his message Lacan 
destroys the central premise upon which stylistic criticism has operated, the notion that 
style and the writer are self-identical.142  Lacan understands style not as the simple and 
readily decipherable outward expression of the individual on the page.  Instead, style is 
one half of an intersubjective experience, the partner to whom and against whom one 
speaks.  We must pause to ask ourselves, though, how does one address oneself to style?  
Style as the means by which one metaphorizes and metonymizes, condenses and 
displaces, is the second subject, the subject of address in a shift “from the individual 
person taken as a separate monad to the intersubjective dialectic.”143  In psychoanalysis, 
as the subject expresses himself in language he directs his address to the ideally neutral 
position of the analyst.  A reader, as we know however, is never a neutral party and is 
always caught up in the dialectic of transference.  A reader, then, finds herself in the 
position both of the addressee and of style, for if style is the man to whom one addresses 
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oneself then the reader is paradoxically in that position of style.  The theory of style I 
propose takes this Lacanian insight and understands the reader to be in the position not of 
the adjudicator of style but as that exact locus upon which the writer projects her style.  
The critic’s task, then, is not to receive the message and report what secret is contained 
within as though she were codebreaker with an intercepted message in a time of war.  
The critic’s proper role, after all, is not to intercept anything but to take her place as a 
subject of address, to accept her engagement in the transference, and to ask, instead of 
what style means about the one who sends it, how that style received engages the critic’s 
own desires and aggressions; one might say that the proper goal of stylistic analysis is a 
self-analysis.  Why does a critic, for example, receive and celebrate Hemingway’s style 
as the highest achievement both of simplistic writing and heterosexual masculinity? Why 
does a critic face the challenge of Gertrude Stein’s incantatory rhythms and call her a 
lesbian?  A queer literary critique engages with these questions, accepts the critic’s own 
partial relationship to language (that is, does not presume that the critic speaks in a 
metalanguage that can describe the exotic variety of the writer like a Western 
anthropologist describing some forgotten group of indigenous peoples), and tries to 
answer the most pressing question facing progressive critics of style: not what does a 
given writer’s style express about him in some absolute way but why does the critic 
herself, for what reasons, does she think she recognizes in style the expression that she 
does?  This is not to say that style is meaningless, for it most certainly is not.  Rather, a 
queer critique of style understands that the critic does not occupy the sufficient place of 
the master to understand fully style’s meaning, limited as she is by her own castration in 
language.  Rather than fleeing from that partial understanding, however, she accepts it for 
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the partial meanings she can get from it instead of, as has so long been the case, 
projecting the imaginary image of self-image of control and pretending she’s got what it 
takes to provide a comprehensive explanation of style. 
 We may feel unsatisfied with a program that offers no conclusive answers on 
what style “means” but instead asks us to try to understand how style engages the critic in 
the transferential dance.  But this is a crucial goal for queer critique to try to reach, 
especially because to continue along the path of trying to pin down absolute stylistic 
meanings does nothing more than to collude with the heterosexist ideology of much 
stylistic critique by allowing it to, as Edelman says, mobilize the symbolic to defend its 
own narcissistic self-image.  In other words, analyses that abide by the same rules that 
stylistic critique uses but merely provide counter-readings of sexuality merely reinforce 
the notion of linguistic mastery we know to be a fraud but which heterosexist discourse 
pretends to have as its birthright.  As we will see in the following chapters, that self-
image is heavily invested in proving to itself that itself is on the side of an objective 
standard of stylistic clarity, the “good” side of honest, hard working, plain talking folks.  
And it is a self-image that defines itself against what it depicts as a deceptive, unthrifty, 
and excessive mode of the perversely styled.  Our goal should be to try to dismantle this 
entire apparatus to, as Edelman says, “unmask it as always only imaginary” and to 
implicate those critics’ imaginary investment in style by proving everyone’s imaginary 
investment in it. 
 In the chapters that follow I will examine three literary writers known for their 
unique styles and the stylistic critique that has been mobilized to defend or to excoriate 
the sexuality of each.  I will have little recourse to the technical language of Lacanian 
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psychoanalysis there, preferring instead to remain true to the practice of the mode of 
critique I have described here.  In other words, rather than trying to locate in each writer 
instances of Lacanian themes or chains of signifiers, I take a more truly Lacanian critical 
approach in trying to decipher the critic’s response to style, to ask why and for what 
ideological reasons the critical response to each figure has been what it has been.  
Seeking to provide no final answers on what style “means” about each of the writers I 
attend to, the work ahead does consider how each uses signifiers strategically as part of 
their aesthetic projects.  But I am far more interested in the work ahead to ask why we tell 










A Personal Quantity,  
Or, Bringing Out Henry James 
 
 
Why should one call one’s self anything?  One only deprives other people of their dearest 
occupation. 
Henry James, The Tragic Muse 
 
The Jamesian ideal of consciousness express[es] a dream of detaching instruments of 
sublimation (speech and thought) from the activity of repression.  The best talk and the 
best thought would be the talk and the thought which resist interpretation.  Language 
would no longer reveal character or refer to desires “behind” words; it would be the 
unfolding of an improvised and never completed psychological design. 
Leo Bersani, A Future for Astyanax 
 
 In chapter nine of The Tragic Muse (1890), Henry James relates the first extended 
interview in the novel between two reunited Oxford friends – the failed politician and 
aspiring painter Nick Dormer and his aesthete-writer college chum Gabriel Nash.144  
Their conversation as they stroll around the Notre Dame area ranges from Nash’s theories 
on art and good living to Dormer’s feelings concerning his would-be sponsor in an 
upcoming parliamentary election, the wealthy and politically ambitious widow Julia 
Dallow.  Throughout their talk, Dormer displays a marked longing to avoid the return to 
British political life that Julia and his parochial mother are pushing on him in favor of a 
career as a portraitist, a path that seems much more fitting given the artistic taste he 
evinces while abroad in Paris at the novel’s start.  Nash, responding to Dormer’s obvious 
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knows only one of two parts of him and that “there’s another part, very much smaller doubtless, which, 
such as it is, represents my single self, the unknown, unimportant – unimportant save to you – personal 
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desire not to stand for the newly vacant seat representing Harsh, interrogates his friend 
about his plans for the future, in the process prompting the revelation of Nick’s profound 
ontological uncertainty: 
I don’t know what I am – heaven help me!” Nick broke out, tossing his hat down on his 
little tin table with vehemence.  “I’m a freak of nature and a sport of the mocking gods.  
Why should they do everything so inconsequent, so improbable, so preposterous?  It’s the 
vulgarist practical joke.  There has never been anything of the sort among us; we’re all 
Philistines to the core, with about as much aesthetic sense as that hat.  It’s excellent soil – 
I don’t complain of it – but not a soil to grow that flower.  From where the devil then has 
the seed been dropped?  I look back from generation to generation; I scour our annals 
without finding the least little sketching grandmother, any sign of a building or versifying 
or collecting or even tulip-raising ancestor.  They were all as blind as bats, and none the 
less happy for that.  I’m a wanton variation, an unaccountable monster.  My dear father, 
rest his soul, went through life without a suspicion that there’s anything in it that can’t be 
boiled into blue-books, and became in that conviction a very distinguished person.  He 
brought me up in the same simplicity and in the hope of the same eminence.  It would 
have been better if I had remained so.  I think it’s partly your fault that I have n’t,” Nick 
went on.  “At Oxford you were very bad company for me – my evil genius: you opened 
my eyes, you communicated the poison.  Since then, little by little, it has been working 
within me; vaguely, covertly, insensibly at first, but during the last year or two with 
violence, pertinacity, cruelty.  I’ve resorted to every antidote in life; but it’s no use – I’m 
stricken.  ‘C’est Vénus toute entière à sa proie attachée putting Venus for ‘art.’’  It tears 
me to pieces as I may say.”145 
 
 It would be tough for many queer readers of this passage not to hear in it an all-
too-familiar story about growing up queer.  In fact, what at first blush looks to be the 
mere uncertainty of a youngish man about what he wants to be when he “grows up” 
instead reveals a canny perceptiveness on James’s part about the emerging growth of an 
assumed conceptual relationship between aesthetic production and sexuality.  There is no 
misunderstanding Nick’s obvious anguish in this moment, his sense not only that he 
doesn’t have a clue to what he wants to do, but more ominously for a queer audience, his 
sharp hatred of what he is beginning to admit to himself that he is.  Many readers might 
see this scene as a moment of dramatic plotting designed to create suspense about 
whether Nick will ultimately accede to his family’s pressures to pursue a respectable 
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future in politics – an outlook represented not so favorably in the figure of the novel’s 
other male lead, the diplomat and hopeless boor Peter Sherringham – or whether Nick 
will instead follow his hopes and become a painter, a much more dubious proposition he 
thinks.  Reading through a different lens, however, makes this passage stand out for very 
different reasons.  It is no coincidence, after all, that Nick makes this emotional 
confession to the novel’s dandyish representative of aestheticism, or that it immediately 
follows Nash’s queries about whether or not Nick is really in love with and plans to 
marry his cousin Julia, something that is even by the book’s end far from confirmed.  It is 
apparent for a host of reasons that, at least as far as Nick understands it, the respectable 
life, the boring but socially desirable married life of his father and the rest of his family 
before him, and a life that indulges in producing art are incompatible.  Art and blue-
books don’t go together.  In the social economy of the novel as in the social economy of 
the bourgeois West more generally, to be married, practical, and plainspoken are all of 
one piece, while to be enamored of art and under the suspect influence of frivolous, 
immature, fancy-speaking company from one’s college days are all of quite another. 
 What might in any other novel be a decision for Nick tempered by ambition, 
indolence, or avarice is sucked into the orbit of shame and humiliation in The Tragic 
Muse.  “I’m a freak of nature,” Nick wails, as well as “a wanton variation, an 
unaccountable monster.”  All that fuss because he doesn’t want to be an MP?  If that were 
the whole story after all, calling him a drama queen would be a vast understatement.  
Nick later explains to Nash that the reason the situation is so fraught for him is that “you 
don’t know the atmosphere in which I live, the horror, the scandal my apostasy would 
provoke, the injury and suffering it would inflict.  I believe it would really kill my 
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mother.  She thinks my father’s watching me from the skies” (I.182).  Some critics have 
pointed to this declaration in order to argue for the insignificance of the alternative to 
politics that Nick is considering.  For some the most important fact is just that Nick is 
concerned about violating the strict norms of bourgeois decorum by failing to 
demonstrate the proper social, political and economic ambition as imagined by his 
mother and by his aged benefactor Mr. Carteret.  Indeed that does seem to be what is 
really objectionable as far as Mrs. Dormer and Carteret, which is to say the older 
generation, are concerned.  Nick’s tortured and remarkably modern soul-searching, 
however, cannot simply be explained away so easily as a matter of not wanting to 
disappoint his mother’s socio-economic aspirations, nor can it be explained as his need to 
please Carteret, his father’s old friend, in order to secure for himself an inheritance that 
he will later turn down from Julia Dallow; the gravity of his dilemma is not satisfyingly 
“solved” by either of these banal, plot-oriented explanations.  For Nick does not simply 
obsess about two more or less equivalent alternatives, one being the specific career 
trajectory imagined by his mother and the other being anything less than that.  Rather, 
and this is crucial, the specificity of the other choice, that Nick wants to paint, i.e., to 
pursue style over a prosaic political existence, is central to the novel’s understanding of 
sexual subjectivity and therefore of Nick’s narrative crisis.  Try as we might want for a 
variety of motives, we must not explain away as meaningless Nick’s attraction to “style,” 
nor can we afford to ignore the dawning sexual significations the novel insists that term 
had begun to accrue in the culture during this important stage of James’s career. 
 While it may not be up to the level of literary excellence of the virtuoso novels of 
his major phase – one of James’s harshest critics, Maxwell Geismar, derided him for 
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having “rationalized all of the obvious defects in this weak novel into a series of hidden 
virtues” – The Tragic Muse nevertheless marks an extremely significant moment in 
James’s career.146  For one thing, James seems to have planned The Tragic Muse to be his 
last novel, his theatrical ambitions finally having reached the tipping point.  James writes 
to his brother William, “The Tragic Muse is to be my last long novel.  For the rest of my 
life I hope to do lots of short things with irresponsible spaces between them.”147  We 
might pay special attention to the novel, then, as what James appears to have, at one point 
in time anyway, thought of as his final statement in the novel form.  Jonathan Freedman 
in his Professions of Taste dismisses this speculation as perhaps “too facile,” though he 
agrees that The Tragic Muse is a crucial document for understanding James’s 
complicated, often conflicted relationship with aestheticism, a relationship that is 
thoroughly entangled – particularly in the relatively one-sided critical response that 
“consistently treated [him] as an aesthete tout court” – with homosexuality.148  Indeed, 
Freedman is right to point out that for the majority of the past hundred years, when critics 
spoke of James’s “aestheticism,” they were also often talking about “James’s 
homoeroticism, an unspoken subject that clearly underlies the language of effeteness and 
effeminacy that anti-Jacobites persistently used to describe James’s putative aestheticism, 
and for which the term ‘aesthete’ long served as a virtual synonym.”149   
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If after the Oscar Wilde debacle aestheticism in the 20th century served as a kind 
of short-hand for homosexuality – not to rehearse the fractious debates surrounding the 
matter of James’s own “actual” sexuality – what of The Tragic Muse’s own time?  What 
could and would Nick’s attraction to the bright flame of Nash’s aestheticist acclamation 
of style signify for the culture when James produced this text?150  To answer these 
questions would be to, in Michel Foucault’s words, “enable discursive practice to be 
grasped at precisely the point where it is formed,” to appreciate the establishment of the 
sexualized discourse surrounding style in the late 19th and early 20th centuries at precisely 
the moment they came into being during James’s middle period.151 
 If we appeal to The Tragic Muse for answers it would seem to suggest a nascent 
yet budding appreciation of the cultural reorganization (discussed in chapter one) that 
produced the modern gay signification of style as we know it.  Nick, for example, in a 
move that already uncannily anticipates the nature or nurture debates of more recent 
times, wonders at length about from where his artistic proclivity springs.  He at first 
speculates on a biological explanation for its origins, noting that “there has never been 
anything of the sort among us; we’re all Philistines to the core, with about as much 
aesthetic sense as that hat,” before rejecting the biological appeal to “the core” as his 
stock is “not a soil to grow that flower.”  He deduces that he began “in the same 
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simplicity” as his unimaginative father and that he was seduced into the life, as they used 
to say, by Gabriel Nash, who “communicated the poison.”  And could there be a more 
authentically incipient portrait of a gay man recognizing his own finally nameable 
sexuality than in Nick’s last, desperate words: “Since then, little by little, it has been 
working within me; vaguely, covertly, insensibly at first, but during the last year or two 
with violence, pertinacity, cruelty.  I’ve resorted to every antidote in life but it’s no use – 
I’m stricken”?  The passage reminds one of Robert Louis Stevenson’s Strange Case of 
Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, a text by James’s close friend (whom he also quotes in the 
preface) published just four years earlier, because it has often been read as staging a 
prototypically similar, allegorical narrative of overcoming homosexuality.  This is all to 
say that the problem at the center of Nick’s growth over the course of the novel – his 
indecision about his artistic career – operates as a kind of synecdoche for a struggle that 
remains indeterminate in the elusiveness of its sexual subtext, even though it nonetheless 
provides a compelling thematic marker of James’s awareness that style had by this point 
become a matter of sexuality, that by the 1880’s at the latest the two topics already 
virtually signified one another.152  The very special and particular vocational dilemma, 
then, displaces in the text the overt formation of Nick’s sexual subjectivity, a topic for 
which James may or may not have had a rich vocabulary but with which he was 
undoubtedly, as his less public writings make clear, very familiar.153  What is left is a 
novel that remains ambivalently committed to the Victorian traditions of appropriate 
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subject-matter even as it registers that culture’s response, in the form of its 
problematization of style, to the crisis of a brand new and wholly modern type of sexual 
subject. 
 Suggesting that this is just a novel about a gay man becoming gay is sure to meet 
with some harsh rebukes, and though that is a tempting argument to make, I do not mean 
to suggest that homosexuality is the solution to The Tragic Muse.  Rather homosexuality 
– conceived as a signified and signifier of style – is an important ingredient and essential 
outcome of the novel’s logic.  It is crucial that we recognize, as David McWhirter argues, 
that “James’s position as a transitional figure who, for all his superficial adherence to the 
Victorian sexual mores of his audience, nevertheless embodies ‘the ferocious 
contradictions of his age.’”154  What I take to be one of the signature qualities of James’s 
writing, especially in a mid-career novel like The Tragic Muse, is his talent for balancing 
these contradictions, often through the use of, in his famous term, “counterplotting,” 
critically evoking at once the established mores of characters like Mrs. Dormer and Mr. 
Carteret alongside the revolutionary but uncertainly efficacious values of a distinctively 
modern generation. When it comes to sexuality, the novel steps two ways at once, 
attempting to satisfy the traditional, heterosexual conditions that typically signal the 
completion of the well-made novel on the one hand and on the other frustrating those 
same conditions by leaving Nick’s romantic situation virtually unresolved.  Nick, after 
all, does not finally marry Julia (nor his muse Miriam for that matter), anticipating 
Lambert Strether’s similar rejection of financial security in the form of Maria Gostrey in 
James’s late novel The Ambassadors.  Instead, his sister Biddy marries Sherringham and 
it is Mrs. Dormer, courtesy of Julia’s generosity, who is at last secured in the economic 
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comfort we all along expect our protagonist to achieve.  Meanwhile, the impermissible 
contamination of Gabriel Nash is expelled from the novel even as his influence on Nick 
seems to persist well past the book’s conclusion.  In the final accounting, then, the reader 
is left with a “superficial adherence” to the well-made ending whose faults are so deep 
and wide that we wonder how long it will stand.   
Eve Sedgwick notoriously examines James’s handling of a similar superficial 
adherence to conventional novelistic sexuality in her provocative essay “The Beast in the 
Closet,” suggesting that the mysterious presence at the center of James’s tale “The Beast 
in the Jungle” is its protagonist John Marcher’s inability to navigate the powerful and 
competing demands of homoerotic desire and homosexual panic.155  Many critics have 
taken Sedgwick to task for the audacity of her reading, protesting in classic reactionary 
fashion that she is reading too much into things, injecting her own vested political interest 
into a text that is about a man who, afraid to live, has no evident homoerotic leanings of 
any kind.  Sedgwick takes an unspecified affliction, this line of thinking goes, and twists 
it into something dirty to advance her own intemperately pro-gay agenda.156   
I could likely be accused of a similar transgression, taking what is a legitimate 
point of plot – Nick’s indecision about his career – and making a lot of gay hay about it.  
Critics after all have not historically read the novel in the way I suggest and even recent 
queer readings have inflected the novel in a different manner.  Christopher Lane, for 
example, points out the novel’s “awkward prominence of homosexual desire” but sees, 
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wrongly I think, that desire manifested in an erotic attraction between Nick and Nash.157  
An assertion of homoerotic desire between the two men is overly speculative, and I 
understand Gabriel Nash’s role to be that of an initiator to a specific culture rather than a 
potential lover.  Lane’s thoughtful handling of the novel’s bungled attempt to jettison 
homoeroticism in favor of an unbelievable heterosexual resolution, however, is extremely 
perceptive.  Lane is also correct to warn us away from “the assumption that homosexual 
desire is simply the ‘truth’ of The Tragic Muse,” suggesting instead a more nuanced 
approach that uncovers the occluded homosexual meanings of the text without trying to 
out its characters or author.  This sort of reading is precisely what I have in mind when 
arguing that this transitional novel is divided against itself, that it ultimately submits to 
understanding the society that it is critiquing in the same problematic terms that society 
employs to describe itself.  The novel poses a challenge to Victorian standards of 
propriety and decency in its opening acts before finally collapsing into what is more or 
less a reification of some of its most troubling values.  In other words, even as the text 
suggests an alternative, non-heteronormative existence as a desirable and to a great extent 
positive possibility – (Nash’s jet-setting, opera-going, cosmopolitan life sounds pretty 
fabulous to me, anyway) – it nonetheless perpetuates as fact some of the most 
problematic negative associations, specifically the notion that homosexuals are detectable 
by, for one thing, their predilection for style, about a “lifestyle” whose outlines seemed at 
that very historical moment to be coming into focus. 
 The crudely aestheticist ideals propounded by Gabriel Nash allow James to 
emphasize thematically the novel sexual significance of style in the society in which he 
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lived and worked – a bourgeois, Anglo-American culture that was at this moment 
beginning or about to begin to widely assume (years before the Wilde trial exploded onto 
the front pages, cementing lasting impressions of gay men, e.g., effeminacy and urbanity) 
that style means homosexuality – on behalf of what seems to be what we would today 
call a moderately activist pro-gay agenda.158  In thematizing the homosexualization of 
style in this novel, James transmits a field report, a first hand account in which we can 
clearly discern the discursive transformations of the final years of the 19th century that 
enabled style and (homo)sexuality to be read together.  If James was only beginning to 
register and write about the topic in a heavy-handed tale like “The Author of ‘Beltraffio’” 
(1884), he had by the time of The Tragic Muse definitively perceived that style in the 
modern age meant something radically new and that the signification of style would 
come to be understood in opposition to all of the bourgeois values ultimately rejected by 
Nick at the end of this novel – marriage, children, economic upward mobility, national 
pride, and British imperialism.  This is, as Ross Posnock points out, one of James’s most 
consistent patterns, that is “a willingness to recognize and submit to a new scale of values 
and new ‘importances’ rather than to contrive measuring by older standards.”159  I argue 
further that though James provides a scathing critique of Victorian standards of sexual 
and artistic subjectivity in The Tragic Muse, he nonetheless ends by reifying the 
stigmatization of style and homosexuality in a novel that seems to want but is ultimately 
unable to offer a genuinely new and sustainable model of sexual subjectivity and instead 
collapses at its end into a pretence of heterosexual resolution in what Joseph Litvak terms 
                                                 
158 See Joseph Litvak Strange Gourmets: Sophistication, Theory and the Novel (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 1997) and Alan Sinfield, The Wilde Century (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994). 
159 Ross Posnock The Trial of Curiosity: Henry James, William James, and the Challenge of Modernity 
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“one of the more extreme, if not exactly terroristic, instances of James’s 
counterplotting.”160  In other words, James seems to want to make room for his 
protagonist to step outside of the heteronormative matrix and to create a life for himself 
that is dedicated to style and to a prototypically gay existence, something akin to what we 
might today call an “art fag.”  Yet at the same time by coupling in the logic of the 
narrative these two things – style and a lifestyle that cannot shake, rightly or wrongly, 
discrediting presumptions about sexuality – James hypostatizes the fledgling notion that 
style is the locus of the homosexual.  Ironically, the consequence for James is that the 
same kind of moral and aesthetic assessment – in short, style is a tell-tale signifier of 
homosexuality – that he writes about and fails to recuperate in the middle period of his 
career will later be marshaled against him, especially with regards to the notoriously 
mannered novels of the major phase.  If then while James’s finely tuned perception 
shows a striking apprehension of the sexual inflection style undergoes during his middle 
period, he will later fall victim to the very same discursive conversion on which he is at 
this point reporting, a lamentable repercussion for a writer who seems eager to open a 
space for novel erotic experience and style of life, but in the final accounting cannot 
permit himself to do so. 
 Though it does recognize the positive potential style might conceivably afford to 
the erotically marginal, The Tragic Muse repeatedly figures style of expression as one of 
its most fraught terms.  James starts the book, in fact, by defining the milieu in which 
Nick lives as being expressively impoverished, staging the respectable world of 
bourgeois Anglo-American society as a stylistic void.  “The people of France have made 
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it no secret,” the narrator informs us, “that those of England, as a general thing, are to 
their perception an inexpressive and speechless race, perpendicular and unsociable, 
unaddicted to enriching any bareness of contact with verbal or other embroidery” (I.3).  
The statement, presented as national opinion rather than fact, is soon confirmed when the 
narrator speculates that “this view might have derived encouragement, a few years ago, in 
Paris, from the manner in which four persons sat together in silence, one fine day about 
noon, in the garden, as it is called, of the Palais de l’Industrie” (I.3).  Our introduction to 
the Dormer family is all the more convincing as to their stylistic emptiness because, as 
Sara Blair points out, the narrator “deftly distances himself from English ‘insularity’ and 
‘inexpressiveness’ in his elaborate play with syntax and narrative style,” creating a 
stylistic acrobatics that makes the Dormers seem every bit as stodgy and inexpressive as 
the French are alleged to think.161  His very stylishness underlines the plainness of those 
he is describing.  The very first thing we learn about the culture that James will satirize 
over the course of the novel is that it is prone to shunning style and that it is likely to 
welcome style’s intrusion with the same icy silence that the Dormers demonstrate at the 
novel’s opening.  By no means is it hard to imagine what that stifling world must feel like 
for the man in the middle, Nick, who probably might have a lot more in common with the 
people of Paris than with his own “inexpressive and speechless race.”162 
                                                 
161 Sara Blair, Henry James and the Writing of Race and Nation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1996), 133. 
162 It might at this point be fair to object that the distinction James draws at the outset of the novel is one 
based not on the vicissitudes of sexual identity as my larger argument suggests, but rather on a key 
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indeed the categories James employs both in ascribing a collective sentiment to “the people of France” and 
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most notably of course in the figure of the tragic muse herself, the foreign-born Jew Miriam Rooth (155).  
While I agree with this argument and do not wish to dismiss its importance, what James sees himself as 
being up to, I think, by marking the difference between the English and French is rather more related to 
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While the problem of sexual identity is left unresolved at the conclusion of the 
novel, it is quickly established as indistinguishable from the question of the expressivity 
with which James begins.  The arrival of Gabriel Nash in the novel’s opening chapters, 
                                                                                                                                                 
sexuality than Blair acknowledges.  James de-emphasizes the racial aspect of that reading, for example, in 
his account of the genesis of the novel in the New York edition preface: 
 
What I make out from furthest back is that I must have had from still further back, must 
in fact potentially have always had, that happy thought of some dramatic picture of the 
‘artist-life’ and of the difficult terms on which it is best secured and enjoyed, the general 
question of its having to be not altogether easily paid for. (I.v) 
 
James, despite his characteristically circuitous manner, is clear to stress that his preoccupation, the germ 
from which the novel sprang, is the high cost to be paid for attaining the life of the artist rather than that 
theme in its relation to other national contexts.  Obviously James’s “dramatic picture” is situated within a 
national context, the English one, a point he acknowledges again in the preface by pointing out that: 
 
Art indeed has in our day taken on so many honours and emoluments that the recognition 
of its importance is more than a custom, has become on occasion almost a fury […] 
especially in the English world (I.ix). 
 
However, where Blair sees the project of nation-building as an implicit part of that notion of Englishness, I 
see instead James trying to situate an aesthetic problem within a sociological and more importantly 
psychological context.  As a consequence of her emphasis Blair reads the conclusion of the novel as 
showing that “James’s identifications with cosmopolitan alterity will collapse into the well-made ending, 
with the requisite marriages and reversals of fortune, of the distinctly English literary tradition he has 
attempted to redirect” (156).  As I have pointed out already, however, this description is not entirely 
accurate.  Nick does not, in fact, as Blair says “embrac[e] the patriarchal cultural imperative he initially 
resists,” nor does he submit to the requisite marriage the reader all along expects he eventually will (156).  
Instead, The Tragic Muse’s ending is a kind of stop-gap measure, a partially well-made ending that queerly 
excuses Nick from its totalizing and terrorizing heterosexual completion.  Gabriel Nash had predicted – not 
without a substantial note of irony – Nick’s return to the respectable fold, telling him to “take care, take 
care … and every one, beginning with your wife, will forget there’s anything queer about you, and 
everything will be for the best in the best of worlds” (I.406).  Yet that prophesied future never comes to 
pass.  Instead on the final page of the novel the narrator reasserts his queer presence in a gossipy – gossip 
as we all know being that supposed province of women and gay men – finale, contradicting Nash with 
news: 
 
[O]f Nick Dormer, in regard to whom I may finally say that his friend Nash's predictions 
about his reunion with Mrs. Dallow have not up to this time been justified. On the other 
hand, I must not omit to add, this lady has not, at the latest accounts, married Mr. 
Macgeorge. It is very true there has been a rumour that Mr. Macgeorge is worried about 
her – has even ceased at all fondly to believe in her. (II..441) 
 
While I agree, then, with Blair that many if not most of the identification with cosmopolitan alterities we 
encounter in the novel are collapsed at its end, the resolution of the novel does remain brazenly if playfully 
indeterminate when it comes to sexuality and that that sexual indeterminacy is a direct consequence of the 
novel’s modernity.  For as the narrator remarks at the novel’s end, “in glancing about the little circle of 
interests I have tried to evoke I am suddenly warmed by a sharp sense of modernness” (II.440).  If it is true 
as Blair suggests that these other forms of alterity (racial, ethnic, national, etc.) are dispensed with at the 
novel’s end, what else remains to evoke the warmth of that modernity but the tantalizing yet not completely 
embraced hope that Nick, all rumor aside, won’t stick around with Mrs. Dallow at all? 
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for example, unsettles Nick’s reluctant conformity with his family and countrymen and 
inaugurates the possibility both of stylistic and of sexual transformation.  Nick 
admiringly explains to his sister Biddy that Nash “has written a very clever book … a sort 
of novel” that he cannot describe other than to say it contains “a lot of good writing” 
(I.29).  Nash is from the start, then, associated with the violation of proper convention, of 
the aesthetic conventions that would make his work more easily classifiable as something 
other than “a sort of novel,” whatever that means, and of the social transgression that is a 
consequence of the boundary to polite bourgeois appreciation instigated by the inability 
of the characters to discuss the book, a problem that brings a swift end, in fact, to Nick 
and Biddy’s discussion of Nash’s sort of novel.  Nash makes bad art, clever bad art, that 
contains good writing for sure, but art that is totally alien to English culture because it 
does not play by the conventional stylistic rules. 
 What is much more palatable to polite Anglo-American society, the novel 
suggests, is the “unstyled” vernacular of the political class.  Gabriel Nash rejects that 
dialect outright in an exchange that makes him about as close as the novel has to a 
spokesperson for the cause of rejecting boring, self-satisfied political rhetoric.  He 
suggests, simultaneously criticizing the ineloquence of British politicians and the 
prejudice of the reading public, that literature in his transgressive style is far better art but 
that the demands of his readers ultimately make writing a bankrupt enterprise.  His 
critique rests on his almost Foucauldian belief that categorization of individuals is the 
primary task of modern Western culture, a belief that has been borne out all too well over 
the decades in the case of his, Nash’s, creator.  “Why should one call one’s self 
anything?” he wonders.  “One only deprives other people of their dearest occupation” 
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(I.34).  That occupation acts particularly fiercely against writers, Nash explains, and 
“from the moment” writing is “for the convenience of others the signs have to be grosser, 
the shades begin to go.  That’s a deplorable hour!  Literature, you see, is for the 
convenience of others.  It requires the most abject concessions.  It plays such mischief 
with one’s style that really I’ve had to give it up” (I.34).  Nash suggests that he greatly 
values his freedom to produce art in a style foreign to his audience but that he has found 
the freedom to be unacceptably curtailed by his readership.  For him the moment one 
gives in and allows mischief to be made with one’s style is the moment that it is not 
worth doing any more.  Literature may be a means of communicating with one’s 
audience, Nash concedes, but he is also voicing the novel’s commentary on its own 
reception, a commentary that reads as deeply dissatisfied with the conventions of literary 
criticism, especially the conventions of style. 
 One can imagine that what Nash wants instead is the freedom to continue in his 
own style, to write books that aren’t quite novels, without that project marking his own 
person so definitely.  He recognizes, though, that to use style is to make oneself 
vulnerable to the judgment of readers, in other words, that it is the writer who bears the 
burden of stylistic analysis, especially the burden of sexual diagnosis.  Nash, after all, is 
first described by Biddy as being in the company of “queer female appendages” and “as 
generally a good deal accounted for by the literary character” (I.29).  His strangeness 
seems to her to bear a direct correlation with the literature he produces.  It is as though 
Nash’s literary character, the quality of his writing, and his social character – the quality 
of his being or behaving – directly imply one another. 
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Dormer can easily be read as being in the same perilous position.  Nick clearly 
understands his situation and Nash’s to be related, if not identical, because different kinds 
of art seem only various manifestations of the same core artistic impulse.  Early in the 
novel Nick explains as much to Biddy, telling her “all art is one – remember that, Biddy 
dear. … It’s the same great many-headed effort, and any ground that’s gained by an 
individual, any spark that’s struck in any province, is of use and of suggestion to all the 
others.  We’re all in the same boat.”  (I.14).  While Nick is a painter and, in one of 
James’s slier undercuttings a mere portraitist, his story as he understands it is the story of 
any artist.  James reinforces that notion in his preface in which he writes of “the happy 
thought of some dramatic picture of the ‘artist-life’” or as he puts it, “art, that is, as a 
human complication and a social stumbling block” (I.v).  James’s aim is to produce a 
portrait of the “artist-life,” suggesting we are meant to see Nick’s and Nash’s 
predicaments as overlapping or even the same.163  On this reading Nick’s artistic 
indecision and Nash’s disgusted rejection of the literary world have a lot in common; 
both face the demands of an inexpressive public ready to pounce on any, to use one of 
James’s favorite words, “queer” instantiation of style.164   
We need look no further than the way that James stages the major opposition of 
the book – the artist-life versus the politician-life – as a battle over style to see that 
painting and literature are allies in this novel, allies aligned on the promiscuously 
productive side of style over and against politics’ monogamously barren idiom.  The 
                                                 
163 This would not be at all an unexpected move for James as Michael Moon shows that James thought that 
what he calls his own “initiation” into style occurred through his reception of painted works as a boy and 
that that initiation carried over into the adult James’s written aesthetic.  Michael Moon, A Small Boy and 
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University Press, 1998), 31-65. 
164 For an analysis of James’s use of the word queer see Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, “Shame, Theatricality, 
and Queer Performativity: Henry James’s The Art of the Novel” in Touching, Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, 
Performativity (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003). 
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inclusion of Nash’s critique of the literary establishment allows James to position art and 
politics as competing values that can be measured on the same scale of expressive value.  
In other words, it would be ungenerous to evaluate politics on the basis of a plastic art 
like painting but if all art is one, then it is perfectly reasonable to talk about style as a 
value across the board, to talk at once about style in painting but at the same time to talk 
about style as a literary or rhetorical feature. 
The problem of politics in The Tragic Muse, I suggest, is that it manifests the 
same trend toward inexpressive or “unstylized” language that drove Nash out of the 
writing business.  Politics, as Nick says sarcastically, “is still worse for one’s style” (I.35) 
than even the demands of fiction writing.  Nash emphatically agrees, pointing out that “it 
has simply nothing in life to do with shades!” (I.35).  In other words, as the demands of 
the citizenry and the reading public homogenize, they force linguistic concessions that 
leave texts bleached of style, with politics, that path for which Nick continues to be 
groomed on all sides, as the worst culprit.  As evidence Nash points out that once Nick 
“had a style, upon my words he had!  But I’ve seen it go.  I’ve read his speeches” and “it 
was like listening to a nightingale in a brass band” (I.35).  In his former life Nick had a 
style, that same former life by the way in which he was under Nash’s sway at Oxford.  
Once he finds himself a servant to his country, though, Nick’s style seeps out of him, 
leaving behind a dried up husk of boring prose.  Politics, what Nash calls “the verbiage of 
parliamentary speeches – !” (I.175), is the style killer, a tradition-bound rhetoric designed 
to conservatively advance the protection of traditional or family values, to borrow a 
modern day neology.165 
                                                 
165 Family values being in this case the Dormer clan’s, especially Mrs. Dormer and Nick’s prospective wife 
Julia’s, ambitious hopes for Nick’s political ascension as a catalyst for their own social climbing. 
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For Nick to return to that domain would mean a special embrace of bourgeois 
values.  He would marry Julia, contract into a large inheritance from his father’s friend 
Carteret, and secure his supposed obligation to his mother to do right by her fiscally.  But 
it would also mean buying into the tradition of English rhetoric, “the tradition of 
dreariness, of stodginess, of dull dense literal prose” (I.170), the sort of existence we 
already know Nick is aversive to.  Moreover, he would have to foreclose on the style of 
life that Nash’s reappearance has activated and put into play as a possibility.  Nash, of 
course, is having none of it, telling Nick that that dense literal prose “has so sealed 
people’s eyes that they’ve ended up thinking the most natural of all things the most 
perverse. Why keep up the dreariness, in our poor little day?  No one can tell me why, 
and almost everyone calls me names for simply asking the question” (I.170).  The 
tyranny implied in that passage is telling as to the social conditions Nick faces and James 
reproduces.  If Nash is “out” about his proclivity for style, it is not for lack of trying on 
the part of the discursive forces that enfold him.  For life is not merely made boring for 
Nash by his linguistic surroundings – that cardinal sin of modern times for the dandy – 
but are actually dangerous for him as those around him gladly take up the ideological 
labor of policing the boundaries between socially acceptable and perverse idioms.  As 
John Carlos Rowe points out, “James’s male characters who suffer their secrets of artistic 
or homosexual passion are also victims of social orders in both England and America that 
do not permit the expression of masculine aestheticism or same-sex eroticism.”166  Some 
of those characters, like Nash, defy the social order and express in spite of it, only to face 
the punitive measures here euphemistically termed “name calling,” of the social order’s 
response.  Others like Nick (and we can speculate James himself) remain ambivalent, 
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attracted to the idea of an open and expressive vernacular but abjectly frightened by the 
torments that Nash so nonchalantly shrugs off.  As Rowe puts it, Nash and Dormer are 
instances of James’s “gay characters and those identified variously as ‘different,’ who are 
victimized just insofar as they are required to speak a language that expresses only their 
powerlessness or dispossession.”167 
Nash’s function in the novel is to voice the possibility of another kind of existence 
rooted in an appreciation of style and “the most natural of all things,” which operates as a 
kind of short-hand for the unspoken homosexual meaning that style implies.  Rowe 
argues that “on one level James is defensive in his representation of same-sex relations, 
preferring to subordinate any explicit sexuality to textual and aesthetic issues.  In this 
regard James often acts out the homosexual panic Sedgwick finds structurally integral to 
masculine writing in the Victorian period and a necessary corollary of its constitutive 
homosociality.”168  While I agree that James is often “defensive” about same-sex 
relations as evidenced in his famous refusal to sign a mass protest of writers and artists 
against Wilde’s prosecution, Rowe’s reading here strikes me as a slightly insufficient 
description when considering The Tragic Muse.  Such a reading necessarily makes 
homosexuality the secret of this text, the hidden answer or “what he’s really talking 
about” when he talks about style.  But as I’ve said already this is not just a text “about” 
same-sex desire that camouflages that story by overlaying an arbitrary narrative about 
aesthetics on top of it.169  Rowe is right to suggest that James very often addresses 
aesthetic or textual issues with the goal, conscious or not, of taking up same-sex eroticism 
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might suggest. 
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as a problem – take for instance the litany of tales about writers such as “The Author of 
‘Beltraffio’,” “The Figure in the Carpet,” and “The Death of the Master” that are 
saturated with queer meanings.  Rowe’s recourse to the idea of subordination, however, 
paradoxically and problematically attributes greater value to the subordinated term; the 
subordinate or concealed term – homosexuality or “same-sex relations” as he calls it – 
takes on greater importance because it is the term that requires us to breach the author’s 
defenses – moral, textual, psychological – in order to reach.  It is crucial, I contend, that 
we not subordinate the very real same-sex eroticism of The Tragic Muse only to let it, in 
Gordian fashion, dominate our entire understanding of the novel at the expense of the 
aesthetic issue – style – that supposedly subordinates it.  Because the aesthetic and textual 
issue of style – a term that so preoccupies Gabriel Nash that he returns twice to lecture 
his friend about it – is surely just as important to the novel as is the panic of same-sex 
eroticism, we must be careful to counterbalance, as James so masterfully does, the two 
terms.  Eric Haralson lucidly describes that counterbalance in Henry James and Queer 
Modernity when he talks about the new idea in the Victorian period that 
Aspects of style – such as the tone and diction of a speech such as “We defy augury” – 
can reveal or betray authorial sexuality, and precisely because sexuality determines what 
sort of “line” an author can or cannot produce.  By implication, only a straight author can 
write a straight line (or walk a straight line, or deliver a straight line), just as a queer line 
can only be composed by, and thus invariably signals, a queer author.170 
 
Haralson is not directly talking about The Tragic Muse or at least not talking about it by 
name, but his is a near perfect description of the novel’s central thematic preoccupation, a 
culture-wide preoccupation that I discuss at length over the course of chapter one. 
 If the homosexualization of style is a thematic concern in the novel, though, The 
Tragic Muse also suggests in its own form that distinctive style is the province of a 
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distinctive few, namely of Nash, the narrator and finally, though uncertainly, of Nick 
himself.  As I’ve already pointed out, the staid speaking style that is attributed to Nick’s 
family and the English public at large (and especially to the people’s representatives in 
government, that depository of all the very worst of “the verbiage of parliamentary 
speeches”) is regularly contrasted with the urbane exuberance of the narrator’s 
commentary.  Among all the Jamesian narrators, this one especially flaunts a punditry 
nourished by James’s twin commitments (or one an aspiration and the other a burden) to 
the past age and to the new.  This narrator stays reluctantly bound by the conventions of 
novelistic plotting even as he laments the omission of that non-heteronormative excess of 
the story to which he seems more dedicated.  At the start of the book’s second volume, 
for instance, the narrator abridges a conversation between Nick and Nash, moving on but 
complaining that “with much of our tale left to tell it is a pity that so little of this colloquy 
may be reported here; since, as affairs took their course, it marked really – if the question 
be of noting the exact point – a turn of the tide in Nick Dormer’s personal situation” 
(II.23).  This formative moment, a queer tutorial if you will, is truncated by the demands 
of the novel form for movement towards its conclusion yet we can hardly resist noting 
that our narrator doesn’t seem to want to fulfill that obligation and that he (and of James’s 
anonymous, omniscient narrators surely this one ranks close to the most decidedly 
marked as male at least and gay male probably) registers his disappointment in a stylized 
way.  That style in turn marks a decidedly erotic investment in the Nick/Nash sub-plot, a 
trope of intense interest in those kinds of narrative tributaries that will especially in the 
20th century become one of the hallmarks of queer spectatorship.171  But more to the point 
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of our present concerns, that queer tactic is executed in a – maybe even the – queer way, 
a stylized way.  Notice in particular the strange cobbling together of two sentences 
relaying a fairly short and simple idea along the seam of a semi-colon whose position 
serves only to complicate the style rather than to elucidate, at the level of “meaning,” the 
narrator’s point.  It is as though the narrator’s overdetermined allegiance to the story of 
Nick and Nash overtakes the responsibility he owes to relate the fairly conventional (and 
dare I say it not all that interesting) marriage plot, and his protest is registered 
stylistically.  Stranger still than that awkward joint, though, is this narrator’s 
characteristically involuted style as enacted in the sentence’s second part, a multiple in-
turning or embroidering of thought as resistance to linearity or simplicity.  This style is 
not yet at the level of what Sedgwick describes as the property of the sentence in The 
Ambassadors, “whose relatively conventional subject-verb-object armature is disrupted, 
if never quite ruptured, as the sac of the sentence gets distended by the insinuation of one 
more, and just one more, and another, another, and impossibly just one more, qualifying 
phrase or clause,” yet that is because, I would argue, James and his narrator too still 
remain suspicious of, if undeniably interested by, what a novel written in such a style 
would reflect about its author.172  Or to put it more precisely, James cannot yet bring 
himself to abandon the novelistic form in all its heteronormative triumph, as half-
heartedly embodied in The Tragic Muse as it is, even as his narrator voices this 
dissatisfaction that is both enchanted, like Gabriel Nash, with the queer play of style and 
                                                                                                                                                 
anonymous woman Marlene Dietrich famously kisses in Morocco.  Bright explains that upon seeing the 
film she constructed a series of alternative stories in her mind about this character and her (lesbian) 
relationship with the star, perversely pulling this minor and backgroundless cipher into the foreground of 
her own erotic relationship to the film as a queer spectator.  The Celluloid Closet, DVD, directed by Rob 
Epstein and Jeffrey Friedman (1996; Sony Pictures, 2001). 
172 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, “Is the Rectum Straight? Identification and Identity in The Wings of the Dove” 
in Tendencies (Durham: Duke University Press, 19930, 102. 
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yet clamped by its ankle to a form whose violation could mean all manner of social and 
professional calamity.173 
 This is the tension that runs throughout The Tragic Muse at the level of both plot 
and form.  Indeed though the novel does fulfill its obligation to move teleologically 
forward in order to resolve the marriage plot it sets up at its beginning, it nonetheless 
looks longingly sideways at the indulgent and pleasurable mischief of style as it passes.  
This double-move, what I have called the novel’s division-against-itself, is summed up 
by the novel’s report that “Nick Dormer had already become aware of having two states 
of mind while listening to this philosopher [Nash]; one in which he laughed, doubted, 
sometimes even reprobated, failed to follow or accept, and another in which his old friend 
seemed to take the words out of his mouth, to utter for him, better and more completely, 
the very things he was on the point of saying” (II.52).  The text goes out of its way to 
disavow Nash’s philosophy, purporting that Nick had “two states of mind” about Nash’s 
doctrine but then going on to multiply the side against five-fold, making it not just two 
equally weighted states of mind at war but rather a gang of five – “in which he [1] 
laughed, [2] doubted, [3] sometimes even reprobated, [4] failed to follow or [5] accept” – 
versus the outnumbered proposition of accepting what Nash has got to say.  And no 
wonder the text marshals such odds as Nash is figured here as reaching into Nick’s own 
mouth to fish out his language, a terrifying and attractive combination of unwilling 
possession and of recognition by Nick that he and Nash are a lot more alike than he 
thinks, a point that seems to confirm Julia Dallow’s proclamation to Nick that “you’re 
everything you pretend not to be” (I.277).  The passages I have discussed here represent 
the novel’s twin imperatives, or more precisely one imperative and one temptation.  On 
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the one hand stands maturity, adult and end-oriented, marriage focused, straightforward 
plotting that would draw Nick Dormer inexorably toward his heteronormative fate (even 
doom?); on the other stands the perversity of style, the meandering of eccentric 
storytelling, the ambiguity and uncertainty of an ending that will not resolve its loose 
ends, and the refusal of predetermined, irresistible heterosexual scripts.  As I’ve tried to 
show, The Tragic Muse tries to have it both ways, making James’ creation into one of his 
most monstrously conflicted texts.  And if I complain, following both Nash and the 
narrator, that this story contains too much of the former position and not enough of the 
latter, the novel is still a compelling document of its author’s gradual rejection of the 
former and growing embrace of the latter.  Flying in the face of popular notions of 
psychology and of psychoanalysis, James’s novels do not grow up and grow out of the 
kind of supposedly immature sexuality that must, for respectability’s sake, give way to a 
fully-formed adult sexuality and its responsible narratives of family-growing.  The Tragic 
Muse is remarkable because it is at that center point of James’s career in which that 
oppressive script begins to become inverted.  If this is an imperfect novel, as Geismar 
claims it is, it is not for the reasons he says but rather because its commitment to a queer 
form is fractured, its loyalties divided, its future promise at this point uncertain. 
 How can we account for such internal strife in The Tragic Muse?  First, there is 
the hot-button topic of James’s response to what is by now his fairly obvious homoerotic 
inclination.  For generations scholars were eager and willing to turn a blind eye to or even 
manufacture elaborate theories so as to keep the master free from the stain of 
homosexuality.  Most often these critics went the route of arguing for James’s celibacy, a 
convenient excuse that solved the problem not only of the striking homoerotic elements 
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of some of his texts but also the embarrassing biographical fact of his confirmed 
bachelorhood.  These arguments ranged from the relatively mild but still necessarily 
pathologizing claims of F.R. Leavis: “it should be generally agreed that something went 
wrong with his development” to the hateful and panicked embrace by many of James’s 
famous “obscure hurt,” Leon Edel going so far as to disseminate the outlandish 
speculation that James’s penis was burned off in an accident at a young age – better to 
castrate the boy than humiliate the master.174  And when critics did begin to allow James 
to take the first tentative steps out of the closet they still frequently did so in a defensive 
manner, shielding him from any actual same-sex attraction or behavior as in this 
estimation: “James did renounce for good and all without having had much of a taste of 
what he was renouncing and … had he not renounced he would have been a 
homosexual.”175 
 All but the most stubbornly unwilling critics today would agree that James was 
neither straight nor desireless nor even, though this would be the contentious part, 
sexless.  Yet as Hugh Stevens points out, “there is in James … a straightforward (and 
easily documented) desire to conform to public standards of acceptability, to ease the 
reception of his novels (he abhorred the scandal surrounding Wilde and Hardy, for 
example).”176  In spite of that speculated desire to conform James remained a sharp critic 
of the prices that conformity extracts from those it constrains, especially when it comes to 
sexuality.  James’s “The Author of ‘Beltraffio’” stands as one of his sharpest rejoinders 
to that conformity, a story that like The Tragic Muse is also a thorough meditation on the 
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links between perversion and style.  As part of James’s anxious view on the cultural 
discourse on style and sexuality that was beginning to take shape around him and within 
him, The Tragic Muse is a decidedly more subtle and refined, if ultimately just as 
conflicted, take on the subject than in James’s earlier treatment of it in “The Author of 
‘Beltraffio.’”  Written just a few years before The Tragic Muse James’s story displays a 
remarkably more savage attack on the cultural trend to read homosexuality in style even 
as it, like The Tragic Muse, remains ambivalent about the same-sex desire it represents 
between the narrator and his object of erotic curiosity, the eponymous novelist.  The story 
itself is narrated by a zealous American partisan of writer Mark Ambient, who comes via 
letter of introduction to spend a weekend at the country home of Ambient and his wife, 
son and spinster sister.  From the start the narrator’s effusive enthusiasm for Ambient’s 
work, and in particular the novel Beltraffio, is met with dismissive scorn by Ambient’s 
wife Beatrice who repeatedly declares, “I don’t read what he writes.”177  We learn from 
Ambient’s sister Miss Ambient, moreover, that it is not mere ignorance or intellectual 
incapacity that motivates Beatrice Ambient’s cold response to her husband’s work but 
rather that “she does n’t like his ideas.  She does n’t like them for the child.  She thinks 
them undesirable.”178  As the story progresses, Beatrice’s suspicion of Ambient’s “ideas” 
and her disgust with “his writings most objectionable” drives her to deny medical 
attention to their critically ill young son Dolcino, resulting ultimately in the boy’s 
untimely death.179  Miss Ambient later explains to the horrified narrator that Beatrice’s 
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actions were to her a hygienic measure: “she determined to rescue him – to prevent him 
from ever being touched.”180 
 Once the initial shock of this gruesome infanticide wears off, we must critically 
ask what Beatrice finds so objectionable about her husbands “ideas,” what could in 
essence drive a mother to kill her son.  The reader is never exactly privy to the content of 
Ambient’s books but from the discussions on literary method that Ambient has with his 
admirer one can capture a good sense of why his wife finds those ideas so dangerous.  It 
becomes apparent that what is such a hysteria-inducing threat about Mark Ambient is, 
like Gabriel Nash, his aestheticist preoccupation with style.  In the opening pages of the 
story, for instance, the narrator singles that preoccupation out as evidence that “the man 
who drew those characters and wrote that style understood what he saw and knew what 
he was doing,” suggesting that perhaps the most characteristic feature of Ambient’s work 
is not its commitment to some intrinsically immoral or politically objectionable subject 
matter but rather something remarkable about its style.181  The narrator continues to stress 
this point when he reports that, 
This was the taken stand of the artist to whom every manifestation of human energy was 
a thrilling spectacle and who felt for ever the desire to resolve his experience of life into a 
literary form.  On that high head of the passion for form – the attempt at perfection, the 
quest for which was to his mind the real search for the holy grail – he said the most 
interesting, the most inspiring things.182 
 
Beyond merely having an extreme dedication to form (“style”) the story presents that 
stylistic preoccupation as evidence of a deeper stigmatizing tendency.  For instance, 
though Ambient expounds at length on the aesthetic virtues of “literary form,” he 
nonetheless has “in his books … uttered but half his thought, and that what he kept back 
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– from motives [the narrator] deplored when [he] made them out later – was the finer, 
and braver part.”183  Ambient’s aesthetic manifesto, then, exceeds even the studied 
excellence of his published writings.  The narrator’s words suggest that Ambient’s 
dedication to style is in theory absolute but that “at bottom the poor fellow, disinterested 
to his finger-tips and regarding imperfection not only as an aesthetic but quite also as a 
social crime, had an extreme dread of scandal.” 184  Though stylistic perfection is of the 
utmost importance to Ambient, the scandal that style might provoke among his readers 
curtails the lengths to which he is willing to go to put that aesthetic theory into practice. 
 The sort of scandal Ambient’s style is liable to incite is hinted at by the sudden 
eroticization of discussions between the two men.  The narrator initiates this trend, 
suggesting to Ambient that the latter’s artistic goal is “to stick your shaft deep and polish 
the plate through which people look into it – that’s what your work consists of.”185  This 
rather strange description of the writing process combines the sexually prurient imagining 
of Ambient sinking his shaft deep together with a voyeuristic rendering of style as the 
process of making that sexual act transparent to the audience.  In other words, style is 
conceived here as that thing that makes visible to every reader exactly where and how 
one sinks one’s shaft – a decidedly phallocentric conception of the artistic process to be 
sure – and that is both its tremendous value and the reason it instills in Ambient, as with 
James, such “an extreme dread of scandal.” 
 The narrator is not the only one to perceive style in this way as Miss Ambient also 
proves herself to be a keen observer, freed from the world of socio-sexual exchange as 
she is, of how style and sexuality work together.  “I’m intensely sensitive to form,” she 
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says.  “But sometimes I draw back don’t you see what I mean?”186  Miss Ambient’s 
position as a spinster seems to make her both unusually perceptive and unusually free to 
speak.  Passed by, as it were, by the chance of married life somehow attunes her to form, 
style, and also of course to sexuality.  Miss Ambient, after all, delicately interrogates the 
narrator, “Do you also write then?  And in the same style as my brother?  And do you like 
that style?  And do people appreciate it in America?”187  With these questions she feels 
out the narrator – his answers are pointedly omitted – asking in a roundabout but very 
telling way if his “style” is the same as her brother’s.  Her coy entreaties here are 
matched by her assertion that “poor Mark does n’t make love to other people either.  You 
might think he would, but I assure you he does n’t.”188  Miss Ambient’s again knowing 
suggestion here, especially in her carefully worded explanation that Mark isn’t sleeping 
with “other people” confirms our suspicions through its very denial.  Both the narrator 
and reader might expect that Mark would stray given that he is, as the narrator puts it, 
“mismated,” but the gender-neutral selection his sister uses is clearly meant to put 
everyone in the know on the same page.  Miss Ambient as a “modern” woman, one we 
might otherwise scorn because of her “failure” to achieve conventional heterosexual 
union – “Miss Ambient was a restless romantic disappointed spinster” – comes out 
herself in the story as perhaps the most sexually knowing, or at least the one most willing 
to talk about the open secret of Ambient’s sexuality.  And though the narrator “was never 
more than half to penetrate her motives and mysteries,” Ambient’s sister reiterates 
James’s familiar terror of the rapidly crystallizing link between style and 
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homosexuality.189  This description of Mrs. Ambient’s fear of Mark’s style should sound 
very familiar: “she has a dread of my brother’s influence on the child – on the formation 
of his character, his ‘ideals,’ poor little brat, his principles.  It’s as if it were a subtle 
poison or contagion – something that would rub off on his tender sensibility when his 
father kisses him or holds him on his knee.”190  Shades of Gabriel Nash.  The threat of 
contagion, then, forms the key point upon which the climax of the tale turns, a pivot that 
might not be immediately obvious to all but which intimates to those in the know a wider 
trend in Anglo-American literary culture.  As Kevin Ohi points out, “the wife’s concern 
that Ambient’s writing might corrupt the young could be read to index, in a more or less 
oblique way, the intimations of homosexuality that would have clung, for members of 
James’s circle as perhaps for a wider English audience, to Symonds.”191 
 Critics have, of course, long recognized the homoeroticism that saturates “The 
Author of ‘Beltraffio.’”  Freedman perhaps puts it best by historically contextualizing the 
tale, seeing in it a reflection of James’s conflicted relationship to John Addington 
Symonds, upon whom Mark Ambient seems to be at least partly modeled:  
James evinced equal measures of fascination and disturbance with J.A. Symonds’s 
defenses of male-male love; and James’s ambivalence is inscribed into his story The 
Author of Beltraffio, which inflates gossip about Symonds’s alienation from his horrified 
wife, pained by her husband’s frank acknowledgment of his sexual inclinations, into a 
tale of Gothic horror in which a mother lets her child die rather than grow up with a 
homosexual father.192 
 
Freedman, by situating the tale within the determining pull of the history of aestheticism, 
with its long ties to homoeroticism, usefully illuminates one strand of influence on 
James’s writing.  It is important, however, not to discount the other important, more 
                                                 
189 Ibid., 24. 
190 Ibid., 38. 
191 Kevin Ohi, “The Author of ‘Beltraffio’: The Exquisite Boy and Henry James’s Equivocal 
Aestheticism.”  ELH 72.3 (2005): 747-67, 749. 
192 Freedman, 172. 
111 
literary component of Ambient’s crime in his wife’s eyes.  For it is not the whole story, 
as Freedman says, that Mrs. Ambient doesn’t want her son to grow up with a homosexual 
father, though that is of course part of it.  Ambient himself, for example, points out that 
“she thinks me at any rate no better than an ancient Greek,” a reference not only to his 
non-Christian values but also to the sexual act that would to a man of James’s time – and 
to many still does – characterize the men of that culture.193  What the story reiterates time 
and again is that what strikes genuine terror into Mrs. Ambient is her husband’s writing, 
and in particular his style; she is horrified by the thought that some day her son will read 
his father’s stories – “we must simply tell him they’re not intended for small boys,” 
Ambient helpfully offers – and know without a doubt that his father is a fag.194  To Mrs. 
Ambient the proposition is too obscene, worth essentially killing for.  What I mean to 
stress, then, is James’s awareness of a culture that could produce a mother, albeit a 
fictional one, who would rather kill her son than let him bear witness to his father’s 
perverted style.  What the story represents, and the reason that it is important to our larger 
understanding of what is going on in The Tragic Muse, is that it shows us in a rather 
unfiltered way why James understands the coupling of style and sexuality to be under 
such high stakes.  Whereas in The Tragic Muse the pull to style and the homosexual 
identity that move connotes function under the auspices of family disappointment, in 
“The Author of ‘Beltraffio’” James gives us the naked truth – the genocidal reaction of a 
culture that thinks it knows exactly what sort of person is attracted to style and isn’t 
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afraid to go to virtually any lengths and to accept virtually any measure of collateral 
damage to stop that predilection from spreading.  While Ohi argues that “James’s 
verifiable knowledge is perhaps less relevant than the implicit cultural link between 
aestheticism and sociosexual nonconformity that, implicit in 1884, was cemented and 
made explicit by the Wilde trials,” it is hard to argue given its prominence in both “The 
Author of ‘Beltraffio’” and The Tragic Muse that James was not only verifiably aware 
but actively intervening where he could to critique the “implicit cultural link” between 
style and homosexuality.  In this tale, though, he would only go so far as to paint a 
stinging portrait of the class of people – “so religious and so tremendously moral” – that 
stand ready to discharge their cultural duty to do the stylish so much harm.195 
 If we take the gothic story in general to often function as a kind of caricature of 
the crises that unsettle a given culture, James’s subsequent effort at exploring the sexual 
circulation of style is the more measured and nuanced but no less fraught work of The 
Tragic Muse.  In that novel we find the graphic dramatization of “The Author of 
‘Beltraffio’” replaced with a less overtly panicked but still restrained representation of 
sexuality and style.  For instance, gone is the fanatically murderous mother of 
“Beltraffio,” replaced this time with a more modern, less morally inflexible mother 
whose motives express outward social piety but really depend on a thirst for personal 
material comfort.  Dissolved as well is the salaciously charged mentorship of the narrator 
and Mark Ambient, leaving instead the push/pull, attraction/negation couple of Dormer 
and Nash.  Finally there is the ramification of style itself.  In “Beltraffio” a personal 
obsession is always threatened with a public or semi-public exposure that will ultimately 
bring calamity down on itself and even those around it; in The Tragic Muse it is no less 
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psychically fraught but its discovery, while it may mean social ruination is unlikely to 
leave any actual bodies in its wake.  What I mean to suggest by drawing these parallels is 
not that James was telling the same story twice or that The Tragic Muse is a kind of 
mature revision of a child’s horror story; certainly it would be wrong to call “Beltraffio” 
unsophisticated.  Rather, what these two texts demonstrate through their similar 
preoccupations is James’s working through over a period of years the question of style.  
In the earlier text style and same-sex desire (which function as more or less one and the 
same) are spaces of excess and abjection, cast out of the respectable, bourgeois family 
unit and expressible only under the aegis of certain suspect and discredited zones of 
disreputable privacy: either in the queer space of the aficionado and the celebrity or in the 
confidence of the gossipy, pruriently interested old maid.  The Tragic Muse, in contrast, 
attempts to recuperate and to nurture the dyad style/homoerotic desire in the course of 
Nick Dormer’s long struggle with his vocational and sexual identity in a way that doesn’t 
seem possible in the earlier text.  As I argue, however, even that novel hastily casts doubt 
on the project of recuperation upon which it had embarked, pessimistically concluding 
that the hope for artistic and sexual liberation it tries to make possible for Nick is 
probably untenable.  F.R. Leavis says of James that “essentially he was in quest of an 
ideal society, an ideal civilization.  And English society, he had to recognize as he lived 
into it, could not after all offer him any sustaining approximation to his ideal.  Still less, 
he knew, could America.  So we find him developing into something like a paradoxical 
kind of recluse, a recluse living socially in the midst of society.”196  Leavis’s rather bleak 
assessment of James’s idealism aside, the sense of his claim has generally seemed 
correct.  These two texts register James’s dissatisfaction and finally disappointment with 
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trying to resolve the problem of style as a site at which one can experience the erotic self.  
He finds, as Gabriel Nash does, that style is always prone to mark one as an excessively 
sexual subject, a prospect that James seems to have been extremely skittish about.  His 
later response, though, is not to withdraw, as Leavis suggests, into a kind of reclusive 
living death.  Whereas Nash had retired from the world of writers in total frustration, 
James takes a surprising turn in what Leavis calls “his queer development” and forges 
ahead, putting aside style in the thematic register and re-investing in form to create the 
most dramatically eccentric style of his career.197 
 I turn now in the final section of this chapter to James’s late novel The Wings of 
the Dove (1902).  Its historical proximity to the two texts I have already discussed 
combined with its status as the first of the so-called major phase novels makes it a 
particularly rewarding place from which to view James’s stylistic response to the cultural 
discourse whose effects he had explored in “Beltraffio” and The Tragic Muse.  
Disappointed by his inability to satisfyingly resolve the crisis of style on a thematic or 
narrative level, James instead took the risky step of responding to it on the level of his 
own style, reapproaching a failed project not through plotting but by entering this fraught 
territory on its own terms.  That is, if his usual technique of counterplotting did not allow 
him to deal with the discursive demands placed on style in its new infancy in the 1880’s, 
James responded not by giving up the project as Leavis would suggest but by trying a 
different formal tactic.  Where a critic like Leavis sees in “the peculiarities of his later 
style” nothing but “complexities and exhausting delicacies and its incapacity for 
directness,” there is in fact a strategic – strategic in the sense popularized by Foucault – 
effort to deploy style as the answer to the dilemma posed by the link of style and 
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homosexuality in the cultural imagination, that is, to create a radically disruptive style 
that would evade the sexual policing of stylistics that James saw growing around him and 
described in “Beltraffio” and The Tragic Muse through recourse to a style of 
negativity.198  Leavis, echoing a common opinion of mid-20th century critics about James 
contends that “the style involves for him, registers as prevailing in him, a kind of 
attention that doesn’t favour his realizing his theme.”  In contrast, in the novels of the 
major phase I contend that style is one of the great themes, that style and the sexuality it 
allegedly expresses are now for James strategically utilized to frustrate the prying eyes of 
sexual diagnosis by forging a manner of writing that would infuriate many with its 
ruthless insistence on the surface, on the signifier or letter of nothingness rather than the 
more conventional focus on plotting that had already failed him. 
 Perhaps the most noticeable feature of the Jamesian style in The Wings of the 
Dove is its often remarked upon insistence on negativity, its almost obsessive insistence 
on describing the world of the novel by what it is not.  This technique of course had long 
been a favorite of James’s to use in his characters’ dialogue, famous as his novels are for 
featuring long conversations that studiously avoid any mention of the characters’ 
motives.  By the time of The Wings of the Dove, however, James had begun to extend that 
practice to the style as a whole, creating what Kristin King describes as a “reliance on 
indirection, circumlocution, definition by exclusion, double negation, and silence.”199  
We can see this practice at work in the early introduction of Merton Densher, one of the 
novel’s three “centers of consciousness”: “Merton Densher, who passed the best hours of 
each night at the office of his newspaper, had at times, during the day, to make up for it, a 
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sense, or at least an appearance, of leisure, in accordance with which he was not 
infrequently to be met in different parts of the town at moments when men of business 
are hidden from the public eye.”200  What strikes one immediately about this passage, of 
course, is that it is “passive, tentative, and self-postponing”; in other words, it begins in 
declarative fashion by suggesting that it will provide a straightforward description of the 
man whose name is introduced at the sentence’s start.201  But it immediately undercuts 
that expectation by diverting the narrative thrust into a potentially endless series of 
syntactical tributaries or cul-de-sacs.  The sentence draws back, hesitates, or willfully 
refuses the simple narrative logic of description in favor of its own exhibitionistically 
frustrating embroidery.  With each successive clause the sentence holds out to the reader 
the satisfying promise that it will resolve the ambiguity that it in turn only deepens rather 
than abbreviates with every additional clause before finally discharging that meaning that 
it so closely guards in a final expulsion: “in accordance with which he was not 
infrequently to be met in different parts of the town at moments when men of business 
are hidden from the public eye.”  In addition to the sentence’s syntactical complexity, 
though, the text also relies on a strategy of stylistic exclusion or definition through 
negativity.  Notice, for example, the text’s refusal to pin down the details of Densher’s 
existence, describing him instead as a man who “had at times, during the day” been out 
and about but going no further to narrow its specificity than to say it is “not 
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infrequently.”  Moreover, Densher has “a sense, or at least an appearance, of leisure,” but 
the reader does not know in what that “sense” consists, nor if it is a “sense” or an 
“appearance” of leisure, nor even what that distinction means.  Together these techniques 
produce The Wings of the Dove’s characteristically opaque and often frustrating style, 
what Sedgwick describes as one that “presents the reader of the beginning of the sentence 
a blankly baffling, ‘closed’ grammatical façade, which yet as one arduously rounds a turn 
of the sentence will suddenly open out into a clear, unobstructed, and iron-strong 
grammatical pathway of meaning.202 
 If the grammatical complexity at the sentence level is eventually resolved into a 
grammatical pathway of meaning at the end, however, that meaning is still more often 
than not rendered through negativity.  For instance, the narrator, remarking on the 
undecidability of Desher’s appearance, notes that “distinctly he was a man either with 
nothing at all to do or with ever so much to think about; and it was not to be denied that 
the impression he might often thus easily make had the effect of causing the burden of 
proof in certain directions to rest on him.  It was a little the fault of his aspect, his 
personal marks, which made it almost impossible to name his profession” (46).  I want to 
draw attention to the narrative strangeness of this description, especially the way that its 
pronouncements always just slip away from narrative certainty.  For instance, Densher is 
“a man either with nothing at all to do or with ever so much to think about,” a statement 
that as King says “evades responsibility” for decision and that even as it presents two 
possibilities still wants to go no further than “nothing at all” or “ever so much.”  That 
abdication of narrative responsibility pervades this description, asserting confidently that 
“it was not to be denied” that Densher’s impression uncertainly “might often” have an 
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effect.  And it was only “a little the fault of his aspect” that makes it “almost impossible” 
to discover his occupation, a handy turn of phrase that assigns responsibility to Densher’s 
“personal marks”, but only “a little”, and with indeterminate (“almost impossible”) 
consequences.   
If the Jamesian style is tough to scratch beneath in passages like the ones I have 
discussed so far, it only gets more complicated.  In this final passage about Densher that I 
will discuss, we witness the full force of Jamesian style unleashed in an astonishing 
escape act of meaning: 
He was a longish, leanish, fairish young Englishman, not unamenable, on certain sides, to 
classification--as for instance by being a gentleman, by being rather specifically one of 
the educated, one of the generally sound and generally civil; yet, though to that degree 
neither extraordinary nor abnormal, he would have failed to play straight into an 
observer's hands. He was young for the House of Commons, he was loose for the Army. 
He was refined, as might have been said, for the City and, quite apart from the cut of his 
cloth, sceptical, it might have been felt, for the Church. On the other hand he was 
credulous for diplomacy, or perhaps even for science, while he was perhaps at the same 
time too much in his mere senses for poetry and yet too little in them for art. You would 
have got fairly near him by making out in his eyes the potential recognition of ideas; but 
you would have quite fallen away again on the question of the ideas themselves. The 
difficulty with Densher was that he looked vague without looking weak--idle without 
looking empty (46). 
 
As before the description starts out simply enough with a physical portrait of Densher 
that depicts him as rather middling in all things, “longish, leanish, fairish.”  The passage 
quickly shifts, however, into its regular mode of negativity in insisting that Densher is 
“not unamenable,” meaning presumably either amenable or at least indifferent, “on 
certain sides,” whatever those might be, “to classification,” of what sort we aren’t really 
sure.  What follows is a litany of things that Densher is not, as the stylistic method of the 
novel is writ large.  For instance, Densher is “neither extraordinary nor abnormal” and 
hence he remains an elusive character.  His qualities make him seem, according to the 
narrator, unfit for any proper post or even environment.  “[Y]oung for the House of 
Commons” and “loose for the Army,” he is also “refined, as might have been said, for the 
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City” as well as “skeptical, it might have been felt, for the Church.”  We should notice 
especially how the stylistic negativity goes into overdrive, emphasizing ambiguity not 
only through its insistence on where Densher does not fit but simultaneously casting 
suspicion on even that speculation of ill-fittingness with its relentless “mights” and later 
“perhapses.”  For example, Densher “was credulous for diplomacy, or perhaps even for 
science, while he was perhaps at the same time too much in his mere senses for poetry 
and yet too little in them for art.”  There are literally dozens of instances of this technique 
in the passage I have been discussing but the crucial point is that it all adds up to the 
sense that, just as the narrator claims, Densher “would have failed to play straight into an 
observer’s hands.”  Yet it is not merely because his physical nature appears so vague that 
observers fail to place Densher.  The style in fact ruthlessly insists on this point; it makes 
it a fact of the textuality of The Wings of the Dove that everyone and everything fails to 
play into the reader’s hands.  The novel as a whole is an experiment in stylistic 
elusiveness, a long and difficult text that is always at least one and often several steps 
ahead of the foreclosure of meaning and the reader’s grasp.  Just as our hands seem to 
have caught definite meaning they close finally around nothing.  For a description like 
this one – and admittedly this is one of the more hyperbolic but certainly not 
unrepresentative examples from which I could have drawn any number – has told very 
little that is definite about Merton Densher.  Perhaps the one iron-clad fact comes at the 
start – he is an Englishman.  But everything else is like a smoke-ring, at first glance solid, 
coherent, textural and dense that as one stares begins to unravel itself and drift away into 
nothingness.  It is a stunning narrative experience that at once partakes of an excessive, 
often infuriating style that retains for its author a certain kind of plausible deniability 
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about everything it might be said to represent.  If it is true, after all, that the novel 
brazenly exhibits its syntactical invention and its annulling style of narration, it at the 
same time reserves with all its “mights” that that style might mean nothing at all about its 
author. 
While I have focused my attention here to one brief section in the novel, any point 
really might have served just as well.  Late in the novel the narrator reports on Densher’s 
realization about his relationship with Milly Theale that “he hadn’t only never been near 
the facts of her condition – which counted so as a blessing for him; he hadn’t only, with 
all the world, an impenetrable ring fence, within which there reigned a kind of expensive 
vagueness made up of smiles and silences and beautiful fictions and priceless 
arrangements, all strained to breaking” (350).  While the passage of course repeats the 
stylistic mode of the novel it also is a fitting description of the state of the novel’s project, 
a project based on “a kind of expensive vagueness” full of “beautiful fictions and 
priceless arrangements” that create both the textual difficulty of the novel and its 
tremendous aesthetic value.  Yet that project also functions as “an impenetrable ring 
fence,” an exclusionary device that we can admire for its beauty but that also keeps its 
author safe inside and its reader at a safe and safely disempowered distance.  It is this 
authorial disarmament, this stylistic neutralization, that James activates in response to the 
seemingly inescapable bind that he confronted – and lost to – earlier in his career.  For if 
James could not plot his way out of his culture’s pronouncement that style and 
homosexuality are virtually one and the same, he could invent a negative style that would 
steal from the reader’s grasp any ability to apply that same inescapable logic to him.  In 
other words, if James determined he could not argue his way out of the sexually 
121 
stigmatizing connotations of style (one reason, in fact, he may have decided to end his 
novel writing career with The Tragic Muse), with The Wings of the Dove he discovered 
that he could do the next best thing – stylistically foil the blame game before it has a 
chance to ensnare him by disappearing behind a smokescreen of expensive vagueness. 
It is a commonplace, of course, to emphasize the extreme stylistic difficulty of the 
novels of the major phase.  James’s earliest critics had argued this point.  Writing in 
1912, one suggests that “even the most ardent admirers of Mr. James to-day will, I think, 
admit that they have to work at times to grasp his meaning” since “his style has become 
more involved and less clear.”203  Following a familiar line of thinking, this same critic, 
Clara McIntyre, indicts James’s late career shift of style as a suspect enterprise for which 
she cannot completely account: 
Mr. James’s style – that is, the later style, is certainly not unobtrusive; and I think only 
the most extreme of his supporters would affirm that the increase in obtrusiveness has 
meant a gain in sense and vigor.  If, as some of them seem to think, he must write in this 
way to express the windings of his thought, it would seem to the uninitiated that there 
must be something wrong with the thought.204 
 
McIntyre’s critique rests on an objection to what she views as an over-complication that 
obfuscates the sense of James’s meaning for his readers.  Yet it is worth drawing 
attention to how she collapses back exactly into the diagnostic mode of which James has 
been so critical in The Tragic Muse and “Beltraffio,” especially in her claim that style 
reveals “that there must be something wrong with the thought,” that the corruption of 
substance is betrayed by an extremity of style.  And as we have already seen, it would be 
obvious to many in James’s circle if not the wider reading public what sort of corruption 
– sexual deviance – is likely at fault with that thought. 
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 In opposition to this unsurprisingly normative reading of James I posit a counter-
reading that draws for its inspiration on another, more recent theorist and proponent of 
literary style.  In Bringing Out Roland Barthes, D.A. Miller argues that Barthes, while he 
very rarely writes about homosexuality openly in his books nonetheless was also often 
writing about the gay experience generally in ways that are not always obviously legible.  
In an astonishing sequence, Miller autobiographically describes his own preparations for 
his first trip to Japan, a trip that he explains he thought of as modeled in some ways on 
Barthes’s own journey there as recounted in Empire of Signs.  Miller says he readied 
himself for the trip by getting equipped to explore “gay Tokyo”: buying a gay guidebook 
to the city, learning the lay of the gay land in advance, and making sure he possessed a 
working understanding of some Japanese keywords he thought he would need (cock, 
rubber, type).  Miller recalls that upon a first reading he found Barthes’s account of his 
Japanese experience “impoverished,” as not containing the same sorts of preoccupations 
he as an out gay man found himself busied with, and that the book depicted Barthes as 
“the pathetic picture of ‘the homosexual’ (for once the sterilized, sterilizing term was apt) 
who in fact had no sexuality, in any sense that counted had no sex.”205  Miller’s story 
takes a truly remarkable turn, though, when he returns to Empire of Signs, his vacation 
preparations complete, only to discover that he could now recognize what he previously 
could not discern, that “Barthes, in writing of those impromptu drawings by means of 
which the inhabitants of Tokyo give directions to strangers, illustrated the phenomenon 
with a sketch map of the same area of Shinjuku Ni-chome I had just committed to 
memory.”206  Miller reads this revelation as evidence that Barthes had indeed been all 
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along, even when he seemed most to be neglecting any mention of homosexuality, 
producing a wholly different, heretofore illegible kind of gay écriture, a point made 
surprisingly, delightfully evident in our recognition of Barthes’s cartographical 
familiarity with Miller’s own fantasmatically anticipated cruising spots. 
 According to Miller, parsing Barthes’s use of gay writing is no simple task of 
uncovering these moments, of discerning what we might call the gay subtext – and hence 
the supposedly hidden and “authentic” gay subjectivity – of the work.  As Miller says, 
“however intimately Barthes’s writing proved its connection with gay sexuality, the link 
was so discreet that it seemed to emerge only in the coy or hapless intermittences of what 
under the circumstances I could hardly pretend to reduce to just his repression.”207  And 
we might think something similar of Henry James, a writer who often in the margins of 
his works acknowledged gay sexuality in the world but whose refusal to ensure that 
writing with a consistent, coherent and readily legible authorial sexuality has almost 
entirely been understood as a matter of his own repression.  Even when it has not been 
taken that way, often it has been subject to the same sort of psychological expertise that, 
appropriating the benevolent guise of a “helping profession,” removes the scarlet letter of 
repression but leaves the author still a victim of his own immodest and shameful 
psychology.  What if, however, we were to afford James the same sort of good faith 
denial of the easy diagnosis of repression that Miller affords to Barthes?  In other words, 
what if we were to read James’s late work, especially as typified by The Wings of the 
Dove, not as being the product of enslavement to homosexual desire but as the work of 
the sort of active, experientially open agent that, as Posnock argues in The Trail of 
Curiosity, James is?  And also, what if we took this approach specifically with regard to 
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Jamesian style, seeing it not as the failure Leavis argues for but as an active intervention 
on James’s part into the aesthetic and ideological problem endemic to stylistics that 
James understood as resolvable not through plotting, as “The Author of ‘Beltraffio’” and 
The Tragic Muse suggest, but only at the level of style? 
 Miller of course worries about his own culpability in such a maneuver, cautiously 
trying not to trace every textual mark to a definite sexual subject but also noting that, 
Even when not spoken in this writing, homosexuality does not fail to be spoken any the 
less.  On the contrary, though seldom a topic, it comes to inflect any topic, no matter how 
remote, through the operation of a means comparable, even continuous with that 
inexhaustible fountain of revelation popularly known (in fear, scorn, or love) as a gay 
voice.208 
 
James, I would argue, in The Wings of the Dove partakes of something comparable to 
what will come to be known as gay style, as “gay voice,” but I at the same time resist 
ascribing his participation in this mode to any specific kind of sexual orientation.  To be 
more specific, I suggest not that we, as has so often been the case with James studies in 
the last two decades, continue to try to reveal the “real” James, the supposedly repressed 
and pathetic closet-case, but instead that we should try to see James’s text as utilizing a 
technique that can be of great value for queer critique without our having to ascribe an 
authorial sexuality to the author who produced it.  Just as Miller is hesitant to “out” 
Barthes in the sense popularized by proponents of the controversial tactic of “outing” 
public figures, so too must we resist “outing” James, of trying to show that we have 
discovered the last piece of evidence that will finally convict him of the homosexuality 
we have for a long time assumed we should find there.  Rather, I mean something more 
along the lines of Miller’s hope to bring out Barthes in much the same way a scarf brings 
out one’s complexion.  So too can we “bring out” James’s complexion, make it useful 
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and new and recognize in it a powerful aesthetic critique that may or may not come from 
a gay man – and who can ever say anyway really? – but that is on the rhetorical “side” of 
those with the gay voice.  It seems that James is speaking in his final novels in something 
like what Miller calls that gay voice, but we don’t need to nail him down in order to 
recognize how that gay voice is not speaking for James’s essence as an “inexhaustible 
fountain of revelation,” but instead how it might be speaking for us, a voice that critiques 
the heteronormative discourse of style through the very act of refusing to engage in its 
game.209 
While James removes from his text those characters we find in “Beltraffio” and 
The Tragic Muse who seem representative of a burgeoning gay male identity in its tense 
relation to style, that move is partnered with an equal intensification of his own stylistic 
practice, a de-gaying at the level of content joined together with a complementary 
ratcheting up of style.  Miller argues that “Barthes is engaged in the ambiguously twinned 
projects of at once sublimating gay content and undoing the sublimation in the practice of 
what he calls in the case of Proust ‘inversion – as form’”.210  This is James’s project in 
the late works, an unfolding of style whose political stance is coextensive with that of the 
gay voice without being reducible to it.  James’s late style, then, is inversion as form, 
inversion of the rules that say that style should be a transparent window onto the author’s 
sexual substance, a pleasurable rupture with the insistence of a normalizing literary 
criticism that always demands to be in control of the terms of stylistics and sexual 
discovery.  It is an inversion of power with its stylistic negativity manifesting a politically 
oppositional assertion – “no.”  
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 In closing I would like to return to the epigraph with which this chapter begins.  
Leo Bersani’s perceptive reading of The Wings of the Dove in A Future for Astyanax 
remains an indispensable tool for any understanding of Jamesian style.  For Bersani the 
Jamesian project as realized in The Wings of the Dove is also the sort of oppositional 
practice I have argued for.  Resisting the trope of repression and freeing sublimation from 
its troubling adjacency to it, James produces a style that, as Bersani says, “would no 
longer reveal character or refer to desires ‘behind’ words; it would be the unfolding of an 
improvised and never completed psychological design.”  This, I would argue, is one of 
James’s most important contributions to the ongoing cultural reorganization of his time 
that forced together so violently the notions of style and of homosexuality.  Resisting 
firmly the assumption, derived from Freud, that style is an unconscious effect or even a 
symptom of homosexuality, James inverts the process, making style into an unfolding but 
ultimately unforecloseable movement of pleasure.  I mean, then, to explain my title as an 
attempt neither to call out James’s alleged cowardice nor to indict any complex identity 
he may or may not have held but rather to generously and generatively bring his style into 
the community of queer critique.  James, having witnessed, reflected upon, and written 
about the crisis in subjectivity provoked by this literary and historical moment did not go 
quietly but rather resisted as best he could with his own style of inversion as form.  And 
this is what makes the Jamesian style so threatening to what McIntyre called “the 











If I started to write elaborately, or like someone introducing or presenting something, I 
found that I could cut that scrollwork or ornament out and throw it away and start with 
the first true simple declarative sentence I had written. 
Ernest Hemingway, A Moveable Feast 
 
The assumption that “health” and mental soundness must be correlated with simplicity, 
ease of access, or the appeal to so-called “common sense” reinforces the hypostatization 
of the “natural” upon which homophobia relies and thus partakes of an ideological labor 
complicit with heterosexual supremacy. 




 About the most unlikely figure one could take up in thinking about the modern 
gay inflection of style is Ernest Hemingway.  Hemingway, perhaps best known for the 
distinctive simplicity of his prose style — hard, lean, terse — has come to seem to many 
readers the most unimpeachable representative of an especially clear and particularly 
manly brand of literary realism, which is to say he often seems to many of us as far from 
gay as is possible.  Driving that understanding is the tough to face fact that in spite of the 
proliferation in the last few decades of feminist and queer readings that have challenged 
many of the familiar ideas we have about Hemingway, one assumption — that his style is 
the gold standard of clarity — has remained almost entirely unshaken.  His supporters 
and detractors alike have for that reason mostly found Hemingway’s sparse, declarative 
prose style inhospitable to a deconstruction-steeped literary criticism that privileges a 
multiplicity of meanings, precisely the sort of criticism upon which a large wing of queer 
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theory is built.211  Susan Beegel suggests that the popularity of deconstruction and its 
apparent incompatibility with the simplicity of Hemingway’s style are major reasons for 
the general decline in Hemingway’s critical reputation.  That claim is, I think, true but 
also conceptually strange in that deconstruction often tends to privilege as the richest 
sites for reading those places in which language seems most straightforward, least 
complex, a point that would seem to make Hemingway an ideal subject for 
deconstructive reading.  And yet if we simply look at the paucity of deconstructive 
approaches to Hemingway’s work in what is one of the largest critical corpuses around 
we can see compelling evidence that we tend by and large to take Hemingway’s 
transparency for granted.  It is exactly, I will argue, this ideology-fuelled illusion of 
clarity, interwoven as it is in our culture with a triumphant ideal of straight male virtue, 
that plays so significant a role in grounding the Hemingway style, rightly or wrongly, as a 
paragon of heterosexuality. 
 For some critics, no doubt, the famous style, the simple cleanness, has made 
Hemingway a figure relegated to a mere historical footnote for his influence on American 
letters, and it has also made him, some would say, a writer not much worth reading any 
more.  Consider his alleged propensity for misogyny, machismo, homophobia, anti-
Semitism, and racism — just to tick off a few strikes against him in the popular 
imagination — and it is not hard to see how he could fall out of favor among 
contemporary critics, especially among those critics who see themselves as contributing 
to the formation of a progressive literary criticism.  The Hemingway ethos just doesn’t 
quite seem to fit any more.  Hemingway, however, like probably no other single figure, 
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startlingly throws into relief the process through which sexuality becomes bonded with 
literary style in the West today.  He provides a rich example, standing as he does at the 
center of the man’s man imaginary, of how style and sexuality are made one and what a 
resiliently homophobic culture stands to gain from keeping Hemingway’s style 
immobilized, in the face of strong evidence to the contrary, in the domain of the 
heterosexual. 
 Putting aside the issue of Hemingway’s unsure status within “high-brow” 
criticism for now, it is hard to dispute, like him or not, that he is a key figure in the 
history of literary style, one who has indelibly marked the ways we conceive of it overall.  
So influential has he been that Harold Bloom insists that Hemingway “sets the style of an 
age.”  Not simply a product of the 20th century but a dynamic influence on it in many 
ways, his revolutionary prose style arguably did more to reform American literature than 
perhaps any other modern writer.212  Often imitated, close even to duplicated, the 
Hemingway style stands as a model to which countless other writers have appealed, 
seeking to gain for themselves something of his legendary straightforwardness.  In one 
critic’s estimation Hemingway’s “crisp and unpretentious prose changed the nature of 
American writing.  Newspapers and magazines produced decades later bear clear 
indications of [his] transformation in style.”213  Perhaps Hemingway’s greatest legacy, 
then, is that his prose, claiming as it does such a powerful hold over the popular and 
critical imagination, has certified its own claim to simplicity to such a degree that many 
subsequent texts have adopted its style as the most appropriate or genuine way to present 
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clarity.214  Such a broad legacy puts Hemingway, undoubtedly just as he’d like it, right in 
the thick of things, that is, at the center of the canon of style. 
 Much more surprising than the wide influence Hemingway has had in the last 
century is the relative uniformity of opinion about his writing, a popular and critical 
consensus that has established him as a figure whose writing embodies, or so the story 
goes, not only straightforward clarity but also the unmistakable signs of masculinity and 
heterosexuality.  Though it would be unfair to say that no one has taken exception to the 
orthodox view of Hemingway, it is fair to say I think that there is an orthodox view, and a 
powerful one at that.215  Rena Sanderson, for instance, explains that “from the very 
beginning of Hemingway’s career, critics made an issue of the ‘masculinity’ in his 
writings.  His early stories won him critical praise for their stoic, understated, ‘masculine’ 
style and their graphic depiction of male pursuits and attitudes.”216  This was true to such 
a degree that by 1934 Vanity Fair was calling Hemingway “America’s own literary cave 
man; hard-drinking, hard-fighting, hard-loving — all for art’s sake.”217  These 
assessments reflect to a great degree what has come down to us as the “official” reading 
of Hemingway.  Even after his death critics continued to read Hemingway in much the 
same way.  “Hemingway’s emphasis on the masculine point of view is easily the most 
characteristic aspect of his writing,” one explains, especially with its “emphasis on virile 
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and direct language.”218  His prose is, we are all supposed to know, stoic, understated, 
unpretentious; it is in short the paradigm of heterosexual American masculinity, a style 
full of virility and directness, which are, or so this line of thinking goes, virtually one and 
the same.219  What else could we expect from the man they call “Papa,” a nickname that 
captures within it a whole host of reassuringly gendered patriarchal relations to the 
author? 
 The most important yet usually overlooked assumption in this familiar story about 
Hemingway is that his writing is marked by masculinity and heterosexuality precisely 
because it is so simple and clear — virility and directness are part and parcel.  Carl Eby 
argues that “Hemingway’s position in American literature surely owes more to his 
contribution as a literary stylist and technical innovator than it does to his expression of 
psychosexual issues.”220  I insist, to the contrary, that the two topics — Hemingway’s 
literary style on the one hand and the psychosexual issues raised by his texts on the other 
— are intimately related, are each part of the same problem.  In other words, clarity and 
simplicity have become the tell-tale signifiers of heterosexuality and masculinity, 
standing in metonymically for them in a great many critical assessments.  Hemingway 
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himself encouraged such a reading, insisting in Death in the Afternoon that his “prose is 
architecture, not interior decoration.”221  Such a pithy mandate in fact displays a testily 
self-conscious conflation of sexuality and literary style.  Hemingway lauds a literary 
method based on physical exertion and construction, of masculine design and execution 
at the expense of the more faggotty pursuit of mere decorating.  In contrast to his own 
“architectural” prose he situates the suspect practice of interior decoration, a lesser art 
devalued, so it seems, not only for its excessively ornamental emphasis but more 
importantly for the femininity and homosexuality it connotes — frivolity, 
overindulgence, and ultimately sexual passivity being that vocation’s consequences.222  
Real men, Hemingway suggests, don’t write decorative prose, nor do they decorate 
interiors.  Critics often, even if unintentionally, tend to perpetuate the same intrinsically 
homophobic logic when they claim, as in the influential case of Carlos Baker, that 
Hemingway’s prose is “as clear as the observation.  Nothing is ornamental.  None but 
essential modifiers are called, and only a few are chosen.  No similes, no metaphors, no 
literary allusions, no pathetic allusions, no balanced clauses.”223  To sum up, the prose 
style is direct, even, to recall the nomenclature of architecture, concrete.  Baker’s seminal 
account of Hemingway’s prose is unquestionably meant as unqualified praise for his fine 
(and finely hardy) aesthetic achievement.  It is important to notice, however, that 
descriptions like this hierarchize sexuality even as they seem to be doing nothing of the 
kind; they extol clarity and implicitly the heterosexual masculinity it connotes even as 
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they denigrate “ornamental” style — what Hemingway sometimes calls “the inability to 
state clearly” — as a gender and sexual transgression.224  Hemingway criticism in general 
is governed by a commanding but implicit sexual regime, one in which heterosexuality is 
repeatedly celebrated under the guise of clarity or simplicity even as homosexuality is 
relentlessly condemned under the sign of ornament or decoration. 
 If this standard version of the macho Hemingway has remained dominant, there 
are of course also less bombastically masculine and heterosexual Hemingways out there.  
But these alternative readings of Hemingway, multiplying as they have with the 
dissemination of feminist and queer theory, and especially with the posthumous 
publication of Hemingway’s extremely odd, gender bending novel The Garden of Eden 
(1986), still remain in the minority.225  Often these queer readings actually end up doing 
more harm than good to politically progressive criticism by relentlessly psychologizing 
the author, trying to show that Hemingway was “really” homosexual or “really” the 
product of an androgynous psyche who tried to overcompensate for his self-perceived 
shortcomings with an exaggerated masculinity in his life and his art.226  Take, for 
example, Georges-Michel Sarotte’s claim in Like a Brother, Like a Lover, that 
Hemingway is the clearest example in American literature of the sublimation of 
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homosexuality.227  Or, more infamously, Kenneth Lynn suggests in his groundbreaking 
biography Hemingway that an infancy spent dressed as a girl-child had a significant and 
lasting influence on the adult Hemingway.228  Each of these readings, though valuable for 
their attempts to complicate or dispel the old myths about Hemingway, tend toward 
reductive, at times predictably Freudian attempts to queer Hemingway in ways that can 
be easily dismissed by detractors, both homophobic and gay-affirmative.  Even Eby’s 
painstaking psychoanalytic treatment of Hemingway’s fetishism ultimately proves 
problematic in its attempt to provide a psychobiography of the author through a reading 
of his literary work.  It should be obvious that I am extremely suspicious of any attempt 
to produce psychobiography, much less a sexual psychobiography, of any author based 
on his or her literary writings.  Such a practice, though supposedly dead and gone, is as 
we can see from these examples still thriving in a variety of incarnations.229 
 All of this is not to say that certain psychological resources, and I have in mind 
psychoanalysis in particular, cannot be useful for appreciating Hemingway style without 
resorting to the questionable enterprise of psychobiography.  Arguably the first attempt, 
after all, to queer Hemingway, though an attempt that perhaps today seems far less 
radical in light of some more recent interventions, is Philip Young’s classic 
psychoanalytic study Ernest Hemingway.230  Hemingway, suspicious of psychoanalysis 
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additional and revised material as Ernest Hemingway: A Reconsideration (University Park: Penn State 
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from the start, initially sought to thwart the publication of Young’s book with its 
psychoanalytic study of trauma by withholding the copyrights so as to prevent Young 
from publishing.  Ultimately, of course, Hemingway did accede to the book’s publication 
— generously, according to Young — though he apparently remained skeptical to the end 
about the study’s thesis.  “Wounds that do extensive bone and nerve damage,” 
Hemingway opined to George Plimpton with characteristic glibness, “are not good for 
writers, nor for anybody else.”231  Young insists, though, that the central and 
distinguishing feature of Hemingway’s writing — the psychic burden instituted by 
physical trauma — is understandable only because of the tools made available by the 
psychoanalytic method.  The principle characteristic of the text for him is the haunting of 
that text by a traumatic wound, a biographical influence Young traces back to 
Hemingway’s severe injury in Italy during the first World War.  Young argues that this 
biographical incident, the trauma a young Hemingway experienced, creates a compulsive 
pattern in his work that is a “key to his personality.”  Still grappling with the psychic 
aftermath of that injury, Hemingway draws on the wound to form his art, making “not the 
trauma but the use to which he put it which counts; he harnessed it, and transformed it to 
art.”232  In this reading psychic injury hovers somewhere between compulsive repetition 
and artistic mastery as Hemingway is both unconsciously afflicted by the wound and yet 
also able to deliberately manipulate its effects in his work.  Style thus becomes legible as 
the outlet for Hemingway’s unique repetition compulsion in that “the strictly disciplined 
                                                 
231 Quoted in Young, Ernest Hemingway: A Reconsideration, 28. 
232 Ibid., 171. 
136 
controls which he exerted over his hero and his ‘bad nerves’ are precise parallels to the 
strictly disciplined sentences he wrote.”233   
While we should be suspicious of this appraisal as it dubiously emphasizes the 
repetition of content (the wounded hero) in Hemingway’s books as a negative 
consequence of disability, it is still an extremely valuable reading as one of the first and 
most sustained attempts to describe the author’s formal strategy as something other than 
the result of untarnished masculine discipline.  Though Young’s negative understanding 
of disability is problematic in a number of ways, his work is nonetheless of special value 
for its brave effort to demonstrate that the idealized Hemingway’s claim to unequivocal 
heterosexual privilege is not quite so invulnerable after all.  Although the reading does 
reflect some of the able-bodied prejudices of its time, most notably in its commitment to 
a medical model of “overcoming” disability, we should not too hastily dismiss Young’s 
legitimate critique of the still dominant belief in Hemingway’s masculine perfection.  In 
fact, it is precisely through his re-imagining of style as a kind of prosthesis for 
disciplining a body out of control — a true innovation of his approach — that Young 
mounts the most effective challenge to that myth.  The proposition may at first seem a 
counter-intuitive one: that great art is possible for Hemingway only because of his 
disability.  Without an injury to “correct,” after all, Hemingway would not have required 
the strictly disciplined style that makes his art so remarkable; it is only as a consequence 
of disability that Hemingway is driven to create an illusion of invulnerability to mask it.  
Young understands style to play precisely that role, to act as “strictly disciplined 
controls” that straighten out both text and psyche as a means of compensating for 
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disability, a story that is utterly alien to the prevailing conception of Hemingway’s able-
bodied and muscularly impervious style.234 
 Jake Barnes of The Sun Also Rises is the ideal avatar of Young’s model, a hero 
whose disability and sexuality overlap exactly in his physical and psychological 
unmanning during the war.  In Jake’s case, moreover, the strict discipline of a controlled 
and simplistic style supports both a disabled body and an uncertain sexuality and relies on 
linguistic prosthesis to protect his self-presentation in the world.  Ultimately, though, that 
prosthetic falters at times, as when Jake bursts into tears following his first meeting with 
Brett Ashley in the novel, at which point an hysterical outpouring is sealed up 
linguistically so as to head off the eruption of trauma: “I was thinking about Brett and my 
mind started jumping around and started to go in sort of smooth waves.  Then all of a 
sudden I started to cry.  Then after a while it was better and I lay in bed and listened to 
the heavy trams go by and way down the street, and then I went to sleep.”235  The injury, 
ordinarily so well managed by prosthetic control, breaks loose for a moment, even as 
Jake as narrator quickly reigns it in and stifles his emotion with tight linguistic restraint.  
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The style plays-down, as it does so frequently in Hemingway’s work, what is being 
represented, or conspicuously not represented, namely that Jake has lost conscious 
control over himself.  The style’s chief function is to dampen with its apparent simplicity 
the dangerous explosion of Jake’s unmanly sobbing, un-representing it only between 
sentences.  The disciplined style in “then all of a sudden I started to cry” and “then after a 
while it was better,” tames Jake’s weakness and reasserts the hero’s self-mastery, even if 
it is all a sham.  Young’s real value, then, is his suggestion that Hemingway style, which 
for Young is more or less the same thing as his hero’s, is not the self-confident 
manifestation of macho, straight male control, but instead that Hemingway writes from a 
precarious, even histrionic position, on unsure footing that requires a fragile stylistic 
supplement to create the bold illusion of mastery. 
 This is all to say that what makes Young’s thesis so intensely valuable for queer 
approaches to the study of Hemingway is not his by now tired trotting out of Freudian 
clichés about the psychic residues left behind by bodily injury.236  The reason queer 
theory needs to recognize Young is to appreciate that he was among the first to question 
with the resources of Freudian interrogation the heterosexual invulnerability of 
Hemingway style.  In other words, though Young does it in a way we may ultimately find 
very hard to accept politically, what’s really new here is that there might be quite a 
different way to understand Hemingway style’s relation to sexuality and that this other 
way must surely not allow any easy one-to-one equivalence between Hemingway style 
and “straightness.”  Discounting the heterosexual mythos surrounding Hemingway style 
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– the important work done here by Young – forms a crucial starting point for any queer 
reappraisal of Hemingway because at its most basic level, what Young is really saying is 
that Hemingway style only pretends to be straight in order to cover up the embarrassing 
fact of being bent.  Surprisingly, however, even in a culture so hungry for and amenable 
to easy psychoanalytic explanations, Young’s serious objection to the pristine 
heterosexuality of Hemingway style doesn’t seem to have taken firm root. 
 Even with a history of such long-standing readings that challenge the traditional 
view of Hemingway it is still hard to shake the feeling that his famous style remains 
securely immunized against perversion in the minds of most readers.  Debra Moddelmog 
has argued persuasively that a variety of powerful cultural forces have converged to make 
exorcising that Hemingway especially difficult.  “People have high stakes in circulating a 
particular image of Hemingway,” Moddelmog says, “and in reading and teaching his 
work in a specific way.”237  In addition to the diffuse discursive forces of sexual 
normalization I describe in the introduction, Moddelmog singles out capitalism’s interest 
in perpetuating a marketable “straight” Hemingway, useful not only for selling his books 
but also for the veritable advertising cottage industry that has sprung up around him, as 
one of the most influential fuels for the Hemingway mythos.  The overdetermined 
cultivation of this version of Hemingway most certainly propels many defenses of his 
style against queer interlopers.  As the most recent Scribner’s paperback proudly 
declaims, for example, Hemingway “was known for his tough, terse prose,” an assertion 
whose passive construction both suggests irrefutable certainty and conceals the 
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publisher’s own hand in producing and disseminating that historical reading it purports 
merely to describe.238 
 Because of the strikingly resilient connection between Hemingway’s sparse prose 
and the version of masculine heterosexuality that it supposedly reflects, I aim to unsettle 
that apparently settled conviction by trying to think Hemingway differently, to think him 
gay.  The question that should immediately arise from such a proposition is, “What’s gay 
about Hemingway?”  Let me stress that I do not mean to imply anything at all about the 
historical personage Ernest Hemingway, least of all anything about his sexual 
subjectivity.239  Instead I am concerned with “Hemingway,” the figure constructed by and 
through a whole series of cultural forces, one of the most important of which, it should be 
obvious by now, is a pervasive fear of the taint of homosexuality.  These forces, in turn, 
shape how we experience and think about the literary artifacts left behind by the 
historical figure Ernest Hemingway.  The fiction of the masculinity and heterosexuality 
of Hemingway’s style, along with the positive valence of the terms most often used to 
describe it — lean, taut, tough, clean, clear, hard, unpretentious — is a reading I 
strenuously contest and is one that Young’s analysis ought to have already begun to 
erode.  That old reading, however, unfortunately still wields broad influence over what 
we think of when we think about literary “clarity” as a general concept.  I attempt to 
defamiliarize Hemingway, refocusing the picture of him we thought we knew to show 
that Hemingway style has been anything but “clear,” which is to say, “straight,” all along, 
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a move that will in turn expose the fiction of the innate connection between style and 
sexuality that it both partakes of and helps strengthen by example. 
 The aims here are larger, as these last remarks should suggest, than a simple 
reinterpretation of Hemingway as an individual writer.  His writing forms a key node of 
influence in the genesis of the ideology of style, an ideology that is formed in great 
measure on presumptions about sexuality.  To that end, Hemingway is an invaluable limit 
case for the theory of style I propose in the preceding chapters and he marks an important 
step in my larger project of investigating the sexual composition of the idea of style.  For 
if it is true, as I believe, that style in our culture is habitually and ideologically coded as 
gay – and coded as such in a normalizing and punitive manner – where then does that 
leave us with a figure like Hemingway who seems to have virtually no style at all?  I 
maintain that Hemingway, far from being an exception to the thesis I propose in chapters 
1 and 2, in fact vigorously confirms its most unsettling claims.  After all, Hemingway has 
come to be received, despite all evidence to the contrary, as the “clearest” of writers and 
hence the least stylish, i.e., the least gay.  Even as early as 1932, however, Hemingway 
was already anxiously defining his work as a practice of masculine construction in 
contrast to the more revealingly dubious enterprise of “interior decoration,” a dismissive 
shorthand whose economy goes arm in arm with the efficiency of its sexual knowingness.  
I will show that what we have come to understand as Hemingway’s clear unstyle is 
actually highly idiosyncratic, highly stylized.  And if Hemingway is an instance of a 
particularly mannered version of experimental modernism, rather than, say, an exponent 
of an especially “natural” brand of American literary realism, we will see that 
Hemingway style, as the conventional (and deeply troubling) wisdom about style 
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generally insists, would be as far from straight as they come.  Moreover, in the general 
disavowal of perversion that is the masculine myth Hemingway helped cultivate about 
himself, the normalizing, mythic ideal of a natural, transparent style is hypostatized, 
making ready, as Lee Edelman convincingly argues in Homographesis, the fertile 
linguistic soil that homophobia requires to thrive.240  Finally, though we may endlessly 
debate the matter of Hemingway’s own homophobia, ample evidence of which certainly 
exists, it will become apparent that Hemingway criticism as a body of work is profoundly 
marked by the ideological forces of homophobia and that this body of criticism in 
particular, even frequently under the banner of progressive politics, is itself often deeply 
homophobic in its indebtedness to a dangerously normalizing model of style.241 
 My approach here is to focus primarily on the two texts that established 
Hemingway as a literary celebrity and that established the popular idea of what the 
famous style is: the short story collection In Our Time (1925) and Hemingway’s first 
serious published novel The Sun Also Rises (1926).  By looking closely at these two texts, 
I will show how Hemingway style’s experimental perversion has been so profoundly 
misrecognized, with most readers placing it mistakenly under the auspices of clarity and 
simplicity.  In particular, I propose that Hemingway style, what Susan Beegel calls the 
“craft of omission,” is based on a method of excision that leaves gaps in the writing to be 
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filled in by readerly desire.242  During the writing process, Hemingway would cut away 
from a text, removing as much as possible from the bone so as to leave, so he believed, 
only the barest, most essential, truest parts behind.243  In contrast to the elaborate, 
Hemingway strove to “cut that scrollwork or ornament out and throw it away,” leaving 
behind an oftentimes curiously vacant text that would make the reader feel even more 
powerfully what was not there.244  However, the excision-method Hemingway employs 
consequently leaves his work, as in the weeping scene in The Sun Also Rises, especially 
vulnerable to the heterosexist usages by which it has frequently been appropriated.  
Because the method by design leaves gaps in the text, the cut (one is almost tempted to 
say castration) is bound by its very nature to incite the movement of desire.  And in a 
culture that is so deeply frightened by homosexuality, it is not surprising that the desire 
most frequently called forth by Hemingway’s writing has been a desire that violently 
excludes the possibility of homosexuality and securely establishes the belief in its 
heterosexuality. 
 I should point out that I do not wish to argue that there are not parts of 
Hemingway’s writing that are fairly direct – parts that come close to what we could call, 
provisionally at least, objective or even un-mannered.  More often than not, however, 
Hemingway uses these moments of direct description in juxtaposition with more complex 
or vague passages that rely on omission for their full effect.  In this manner he mimics an 
unbroken stream of objectivity or an absence of personal style when in fact the text 
alternates between genuine clarity and disguised, idiosyncratic ambiguity.  “Soldier’s 
Home,” the seventh story in In Our Time, is a case in point.  The story concerns a 
                                                 
242 Susan F. Beegel, Hemingway’s Craft of Omission (Ann Arbor: UMI Research Press, 1988). 
243 I am indebted to Tobin Siebers for his suggestions and helpful discussion about these ideas. 
244 Ernest Hemingway.  A Moveable Feast (New York: Scribner, 1964), 12. 
144 
recently discharged young soldier, Harold Krebs, who after spending two years in Europe 
as a Marine during the first World War, has reluctantly returned to his family of origin in 
an Oklahoma small town.  There Krebs spends his mostly quiet days and nights reflecting 
on his experiences during the war or on the prettiness of the local girls.  The climax of the 
story occurs when Krebs reveals to his mother that he does not love her, causing her to 
burst into tears and pressuring him to retract his statement and disingenuously reverse his 
position.  It is a story in which not much happens on the level of plot.  And yet from the 
way the story is told, it is clear that Krebs has been deeply affected by his recent 
experiences as well as by his post-war return to his adolescent home and that, in the 
absence of any sign or system of values other than the arbitrary, infantilizing will of his 
parents, he is left to aimlessly wander the sleepy town, reading his newspaper and 
watching his sister play indoor baseball. 
 The story opens with an indisputably direct description of Krebs’ life up until the 
war.  It is classic Hemingway — short, uncomplicated sentences spell out just the facts.  
It follows precisely, in fact, Malcolm Bradbury’s description of Hemingway’s style in 
which “the universe and action described is sparse, so the words are limited; adjectives 
are cut to a considered few; causal connectives, similes and metaphors are reduced; the 
writing points always towards objects.”245  We could probably not find a better instance 
than the beginning of “Soldier’s Home”: 
Krebs went to the war from a Methodist college in Kansas.  There is a picture which 
shows him among his fraternity brothers, all of them wearing exactly the same height and 
style collar.  He enlisted in the Marines in 1917 and did not return to the United States 
until the second division returned from the Rhine in the summer of 1919. 
There is a picture which shows him on the Rhine with two German girls and another 
corporal.  Krebs and the corporal look too big for their uniforms.  The German girls are 
not beautiful.  The Rhine does not show in the picture.246 
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The mode is ekphrastic as the narrator describes two photographs, one showing Krebs 
with his fraternity brothers before the war and another with two German girls and a 
fellow soldier during the war.  In this moment of ekphrasis, the exegesis of photographs 
stands in for a narrative that is represented by the presence of photographic evidence and 
yet entirely unspoken.247  The text offers the credentials of reliable objectivity – 
photographic proof, no less! – as a substitute for a narrative that can subsequently be 
omitted.  In other words, we can “trust” the story because it is objectively testified to by 
the photos, and we can extrapolate the narrative of Krebs’ life from frat boy to 
roughneck.  Even with the presence of these photos, however, there are signs of deep 
instability in meaning or value.  The narrator, for instance, follows up the thumbnail 
biography of Krebs with a series of impressions positioned as facts, moments in which 
while the language seems to share a one-to-one correspondence with real things, it is 
instead signifying something deeply subjective, deeply insubstantial.  First, “Krebs and 
the corporal look too big for their uniforms,” a statement, relying as it does on 
perspective (they “look too big”), whose epistemological status is uncertain at best.  
Secondly, “The German girls are not beautiful,” another stereotypical Hemingway 
sentence, but one that even as it reads as objectively certain cannot but rely on subjective 
opinion.  These examples demonstrate that transparency, or the exact equivalence of 
word to thing, is the alias of Hemingway’s writing; instead of the objective world, we 
have a text that operates as if it were clear, smuggling subjectivity and ambiguity in under 
a cloud of objective statement.  Who is it, after all, who sees the uniforms as ill fitting?  
Who is it who thinks the German girls unattractive? 
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 While critics have long maintained the validity of the famously objective and 
direct Hemingway style, in reality it utilizes a subtle form of strategic ambiguity that 
deceives us into seeing it as much more straightforward than it actually is.  It performs, 
flaunts a mirage of straightness.  We learn, for instance that for Krebs, “all of the times 
that had been able to make him feel cool and clear inside himself when he thought of 
them; the times so long back when he had done the one thing, the only thing for a man to 
do, easily and naturally, when he might have done something else, now lost their cool, 
valuable quality and then were lost themselves.”248  The text follows the familiar pattern 
of Hemingway style: the words are extremely simple, as is the sentiment.  The simplicity 
of diction, however, once more disguises an absence — what is it, we must ask, over 
which Krebs is ruminating?  The text never tells.  Whatever it is that is “the only thing for 
a man to do … when he might have done something else” (eat? sleep? masturbate?) is 
missing, hidden in a haze of “direct” but deliberately non-specific description.  This is an 
obvious moment in which Hemingway style, as it so often does, foregrounds its own 
claim to objective, clear description — no fancy words, no metaphors, no allusions — as 
a red herring.  We even get a definitive assertion — there is only but one “thing for a man 
to do.”  In point of fact, however, quite a lot is not being said here in a way that 
misdirects our understanding by investing a stylized, subjective ambiguity with the aura 
of direct, unstyled objectivity. 
 It turns out therefore that the task of tracing the “direct” in Hemingway style is 
precisely at the same time the task of tracing indeterminacy.  Richard K. Peterson defines 
the style as based on the mutually constitutive play of the direct and of the oblique.249  In 
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response to this quality Peterson asks, “how much of Hemingway’s ‘objectivity,’ one 
wonders, is akin to stylized small talk about safe or unimportant topics, avoiding what is 
emotionally charged and suggesting it very obliquely?”250  That description would seem 
to admirably fit many of the most familiar Hemingway stories: “The Battler,” for 
instance, concerns a young Nick Adams who, after being thrown from a train for illegally 
boarding, stumbles across a menacing pair of drifters whose threat is implied through 
small talk rather than directly evidenced.  It is the mysterious, unsettling, and often 
poignant interchapters to In Our Time, though, that best illustrate Hemingway’s blend of 
the direct and the indeterminate.  The interchapters, originally published alone as in our 
time (1924) without the longer stories that were later to accompany them, have long 
puzzled critics with their non-sequitur sentiments and their unspecified relation to the 
longer stories they divide.  The first of the interchapters alone could stand as a primer on 
Hemingway style: 
Everybody was drunk.  The whole battery was drunk going along the road in the dark.  
We were going to the Champagne.  The lieutenant kept riding his horse out into the fields 
and saying to him, “I’m drunk, I tell you mon vieux.  Oh, I am so soused.”  We went 
along the road all night in the dark and the adjutant kept riding up alongside my kitchen 
and saying, “You must put it out.  It is dangerous.  It will be observed.”  We were fifty 
kilometers from the front but the adjutant worried about the fire in my kitchen.  It was 
funny going along that road.  That was when I was a kitchen corporal. 
 
The vignette perfectly blends the simplicity of direct description, “the whole battery was 
going along the road in the dark,” with the indeterminate, yet still directly depicted: “it 
was funny going along that road.”  To call this passage unmannered would be to seriously 
misread it.  The final line, in fact, is especially significant, beginning with a pronoun 
(“that”) that is itself remarkably indefinite.  It is a sentence that gives the sense of 
absolute directness and yet it depends on the reader not assigning a definite value to the 
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pronoun.  Does “that” refer to the moment at which the adjutant worried about the fire?; 
is “that” the entirety of the journey to Champagne?; of the entire night?; or is “that” some 
longer period – a tour of duty perhaps?  Looking closely, we notice that Hemingway gets 
away with being called totally clear even though the evidence is right before us that 
something a lot more complex, a citation of clarity in the service of an artificial, 
mannered style is being produced.  Peterson explains that “the abundance of ‘objective’ 
detail substitutes for and vaguely suggests something else, some very strong but 
unmentioned feeling” and that the reader’s attention is “continually directed to everything 
and anything else — to the small detail, even to the trivial — while knowing all the time 
that there is something much more important in the background which is only hinted 
at.”251  Indeed there is something particularly ominous about this scene that defuses what 
could be humorous about it — the drunk lieutenant talking to his horse — and makes it 
rather more tonally dark.  Ultimately the passage raises more questions than it answers 
and yet Hemingway has succeeded, first in producing an illusion of clarity and second in 
creating a mood, a feeling of barely contained dread, evoking it through a very queer 
style that directly describes at an oblique angle. 
 The most systematic description of how Hemingway achieves this effect comes 
from his bullfighting book.  In Death in the Afternoon, Hemingway talks at length about 
his craft and in detail about paring down his texts so as to maximize their effectiveness, 
their evocative potential.  “If a writer of prose knows enough about what he is writing 
about,” Hemingway explains, “he may omit things that he knows and the reader, if the 
writer is writing truly enough, will have a feeling of those things as strongly as though 
the writer had stated them.  The dignity of movement of an ice-berg is due to only one-
                                                 
251 Ibid., 64. 
149 
eighth of its being above water.”252  The concluding reference, of course, is to 
Hemingway’s famous iceberg principle, a metaphor he would return to time and again 
throughout his life.  According to that theory, only one-eighth of Hemingway’s stories is 
visible on the surface of the text; the rest is submerged and yet “felt” by the reader 
through the strength of the writer’s prose.  A notorious example is the much anthologized 
short story “Hills Like White Elephants,” in which a man and woman over very many 
cocktails resolve a troublesome accidental pregnancy that is never named outright.  
Hemingway omits the most objective fact — that the couple is quarreling over an 
abortion — so as to communicate the feeling of the events to the reader.   
 Journeying far beyond mere artistic preference, though, Hemingway casts his 
technique in terms of artistic competence, suggesting that his craft of omission gets closer 
to “true” feelings than other sorts of “overwritten” language: 
If a man writes clearly enough any one can see if he fakes.  If he mystifies to avoid a 
straight statement, which is very different from breaking so-called rules of syntax or 
grammar to make an effect which can be obtained in no other way, the writer takes a 
longer time to be known as a fake and other writers who are afflicted by the same 
necessity will praise him in their own defense.  True mysticism should not be confused 
with incompetence in writing which seeks to mystify where there is no mystery but is 
really only the necessity to fake to cover lack of knowledge or the inability to state 
clearly.  Mysticism implies a mystery and there are many mysteries; but incompetence is 
not one of them; nor is overwritten journalism made literature by the injection of a false 
epic quality.253 
 
It is worth noting the whole cluster of oppositions that Hemingway deploys as measures 
in his aesthetic theory.  Above all, Hemingway values the “straight statement,” a phrase 
that should come as no surprise to us given that he conceives, as we’ve seen, of the 
straightness of his prose at least partly in relation to sexuality.  Added to this is his tough-
guy disdain for the “so-called rules of syntax or grammar,” suggesting that genuine 
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straightness of prose has little to do with effete prescriptions of grammatical correctness 
and more to do with “the ability to state clearly.”  Interestingly, however, Hemingway 
seems to see no contradiction between the imperative to state clearly and the preference 
for omission — he does not notice or he does not want to admit that, as Peterson says, 
“like any other device, ‘objectivity’ can become a mannerism or trick.”254  For 
Hemingway, there is a distinct envisioning of style as worked-at, to be sure, but worked 
at to make the writing “true,” make it straight and “natural” rather than quirkily 
mannered. 
 If we take these descriptions of the writing process from Death in the Afternoon 
as reliable statements, it becomes apparent that Hemingway’s theory of style by its nature 
accords a powerful, unspoken role to the reader.  To fail to take the reader into account is 
to miss the understanding that, as Barthes reminds us, “every reading is steeped in 
Desire.”255  In other words, though it is more or less implied rather than stated outright by 
his poetics, Hemingway depends on his readers’ desire to fill in his writing, and he counts 
on it to inflect the words on the page.  Even if he were to make his prose absolutely 
straight, and as I’ve suggested he more often than not doesn’t do that at all, the gravity of 
readerly desire will always bend the text to its own ends.  As Moddelmog argues about 
Hemingway, “the attention [he] has traditionally received is so clearly overdetermined 
and thus makes visible what is often hard to see: that critics’ desires play an integral role 
in the construction of authors and the interpretation of their works.”256  While I agree 
with Moddelmog on this point, I would like to shift her emphasis slightly so as to view it 
                                                 
254 Peterson, Hemingway: Direct and Oblique, 66. 
255 Roland Barthes, The Rustle of Language, trans. Richard Miller (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1989), 35. 
256 Moddelmog, Reading Desire, 2. 
151 
with an eye toward our interest in style.  After all, what I obviously find most troubling 
about Hemingway’s legacy is that we often assume that the style in which his works are 
written is explained by or reflective of masculine heterosexuality.  It is instead vital to 
understand, as Moddelmog shows, that readers’ desires dramatically alter how it is that 
we construct an author’s texts.257  It is we as readers who accord sexual status to style and 
it is we as well who can with effort see it in a different way. 
 In the case of Hemingway the influence of readerly desire is all the more crucial 
to understand because the style is based upon excision, that is to say the style always has 
a lack built into it.  Moreover, a style built on a foundation of lack flirts with, solicits, the 
reader’s desire, and desire, as Lacan tells us, is the “desire for nothing,” desire for that 
(no)thing — what he calls objet petit a — that promises to reintroduce the imaginary 
fullness cleaved from the subject by the imposition of language.258  Desire is always 
propelled forward by absence, a lack in being that pushes the subject to attempt the 
recovery of, through obtaining the imagined fulfillment that objet petit a will bring, the 
wholeness that has been lost.  As Lacan puts it, “desire is a relation of being to lack.  This 
lack is the lack of being properly speaking.  It isn’t the lack of this or that, but lack of 
being whereby the being exists.”259  The key phrase here is Lacan’s suggestion that lack 
is not a lack for any particular, specific thing – it “isn’t the lack of this or that.”  Instead, 
desire chases after a more foundational absence in the subject that can temporarily take as 
its object any number of substitutions.  Moreover, “this lack is beyond anything that can 
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represent it.  It is only ever represented as a reflection on a veil.”260  Hemingway style in 
its ostentatious flaunting of lack impels the reader’s desire for imaginary plenitude by 
flaunting the false promise of a satisfying object hidden somewhere “back there.”  
Hemingway has it in mind that each reader will empathetically draw close to the “true” 
object that has been excised from the text.  What Lacan teaches us, though, is that the 
reader’s genuine desire is not really for that specific object that Hemingway pretends to 
hold back — the secret behind the drunken soldiers of In Our Time’s first interchapter, 
for instance — but is instead a desire for her own imaginary fulfillment; that is to say, the 
reader always has the impossible goal of achieving her own satisfaction as a motive.261  
What the reader encounters in Hemingway style is the veil to which Lacan alludes, a veil 
that ostentatiously hides behind it the non-existent “truth” of Hemingway’s omissions but 
that in fact serves, the style that is, as a surface, a mirror in which the reader finds 
reflected back his own self-interested desire. 
 The Sun Also Rises, in one of the most frequently discussed passages in the novel 
– the entrance of Lady Brett Ashley in the company of a gaggle of young gay men — 
underscores the power of this readerly desire to create an almost inescapable expectation 
of clarity and simplicity on behalf of the reader’s own satisfaction.  As in the earlier 
“Soldier’s Home,” the laconic style obscures even as it hints at an objective “fact” — the 
homosexuality of Brett’s night-time companions.  The passage is worth quoting at length 
to understand its style’s characteristic strangeness: 
Some one asked Georgette to dance, and I went over to the bar.  It was really very 
hot and the accordion music was pleasant in the hot night.  I drank a beer, standing in the 
doorway and getting the cool breath of wind from the street.  Two taxis were coming 
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down the steep street.  They both stopped in front of the Bal.  A crowd of young men, 
some in jerseys and some in their shirtsleeves, got out.  I could see their hands and newly 
washed, wavy hair in the light from the door.  The policeman standing by the door looked 
at me and smiled.  They came in.  As they went in, under the light I saw white hands, 
wavy hair, white faces, grimacing, gesturing, talking.  With them was Brett.  She looked 
very lovely and she was very much with them. 
One of them saw Georgette and said: “I do declare.  There is an actual harlot.  I’m 
going to dance with her, Lett.  You watch me.” 
The tall dark one, called Lett, said: “Don’t you be rash.”  The wavy blonde one 
answered: “Don’t you worry, dear.”  And with them was Brett. 
 
There is a noticeable minimum of interiority in the passage aside from Jake’s assessment 
of temperature and of the pleasantness of the music, a desaturation of detail about Jake’s 
mind.  At the same time the high-spirited playfulness of the gay men conspicuously 
contrasts with the stoic response to it by the company of straight men – symbolized by 
the policeman’s conspiratorial straight hail.  The text seems to establish a division by 
which to be on the side of the restrained, to speak simply, is to be straight.  This is 
opposed to the puckish behavior of the gay men with their white hands and wavy hair, 
and more revealingly still, the insincere exuberance of their speech.  “Don’t you worry, 
dear” is, after all, simultaneously meant to reassure and to playfully demean Lett even as 
it makes a mockery of expectations of proper gender behavior.  “An actual harlot!” one 
exclaims also, prizing the prostitute Georgette purely for her camp value rather than for 
any genuine interest in her.  What this passage establishes, then, is a sexual hierarchy 
determined by the use of language.  Whereas straight men say little or nothing at all, 
resigned to make the most out of the limited linguistic resources they are permitted to 
employ, gay men chatter on merrily, extravagantly, and without much apparent 
substance. 
 What is surprising about the passage is that its obvious motive – to signify 
sexuality by taking note of styles of expression – runs contrary to the way that goal is 
carried out because the desire represented exceeds the technique with which it is 
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expressed.  In the strange repetition of the phrase “with them was Brett,” for example, we 
see the problem of appropriate style dramatized most recognizably.  In a matter of just a 
few lines the phrase appears three times in three different forms, as though Jake’s style is 
being short circuited by Brett’s proximity.  The text orbits compulsively around the 
phrase, almost as if it is trying it out in different forms so as to “get it right.”  Each 
permutation contains only a slight variation that utilizes minor stylistic transformation 
rather than major embellishment: “With them was Brett,” “and she was very much with 
them,” and “And with them was Brett.”  One obvious explanation for that phenomenon is 
Jake’s powerful desire for Brett, a force that keeps drawing the text back to her because 
of Jake’s tragic and finally unconsummatable longing.  That can be only half the story, 
though, for this is a matter not simply of representation but also of linguistic form.  The 
text seems to be reaching not only for Brett but also for the right words, the right 
linguistic version to express that desire.  Given the constraints of how modern men are 
supposed to behave, however, Jake can only go so far in his style unless he appear too 
much like the other men in this scene, too excessive, too over-the-top.  The censurious 
proximity of the queens makes it all the more urgent that Jake proscribe the excess of his 
own style.  When his sentiment reaches outward for new, creative expression, that style 
becomes impoverished at the moment it is most desperate for novel language, blocked 
from the linguistic resources towards which it had tried to reach by the self-censoring 
demands imposed by social convention.  The result is a text that trembles with a feeling 
that exceeds the words present, the permitted form of expression being nowhere near 
enough for what really wants to be said.  The passage is virtually a paradigm for 
Hemingway style, a text that is simultaneously performing straightness even as it 
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underscores the fictionality of its own performance.  It gives itself away, playing the 
straight game even as it emphasizes the weirdness of that performance, the off form it 
must take, as with the repeated “with them was Brett.” 
 This passage and many others like it reveal the degree to which Hemingway’s 
writing is, contrary to the general feeling about it, unusually mannered, and mannered in 
a self-conscious simulacrum of simplicity, a copy with no original.  We overwhelmingly, 
as I’ve argued, tend to view this unusual mode of writing as unmarked, as the “natural” 
condition of clarity, since Hemingway’s legacy has been the installation of this kind of 
writing as the prime example of the unadorned.  What the examples so far have shown, 
however, is that Hemingway style is anything but naturally unmarked and clear.  Robert 
Penn Warren suggests that Hemingway, who “characteristically is simple even to the 
point of monotony” shares “an obvious relation between this style and the characters and 
situations with which the author is concerned — a relation of dramatic decorum.”262  That 
style often works, according to Warren, as an “antidote” to the ailments of modern 
existence, an antidote Hemingway had to work hard to create.  For Warren, Hemingway’s 
means of combating the problems of modern existence is his recourse to simplicity, a 
way of writing, in Hemingway’s words, “simply and straight.”263  Richard Bridgman in 
an excellent article expands on this argument by calling out the distinctive simplicity of 
Hemingway’s prose as exaggerated mannerism.  Bridgman insists that “we must be 
prepared to qualify radically the kind of simplicity we are willing to acknowledge is 
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present.  Both Gertrude Stein and Sherwood Anderson are proof enough that limitation of 
vocabulary and simplification of syntax are not in themselves sufficient to earn clarity 
and directness.”264  Bridgman, like Peterson, has it just right.  The pared down 
“simplicity” of Hemingway style is itself affected, a mannerism that at its time must have 
been just as strange for readers to encounter as the radically experimental prose (that 
some would say Hemingway stole) of Gertrude Stein.  Hemingway was above all else an 
experimental writer, one who was pushing the stylistic envelope even in his early 
masterpieces In Our Time and The Sun Also Rises, but pushing it in such a way as to 
flaunt its “straightness” openly.  Not to recognize how mannered his style is is an 
understandable but serious and even ideologically propelled miscalculation. 
 Paul Morrison suggests that to call someone’s prose “too mannered” is one 
familiar, perhaps universally available way in the West to implicate that person in the 
charge of homosexuality.265  If gay men have for a long time been thought to give away 
signs of their condition, so a supposedly mannered style has become one of the ways for 
them to incontrovertibly do so.  Calling an individual’s prose “too mannered,” as 
Morrison points out, is a gesture of implication through the socio-sexual meanings that 
term connotes rather than through direct accusation.  The power of connotation is that it 
suggests, without ever needing to say explicitly, so that it can never be refuted.  Even to 
try to refute it, to raise the issue oneself, is to confirm the charge of connotation, 
protesting too much as it were, against a charge that was never leveled.266  It follows that 
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Hemingway style as an idiosyncratically mannered form of writing, an affectation, is not 
far from that same condition.  Small wonder, then, that critics have for almost a century 
now labored to shield Hemingway from an accusation of mannerism, protecting him from 
a moniker that signifies much too much about a dangerous sexuality they want nothing to 
do with. 
 If queer critics have counter-labored in turn to dissolve those protective 
mechanisms, queer theory has not yet been able to come up with a satisfactory response 
that takes into account both the nuance and the theatricality of Hemingway’s stylistic 
performance of straightness.  Gregory Woods attempts such a reading but unfortunately 
replicates some familiar conclusions when he explains that Hemingway style is always 
shaped by the writer’s personal sexual anxiety.  It is a restrained linguistic feat in the 
constant process of self-surveillance so as to remain entirely unadorned.  Just as Eve 
Sedgwick suggests that male friendship walks a fine line that requires both demonstration 
of the bonds that connect men and a fierce, often homophobic policing of the line that 
means erotic love, so too must Hemingway style, Woods says, stretch to prove its 
individual merit, yet never cross over dangerously, suggestively into the ornate.  What 
this stylistic double-bind “expresses best, in its struggle against effeminate eloquence, is 
the nagging anxiety which is the true condition (in both senses) of masculinity.”267  That 
anxious struggle reveals, according to Woods, a text that is too eager to please, too 
incriminatingly concerned with plain-speaking to be believable.  He claims that the 
restraint of Hemingway style is largely about a fear of saying too much, of giving oneself 
away, of being, like a closeted gay man, exposed by verbal indiscretion.  As he puts it, 
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“to say too much might be to sound queer.”268  Hemingway style, according to Woods, is 
composed under the sign of the closet; its terrific linguistic restraint is restrained in the 
truest sense, not just by the author’s choice but by necessity in the context of a powerful 
system of social and psychological forces that coerce and threaten, especially straight 
men, with sexual exposure.  We reward its built-in lack by accepting this anxious 
performance, by recognizing in the text precisely what the culture wants for us to see — a 
masculine, heterosexual man writing in a natural style that expresses the essence of his 
straight being. 
 What is ultimately problematic about what Woods is saying is that it falls victim 
to the illusion of Hemingway’s simplicity even as it accepts as fact the notion that 
Hemingway style is unadorned and unmannered.  I have argued the opposite, that 
Hemingway is actually among the most stylistically idiosyncratic of writers and that his 
most distinguishing stylistic idiosyncrasy is a flaunted performance of straightness.  
Anyone who has seen any of the countless number of photographs of Hemingway 
standing next to an exceptionally large fish will have some idea of what I mean.  
Hemingway style, however, flaunts that same performance at a textual and formal level 
(think also of Hemingway’s almost certainly apocryphal penchant for doing all of his 
writing standing up, performing the act of writing erect). The style is not afraid of saying 
too much; rather, it cannot stop its mugging as it unflaggingly calls attention to how 
“straight” it is.  Woods would have it that the true straightness of Hemingway’s style is a 
charade designed to comply with the complex discursive pressures of the closet.  I argue 
instead that there is and never was any straight style, that Hemingway’s simulacrum is a 
highly innovative artifice that performs an essence of straightness, an essence that 
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likewise doesn’t exist.  And the record of Hemingway criticism, as we have seen, gives 
ample evidence that a great many people have fallen under its queer charms, accepting 
through their own anxieties about sexuality, this simulacrum of heterosexual style.  If the 
closet is operating anywhere at all it is not, as Woods says, in the psyche of the author, 
but in the reader who is so willing to swallow whole Hemingway’s spectacle of the 
straight. 
 One of the most unexpected consequences of this performance of straight prose is 
the establishment of a reading audience that slavishly eroticizes the qualities with which 
that straight prose is associated.  Curiously, however, that erotic response resides 
overwhelmingly in the appreciative commendations not of the women we might expect it 
to be designed to attract but in Hemingway’s predominantly male critics.269  As an 
anonymous, and hence for all intents and purposes male, reviewer for The New York 
Times describes him in 1926, “Hemingway has a lean, pleasing, tough resilience.  His 
language is fibrous and athletic, colloquial and fresh, hard and clean; his very prose 
seems to have an organic being of its own.”270  The review shamelessly conjures up the 
homoerotic world of the gymnasium in which one man may appreciate the pleasing 
toughness and athleticism of another, but also a domain in which there is a fine line 
between appreciation and over-appreciation.  Described as lean, hard, and clean, 
Hemingway is admired not, as we might think, for the masculine qualities that would 
appeal to a member of the “fairer sex,” but rather in terms of men delighting in male 
beauty.  All of Hemingway’s hard-won straightness of prose, then, has gone in service of 
establishing a cohort of appreciative, drooling, homoerotic critics who surround and 
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celebrate the author’s masculine display.  From Carlos Baker to Malcolm Bradbury to 
countless others, we see the artist worshipped again and again in these terms as critics 
unironically and at times uncritically praise the peacock strut of Hemingway style.  If it is 
true that critics approve of Hemingway’s “organic” simplicity – a reading whose basis in 
fact I think I have already discredited – as a means of celebrating the heterosexual 
“achievement” that style connotes, they do so in a way that makes uncertain their own 
perilous position in this band of Hemingway brothers.  They cannot heap enough praise 
upon him, making Hemingway into a kind of crush object, a figure whose style they both 
identify with and desire.  If the critical legacy of Hemingway is anything, then, I cannot 
help but think that as far as style is concerned, our relation as readers to Hemingway is a 
multifaceted and indeed internally conflicted one, pulled as it is in several directions at 
once by the complex demands of culture, desire and the erotically fraught relations 
instituted by the author’s performance of simplicity. 
 In this chapter we have seen how the modernity’s chief avatar of stylistic clarity – 
Ernest Hemingway – is a figure whose clarity owes a great deal more to ideological 
pressures than it does to any objective standard.  I have shown the socially and erotically 
overdetermined nature of the prevailing opinion that Hemingway style expresses some 
organic, natural essence of clarity and straightness.  In fact, as I’ve shown, not only is 
Hemingway style anything but “natural” or “clear,” it is even more difficult for us to let 
its straightness – in every sense of the word – stand unproblematically.  In the next 
chapter we will look at the work of Hemingway’s one-time mentor, Gertrude Stein, the 
writer who arguably originated the type of stylistic experimentation that Hemingway 
would later refine in what is perhaps one of modernism’s greatest acts of stylistic 
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thievery.  Stein, though her style has much in common with Hemingway, has traditionally 
been read in a radically different and generally hostile way, due in no small part certainly 
to her openly lesbian, cosmopolitan lifestyle, and more domestic (as opposed to 
Hemingway’s outdoors) subject matter.  We will consider not only the critical reaction to 
Stein’s style, which was by any account as far from Hemingway’s as is possible, but also 
Stein’s aggressive attempt to disarm the established practices of reading style that 
claimed Hemingway as a hero with her experimental, and consequently to many eyes 









Doggy Style:  
Gertrude Stein, Canine Discipline, and Lesbian Eroticism 
 
 
Dogs which are not useful dogs are a pastime, as one woman once said to me, one has a 
great deal of pleasure out of dogs because one can spoil them as one cannot spoil one’s 
children.  If the children are spoiled, one’s future is spoilt but dogs one can spoil without 
any thought of the future and that is a great pleasure. 
Gertrude Stein, Paris France 
 
Language, syntax, the appurtenances of “style” perform more truly than they register an 
erotic cathexis, a condensation or dilation of pleasure, a circuit of fantasmatic 
identifications that articulate desire; and as it is always one’s prerogative to be bored by 
what someone else might find desirable (though boredom itself is never innocent or 
exempt from a relationship to eros), so it is always one’s prerogative to find someone 
else’s relation to language too simple or too complex, too alien or too familiar to provide 
a recognizably satisfactory aesthetic/erotic pleasure. 
Lee Edelman, Homographesis 
 
 
 “I am I,” Gertrude Stein famously wrote in “Identity A Poem,” “because my little 
dog knows me.”271  Such a strange but confident ontological claim would seem to insist 
that dogs are a crucial site of identity-meaning in Stein’s work.  However, as Michael 
Trask argues in Cruising Modernism, the dog as a figure that appears regularly in both 
Stein’s popular and lesser known works has received surprisingly little attention from 
critics for all of Stein’s insistence on its importance.272  Queer critics in particular have 
done little to question the work that dogs do in her texts, a surprising fact given that Stein 
herself was a devoted dog lover who made the odd move of naming her new pet with the 
nom de chien of its deceased predecessor (Basket I, Basket II), making them into the 
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most famous of modernist poodles.  Beyond that biographical detail, however, queer 
critics might be expected to find special significance in dogs because of the uncanny 
notion of identity they imply – the self being the self only because of a deferred 
recognition that doubles back to confirm the existence of the subject.  It is crucial, then, 
that we account for Stein’s “peculiar fixation on dogs, who appear there [in her work] so 
frequently that their absence from Stein criticism is almost scandalous.”273  Aiming to 
amend this critical deficit, I attend in this chapter to the complicated and unexpected 
nexus of dogs, identity, and literary style that often recurs as a motif in Stein’s body of 
work.  I will show that dogs represent in Stein one especially important metaphor for how 
she uses her eccentric stylistic practice to open up identity to the aesthetic play of 
language rather than using style, as many of her critics do, to define and pin down 
identity.  For dogs, like style, embody for her the pleasurable erotic fascination with the 
play and the taming of language, a fact that is often mistaken by critics for what has been 
largely understood as Stein’s transparent figuration of lesbian identity as style.   
In chapter three I argued against the thesis that Henry James’s style represents an 
involuntary but unmistakable expression of his deeply repressed homosexuality and that 
instead the late style was a deliberately worked at, determined and politically resistant 
aesthetic response to that very thesis that would see in it merely James’s own repression.  
In the work of Gertrude Stein I see a related political and aesthetic project at work, one 
that though it shares much with James in its resistance to the diagnostic protocols of 
literary criticism is nonetheless structured in a dramatically different way that much more 
fully depends upon the author’s own insistence on her right to the aesthetic delight in 
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dialectical mischief that Stein’s style often first unleashes and then partially attempts to 
re-master.  While it may, then, at first seem that by putting into relief the relationship in 
Stein’s text between dogs and style, that I am at best suggesting a strangely mismatched 
coupling and at worst a forced play on words, in fact style and dogs do perform similar 
labor in Stein’s work.  Moreover, as the passage that begins this chapter argues explicitly, 
dogs bear for Stein the constitutive weight of identity, an identity that is staged through 
the pleasurable double-move of what I call the unleash of language and its subsequent re-
mastering in Stein’s perversely imagined mode of writing.  This non-disciplinary reading 
of her style, then, means to counteract the more common reading of Stein, a reading in 
which style, as an important site of identity, has been problematically pressed into the 
service of at least one progressive political movement – feminism – that has 
unfortunately often to a great degree subscribed to the troubling normalizing effects that 
style causes for queers or those perceived to be queers. 
The bulk of this chapter will be concerned with an analysis of the scandalous 
activities of dogs in “The Good Anna,” the first of three stories that make up Stein’s 
earliest major work, Three Lives (1909).  I discuss the author’s twinning of erotic play 
and discipline in the story by drawing on Stein’s formative relationship with the then 
emerging fields of psychology and behaviorism.  Michael Trask’s rich historical and 
biographical work continues a prominent trend in Stein criticism by focusing on the 
influence of behaviorism and psychology, especially as in the work of Stein’s old teacher 
William James, on Stein in order to show how dogs allow her to explore what Trask calls 
the “unruliness of consciousness.”  I depart from Trask’s work, though, by emphasizing 
the pronounced erotic valence that both dogs and style attain for Stein, a valence that she 
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then uses to represent the textual experience of sexuality in a way that cleverly escapes 
the capture of the expert discourse of stylistic diagnosis that so many of her (especially 
male) contemporaries were unable to avoid.  To be more precise, I argue that Stein’s style 
relies on the erotic alternation between unruliness and control – a kind of textual play – as 
metaphorized in the dog.  And, crucially, though that textual experience does indeed 
implicate its author in an erotic aesthetic, it does so in a way that cannot so easily be 
assimilated to the simple explanation of an authorial lesbian identity as so many critics 
have tried to describe it.  What Stein’s style does is something far more complex than 
simply to register the outlines of a discernible lesbian identity, utilizing as it does a 
textual strategy that thwarts its easy assimilation into the relentless hetero/homo 
structuring of style. 
The unfortunate fact is that one of the major trends responsible for the critical 
reception of her style as directly registering her lesbian identity is the feminist readings of 
the 1980s and 90s that reclaimed Stein and rekindled her reputation as a major modernist 
figure.  Whereas her pupil Hemingway, despite a few staggering missteps in the late 
middle part of his career (To Have and Have Not and the underrated Across the River and 
Into the Trees) had remained critically and commercially popular for reasons I discuss in 
the previous chapter, Stein’s prestige had been tarnished in the decades following the 
publication of her smash hit The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas, though we must admit 
that she never before that had much of a readership outside of a modest circle of 
admirers.  Yet many feminist critics saw Stein as an unrecognized master, the modernist 
genius who nonetheless almost always had difficulty steering her works into print and 
instead had to be mostly content with midwifing Hemingway’s success.  They wanted to 
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tell a different story about her, one that would reframe the critical understanding of 
Stein’s work by reading it through the political and aesthetic lens of gender.  That project, 
however, frequently also ran headlong into the related factor of sexuality and usually cast 
Stein in deeply unflattering terms because of it.  This chapter focuses primarily on Stein’s 
work as it has been received by several major feminist Stein critics and aims to provide a 
better, more progressive anti-homophobic critique of Stein that builds upon the work that 
these thinker have done but tries to eradicate the pernicious strain of rhetoric that has 
historically cast Stein’s sexuality in problematic ways. 
Among the first and most influential of these feminist attempts to resuscitate Stein 
in the critical eye was Catherine Stimpson’s germinal 1977 article, “The Mind, the Body, 
and Gertrude Stein.”  In that article, Stimpson locates Stein in a particularly fraught 
historical moment, a time in which women were both disempowered by the prevalent 
notion of Cartesian dualism that would understand men to be on the side of mind and 
women on the side of the body, even as women had also already begun to gain access to, 
as Stein had, institutions of higher learning.  This created a difficult position for women 
like Stein, Stimpson explains, since “consciousness was more liberated than the flesh.  As 
a result, a problematic gap existed, particularly for elite women, between what they might 
do with their minds and what they might do with their bodies.”274  The division of self 
created by this problematic gap proved to be an additional stumbling block for Stein, 
whose personal lesbian existence was further problematized by the gendered split of the 
mind and the body.  As a result, Stein’s 
Dramatization of homosexuality is paradoxical. … Stein both stopped resisting her sexual 
impulses and found domestic pleasure in them.  However, during the same period, if 
                                                 
274 Catharine Stimpson, “The Mind, the Body, and Gertrude Stein.”  Critical Inquiry 3.3 (Spring 1977), 
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often before meeting Toklas, she takes certain lesbian or quasi-lesbian experiences and 
progressively disguises and encodes them in a series of books.  I would speculate that she 
does so for several reasons.  Some of them are aesthetic: the need to avoid imitating one’s 
self; the desire to transform apprentice materials into richer, more satisfying verbal 
works.  Other reasons are more psychological: the need to write out hidden impulses; the 
wish to speak with friends without having others overhear; the desire to evade and to 
confound strangers, aliens, and enemies.275 
 
I quote at length from this somewhat rocky and speculative explanation in order to point 
out two crucial things in Stimpson’s reading: first, the by now familiar notion that the 
strangeness of Stein’s work is the result of her own disguised and encoded lesbianism; 
and second, the coupling of aesthetic satisfaction gained with psychological repression 
required (a point that would be just as well at home in Freud’s monograph on da Vinci, in 
fact). 
 (1) Disguised lesbianism.  On this point Stimpson argues that on more than one 
occasion Stein wrote a thinly fictionalized account of her personal lesbian experience 
only to revise it later for publication into a more veiled self-portrait.  The most famous 
example Stimpson gives is the suppressed novel Q.E.D., which is widely assumed to be a 
thinly disguised autobiographical account of a lesbian love triangle in which Stein found 
herself involved in her college days, and its supposed revision into the less obviously 
autobiographical Three Lives.  Though Stimpson was far from the first to propose the 
idea that Stein disguised her sexual life and used it as material for her books, as an 
important early voice in what would come to be a powerful feminist literary critical 
movement, she represents one pole of thought that helps define this school’s re-imagining 
of Stein and her “encoded” homosexuality.276 
                                                 
275 Ibid., 498. 
276 Edmund Wilson is one prominent voice that earlier espoused this point of view, according to Stimpson.  
See Wilson Shores of Light (New York, 1952), 575-86. 
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 (2) Aesthetic pleasure and psychological repression.  Stimpson implies that this 
sublimation of homosexuality is both aesthetically beneficial – it makes better art – and 
psychologically beneficial – it makes for a better or at least more tolerable life.  And 
though she does not explicate that relationship, the potential for slippage between the two 
that is evident in Stimpson’s description will come to be virtually canonical in 
feminism’s understanding of Stein’s transformation of psychological material into 
aesthetically productive work.  In other words, the supposed crisis of homosexuality that 
Stein is widely alleged to have suffered from had to be suppressed or repressed in various 
ways, leading to the creation of Stein’s remarkable stylistic achievement. 
 As I mentioned earlier, Stimpson seems to mainly have the thematic or narrative 
material of Stein’s work in mind during her discussion.  In later work, however, she will 
extend that definition, pointing out that the negative opinion many readers have of Stein 
is largely due to the view that she is “guilty of a double transgression: first, and more 
blatantly, she subverted generic and linguistic codes; next, and more slyly, she subverted 
sexual codes.  Both her word and her flesh violated normalities.”277  Here Stimpson 
directly implicates Stein’s style, her subversion of linguistic codes, in such a way as they 
become crossed with one another.  Stein’s linguistic perversion and her sexual perversion 
collide so that they come to seem one and the same as embodied in the figure Stimpson 
calls “the Bad Stein.”  And in that formulation, Stimpson makes clear both the problem 
from which much of feminist critique of the 1980s sought to rescue Stein and also the 
seemingly inescapable trap into which it had plunged her in the years Stimpson’s two 
essays bookend.  In other words, where feminist critique, even the kind like Stimpson’s 
                                                 
277 Catahrine Stimpson, “Gertrude Stein and the Lesbian Lie,” in American Women’s Autobiography: 
Fea(s)ts of Memory, ed. Margo Culley (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1992), 152. 
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that seemed to be espousing a mildly proto-gay-affirmative or at the very least mildly 
proto-anti-homophobic point of view, tried at first to reclaim Stein the woman by 
explaining her avant-garde work as a response to the respectable codes of the 
disempowering society in which she lived, it also often reinscribed in that very work 
some of the most problematically homophobic assumptions about Stein’s sexual life and 
its presumed relationship to her aesthetic and specifically stylistic output. 
Later critics, many of them following Stimpson’s influential lead, would extend 
this line of thinking from Stimpson’s tentative framing in terms of theme in order to 
explain what to many remains the most salient feature of Stein’s work – its extraordinary 
style.  Marianne DeKoven, for example, understands Stein’s style, especially as it is 
represented in Three Lives, as “the beginning of a shift from conventional, patriarchal to 
experimental, anti-patriarchal modes of articulating meaning.”278  DeKoven also insists 
on locating Stein within the same patriarchal culture as Stimpson and explains how Stein 
uses her style to resist the inherited, patriarchal rules of meaning to produce a more 
feminist and consequently less straightforward form of writing.  However, that project 
too is complicated, according to DeKoven, by the way that Stein 
 Simultaneously concealed and encoded in her literary work troublesome feelings about 
herself as a woman, about women’s helplessness, and particularly about lesbianism, still 
very much considered by society a ‘pollutant,’ as Stimpson puts it, during most of Stein’s 
life.  But Stein did not merely stifle or deny her anger, her sense that she did not fit and 
that the deficiency was not hers but rather that of the structure which excluded her.  In 
effect, Stein’s rebellion was channeled from content to linguistic structure itself.279 
 
All of which might sound well and good.  For DeKoven’s portrait of Stein is of a resilient 
and resisting woman, one who is angry, and legitimately so, about the asymmetry of 
power within that patriarchal culture.  This sort of argument aligns Stein on the shared 
                                                 
278 Marianne DeKoven, A Different Language: Stein’s Experimental Writing (Madison: University of 
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279 Ibid., 36. 
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political side of that more famous feminist essayist, Virginia Woolf, who also laid out the 
case in A Room of One’s Own for women’s anger and their need to resist patriarchal 
strictures.280  Much more troubling, though, is DeKoven’s assertion that, unlike in the 
case of Virginia Woolf, “Stein’s anti-patriarchal rebellion was not conscious or 
intentional,” was in effect just another unconscious intrusion (albeit a politically 
advantageous one) of homosexuality into the text in the form of style.281  Which lands us 
once again in the difficult spot of trying to extricate Stein from the charge that her style is 
an involuntary expression – “not conscious or intentional” – of a conclusive homosexual 
essence that manifests itself in the linguistic structure of the text without the author’s 
control.  It is, as psychoanalysis would understand it, a stylistic confession revealing itself 
in the author’s words. 
 Stein represents an especially thorny case for this kind of work for a number of 
reasons, not the least of which is the fact that we do not want to throw the baby out with 
the bathwater and discard the commendable work done by many of theses feminist critics 
on behalf of that cause.  Yet how do we preserve the positive feminist strides these 
readings have made in understanding Stein when critics also routinely insist on the 
problematic link between style and homosexuality?  For example, what of Lisa Ruddick’s 
claim that “as [Stein’s] literary style became, in her own view, happily “dirty,” repetitive, 
and therefore anti-Jamesian, she also became able to affirm what she formerly thought of 
as the dirty part of herself, her lesbian sexuality”?282  The point once again does not 
directly indict Stein for her sexuality and seems rhetorically neutral on the subject.  
Ruddick insinuates a cause and effect relationship, however, that Stein’s style and her 
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growing acceptance of her lesbianism evolved at an equivalent clip.  The task ahead is to 
retain the positive elements of feminism’s reclamation of Stein, notably its inclusion of 
gender and sexuality in literary critique while also trying to distance ourselves from its 
often normalizing stance on homosexuality. 
 In order to make this critical project successful we must first recognize that, as 
DeKoven says, “there is a good deal of sexual material in her [Stein’s] work which is 
concealed or encoded,” without then making the hasty move of tying that sexual material 
down to an expression of authorial homosexuality. 283  Our first task, then, is to recover 
this sexual material as a recognizable feature of the text that is vital to understanding 
Stein’s style in a way that moves beyond the standard, normalizing processes of literary 
stylistics with which we have become all too familiar in favor of an approach that 
understands Stein’s work as an expressive but not repressed play with language.  And it is 
through this recovery of sexual material and its relationship to Stein’s modernist 
aesthetic, that is her style, that we shall see her work in a renewed way as offering, like 
her dogs, a radically evasive challenge to the old-fashioned finger-wagging of stylistics.  
For Stein as we have seen wants to dramatically reconceptualize the protocols of identity 
such that it might be based on something as simple as one’s recognition by a pet.  In other 
words, I will argue that by framing the topic of sexual identity as a matter of more or less 
inconsequential play (recall Stein’s fondness for pet names, including her own self-
nomination Baby Woojums), Stein disrupts the serious scientific work of sexual 
classification and looses, for herself at least, the grip that the expert’s gaze has upon her 
style as an expression of some true sexual nature.  By embracing the primitive play of 
what Freud calls the pre-genital organization of sexuality, Stein refuses the categories of 
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grown-up sexuality and its rigid forms of taxonomy, elevating instead the pleasure of 
play and the celebration of triviality.284 
 On the other side of the spectrum we find that many other critics want to deny the 
existence of any sexual element to Stein’s style at all, perhaps because of the 
frighteningly disarming way – to some at least – that it mobilizes style and sex as play.285  
Richard Bridgman in one important study, for instance, describes “The Good Anna” with 
the appearance of innocence concerning what seems to most queer readers, I would 
wager, its rather overt erotic style: 
‘The Good Anna,’ first of the Three Lives to be written, opens on a sentimental note.  It 
describes the scoldings and mutterings of a loyal servant who is clearly intended to be 
endearing.  A good deal of archness is expended on pet dogs too.  But gradually Gertrude 
Stein begins to build a portrait of a conscience-ridden German-Catholic housekeeper who 
drives herself and those under her remorselessly, at the cost of recurrent headaches.286 
 
In this summary, Bridgman notes that “a good deal of archness is expended on pet dogs” 
but he quickly passes over what is probably obvious to most readers of the story – its 
unusually child-like style and its precocious sexual naughtiness, the two of which seem  
to be expressions of one another.  A description of plot, then, as in most of Stein’s texts, 
is utterly insufficient.  For what this story is “about” is not just the narrative of Anna, for 
which Bridgman’s description is baldly accurate.  Truly understanding what is at work in 
this tricky piece, then, requires a different sort of approach, one that recognizes style as a 
central site of meaning for the story, meaning that Stein deliberately manipulates in her 
role as author in a sophisticated way instead of as some sort of involuntary stylistic 
confession. 
                                                 
284 To be clear I don’t mean to imply that Stein’s work is somehow immature or regressive in the sense that 
psychoanalysis has traditionally understood homosexuality to be an immature sexuality.  Rather I see 
Stein’s return to the play of language as a sophisticated and strategic resistance to power. 
285 Or, we might speculate, for the same-sex themes that dominate some of the texts. 
286 Richard Bridgman, Gertrude Stein in Pieces (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), 49. 
173 
 Trask, like many of the feminist critics who preceded him, argues for the 
importance of reading Stein formally but in a way that situates that formal practice in an 
historical context in order to more fully comprehend the historical agents that might have 
influenced it.  Such an approach is more uncommon than one might think since, as 
Harriett Scott Chessman notes, “most critics of Stein choose one of two positions toward 
reading Stein: either the belief in the primacy of the ‘signifier’ or the belief in the 
presence of a ‘signified,’ in messages that can be decoded, in however indeterminate a 
way.”287  Chessman’s point, I would argue, remains no less true today in its suggestion 
that most critics still wish to read Stein as being composed either of abstracted signifiers 
or in terms of an alternatively conservative or progressive political message – the degree 
to which Stein was or was not a feminist, for example.  The problem with each of these 
approaches is that “Stein’s language is never simply not signifying or disruptive of 
signification.  Stein’s writing mixes the figurative with the literal, the symbolic and the 
bodily.”288  An appropriate way to address this deficit would be to attend to Stein’s 
formalist poetics but to also try to historicize that poetics, include in it an understanding 
of the bodily and the symbolic, instead of reducing it down to a single precipitous and 
ahistorical cause – homosexuality.289  Trask proposes precisely such a middle-approach, 
one that mediates between a signifier-based and a signified-based reading that would 
satisfy Chessman’s complaints.  To read with content in mind, he says, “allows us to 
move beyond the formalist accounts that have dominated discussion of [Stein’s] work” 
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and to add both context and authorial agency to the equation290  What is of use about 
Trask’s reading is that it wants to open up Stein’s work in a way that allows us to ask 
how the style signifies in Stein’s context rather than closing it off to meaning as stylistic 
readings often try to do.  It jettisons neither form nor context and so it allows for a more 
nuanced appreciation of how Stein uses style to register her experience of the world, how 
she incorporates its influences and complexities, bodily and linguistic, as opposed to 
being a passive conduit through which her unconscious pours out the coded desires her 
conscious mind forbids.291  It is in that respect that it is a more authentically feminist 
critical approach than many because it gives agency and a real voice to Stein, not simply 
capturing her within the confines of her own desires. 
*** 
Dogs, as Trask points out, may be an especially important historical factor for 
Stein since the science of canine behaviorism figured prominently in the work of Stein’s 
Harvard professor William James.  And many critics have spelled out at length the 
influence James’s work may have had on her writing.292  As Trask explains, however, 
“though able Stein critics have explored the connection between her work and [William] 
James’s, for instance, they have viewed it largely in formal terms, nimbly positing how 
Jamesian habit is transformed into the arithmetic-like prose of Stein’s texts.”293  What if, 
however, Stein were up to something different, seeking not to translate the theories of 
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Jamesian psychology into her form but taking a special interest in dogs for the model of 
play they provide for her formal strategy?  Trask’s larger goal is to understand the dog as 
test subject in the emerging field of behaviorism and the subsequent installation of the 
canine as the crucial 20th century emblem for “conditioning.”294  Where I disagree with 
him, however, is in his attempt “to see that a particular dimension of Stein’s writing is 
less perverse or idiosyncratic than we may have realized.  More exactly, Stein’s 
experimentations with her culture’s narrative forms and generative grammar turn out to 
have a locatable context in an intellectual milieu that is itself thoroughly perverse.”295  
While his attempt to historicize this particular aspect of Stein’s work by showing that it is 
culture rather than the author that is perverse is a good one, I am suspicious of the 
negative connotation he implies with his use of the term “perverse.”  What if, 
alternatively, we were to follow Trask’s suggestive claims about the canine as a domestic 
figure subjected to a discourse of discipline and correction while also reserving the right 
to recuperate Stein’s perversion?  In other words, what if we were to read Stein’s text not 
as “less perverse or idiosyncratic” but as ultimately both highly perverse and 
idiosyncratic as a way of understanding a textual perversity that is so diverse that it 
escapes the strict definitions of homosexuality that have so often closed around it?  I 
argue that while Stein was indeed demonstrably influenced by the behavioralist literature 
she was exposed to as a student, she also channeled that understanding into her work as a 
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model by which to think about the author’s relationship over language.  For just as dogs 
can be made to temporarily obey before eventually asserting their own will, so too does 
Stein acknowledge language as a temporarily tameable but ultimately elusive animal 
whose joy comes in the see-sawing of dominance and unruliness its use unleashes.  And 
that pleasure in the incomplete, the partially mastered, the childish, is what makes Stein’s 
text perverse according to our culture’s understanding of the author’s proper function, but 
perverse in a way I will show is genuinely both feminist and queer in a politically 
resistant way.  
 If Stein produces in her work a perverse theory about the relationship between 
author and language, what has that other great theory of perversion – psychoanalysis – 
got to say about the terms in which Stein is working?  Psychoanalysis as we know has 
been both a great enemy to queer people and critics but it has also provided remarkable 
tools with which to fight back against the heteronormative protocols that claim the all-
knowing god’s eye position on sexuality.  We must try, however, to avoid 
“psychologizing” Stein in the way that Foucault marks the difference between 
psychoanalysis and psychology.  One of the strengths of psychoanalysis for thinking 
about nonnormative sexualities is that, especially in the case of Lacan’s return to Freud, it 
can be used as a move away from the normalizing aspects of, for example, American ego 
psychology.  Psychoanalysis, in contrast to psychology, offers a rich, nonnormative 
vocabulary for understanding sexuality, especially sexualities that seem as unusual as that 
found in Stein’s writing.296  And it is through combining the insights of psychoanalysis 
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with a formalist reading of poetics that we can appreciate a new richness of the text, that 
is, precisely its perversity, without imposing a normative understanding of sexuality on it.  
As Tim Dean says in Beyond Sexuality, “while neither symbol hunting nor 
psychobiography seem at all adequate for the interpretation of discursive practices such 
as poetry, nevertheless reading poems through the perspective of psychoanalytic 
formalism encourages one to connect distinctive syntactic patterns and structures of 
figuration with unconscious processes in a nonpathologizing way.”297  Combining a 
formalist and a psychoanalytic reading of literature therefore need not be inherently 
pathologizing.  Psychoanalysis offers a comprehensive theory for understanding sexuality 
and sexual difference that we can usefully combine with formalist practice to produce 
liberating rather than normalizing readings of literature.  Indeed, Dean goes so far as to 
say that “psychoanalysis is a queer theory.”298  Our attention, then, to the formal qualities 
of the text combined with an understanding of unconscious processes allows us to avoid 
the disciplining, or normalizing, of the text that many critics subtly, even if 
unintentionally, perform in favor of a more sympathetic view of the text’s perversity.299 
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 Such an approach seems to be an especially important one for Stein since her 
work is among the most psychoanalyzed of modernist writers.  And that approach to 
Stein is an understandable one given the text’s unusual work with language and its 
presentation of what seem rather obvious Oedipal themes.300  As Ruddick points out, 
Stein would have had at least some knowledge of psychoanalysis gleaned from her 
brother Leo but it is likely that she was not deeply familiar with Freud.  However, 
Ruddick rightly argues that “she made ‘discoveries’ in fiction that suggestively paralleled 
Freud’s theoretical discoveries without being due to them.”301   If that is the case we 
might do well to think about how Stein produces a theory both of language and of 
perversion in her writing that could be considered a critique of psychoanalysis rather than 
the usual case of the other way around.  What if we were to invert the usual process of 
psychoanalytic reading and see how Stein’s own theory might tell us something more 
liberating and useful about psychoanalysis? 
*** 
 Theoretical questions now addressed, we can return to where we began our line of 
questioning with Stein’s use of dogs in her writing.  Trask opens his reading of the less 
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perverse Stein through her unpublished French poem “Pissez Mon Chien.”  The poem 
reads: 
Piss my dog. 
Piss my dog. 
Piss along the houses 
If I were a concierge I would give you a kick with my foot. 
Piss my dog. 
 
Piss my dog. 
Piss my dog. 
If I pissed on the wall of your house you’d shoot me to death. 
Piss my dog. 
 
Piss my dog. 
Piss on the streetlight 
A poor tramp would be forced to clean it. 
Piss my dog.302 
 
Trask points out the disciplinary tone of this poem and the way it mandates behavior, the 
way it compels action.  As he says, in the poem “the nature and outcome of the speech act 
are never in question.  The address to the dog, pissez, takes the form of a short, terminal 
imperative.  In this poem, there is no inferred dialogue; there is only the command, the 
rule, to be obeyed.”303  “Pissez Mon Chien” seems to want to enact a pure discipline that 
shows no trace of wavering.  The speech act itself takes the form of the pure rule to 
                                                 
302 Quoted in Trask.  Gertrude Stein, “Pissez Mon Chien,” n.d., box 86, folder 1640, Gertrude Stein and 
Alice B. Toklas Papers, Yale Collection of American Literature, Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript 
Library.  The translation from the French is Trask’s.  The original poem in Stein’s mangled French 
rendering reads:  
Pissez mon chien.  
Pissez mon chien.  
Pissez sur le longue des maisons.  
Si J’etais un concierge je vous flanquerais un coup de pied.  
Pissez mon chien. 
 
Pissez mon chien.  
Pissez mon chien.  
Si je pissais sur le mur de botre [sic] maison vous me tuerez avec un coup de fusil.  
Pissez mon chien. 
 
Pissex [sic] mon chien.  
Pissez sur la reverbere 
Un pauvre chiminot serait forcer de la nettoyer.  
Pissez mon chien. 
303 Trask, Cruising Modernism, 75. 
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which there is no alternative for the dog but submission or the boot.  According to Trask, 
Stein joins this ideal of the pure rule with the figure of the canine in a way that suggests 
the influence of contemporary behavioral psychology.304  As he puts it, “the linguistic 
ideal for behavioral psychology is the command, and its communicative ideal is 
obedience compelled through the repetition of a command.  In behaviorism, repetition 
does the work of causality.”305  Yet it is not entirely true that “Pissez Mon Chien” 
performs this direct correspondence between repetition of the pure command and 
causality; to say the word, to compel the rule, is not necessarily to cause submission to 
that rule.  For we must take into account the presence of the tramp in this poem, a liminal 
figure who emerges from “the bottom” of the social sphere in order to mark the point of 
satisfaction of the speaker’s demand.  This bottom derived character arises as the end 
toward which the dog owner’s command is directed, the logical conclusion toward which 
her command is leading.  Even in this apparently closed system of obedience, however, 
there is still the suggestion of urinary non-compliance since the speaker says that the 
tramp “would be forced to clean it,” a conditional phrasing that leaves open the 
possibility that the dog will not obey and consequently there will be nothing for the tramp 
to clean.  Despite its apparent simplicity and its incessant refrain, then, the poem proves 
to be a rather complex meditation on discipline, misbehaving, and the uncertainly 
deferred foreclosure of end-pleasure.  For as long as the dog does not piss the poem can 
continue to indulge in the pleasurable aesthetic experience aimed at shutting itself off, yet 
never quite at the point of finishing. 
                                                 
304 Much of the first part of James’s Principles of Psychology is dedicated to this subject. 
305 Ibid., 76. 
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 The uncertainly utopian world of “Pissez Mon Chien,” what Trask calls a 
“linguistic [and] communicative ideal,” marks a pattern we find again in the world of 
Stein’s novel Three Lives.  In “The Good Anna,” for instance, this utopian ideal of the 
dog as a figure for the closed circuit of obedience (where repetition = causality) once 
again becomes mixed with the perverse enjoyment of the refusal to obey.  Trask begins to 
suggest that function his reading of Stein’s work as he describes her composition of 
Three Lives as growing out of her own translation of Flaubert’s Trois Contes.  According 
to Trask, Stein 
Learned to associate French with the dynamics of obedience that behaviorists sought to 
develop.  This association factors into what readers have long experienced as the jarring 
stylistic inelegance of Three Lives.  Meaning both to make and to do, for example, the 
French verb faire points to the desirability among behavioral psychologists of a 
constructionist theory that is simultaneously a theory of control, of making do.  I argue 
that the verb “to make” shapes the basic idiom of Three Lives by forcing our attention to 
the grammar of artificial control underwriting the revisionist psychology of the new 
century.306 
 
Faire, then, or “to make,” to compel as well as to create, is is a key component in the idea 
of artificial control that underwrites Three Lives.  To place this word, with its twin 
meanings of dominance and creation, at the center of our understanding of the story 
allows us to see that making (do) and making (creating the work of art) are joined 
together in a linguistic knot.  In other words, the creative act is dependent upon the 
author’s authority or control over the field of language.  In order to make (create) the text 
the author must be able to make (do) and dominate its linguistic material.  But what 
happens, then, if in the same way one cannot always make dogs do one likewise has 
limited control over language? 
 To the extent that this story is built on trying to tame what cannot be tamed it 
seems a perversely unrealizable project.  Yet from the opening lines of the story it is clear 
                                                 
306 Ibid. 
182 
that “making do” is an important motive for the story’s purpose.  In its opening moments, 
for instance, the narrator tells us that “the tradesmen of Bridgepoint learned to dread the 
sound of ‘Miss Mathilda,’ for with that name the good Anna always conquered.  The 
strictest of the one price stores found that they could give things for a little less.”307  This 
opening at first seems to align “The Good Anna” with the closed circuit of discipline as 
fantasized in “Pissez Mon Chien.”308  Anna exerts her dominance, indeed conquers the 
tradesmen of Bridgepoint through her words.  Repetition of the word itself compels 
submission.  We hear also the language of behaviorism, as Trask claims, in the “learned 
to dread” of the tradesmen.  This beginning, however, presents a unique instance of the 
closed-circuit model of behaviorism to which the story’s protagonist seemingly aspires.  
None of her other attempts at compelling perfect obedience will meet with the same 
unqualified success.309 
 Stein offers this opening scene in contrast to the treacherous domestic world of 
overtly sexual discipline, of making, which comprises the bulk of “The Good Anna.”  We 
find that “Anna lived an arduous and troubled life,” a life that is arduous because of her 
compulsion to supervise the disobedience of those around her (3).  It is the members of 
her household, those in the domestic space rather than the merchants of Bridgepoint, who 
                                                 
307 Gertrude Stein, Three Lives (New York: Penguin Books, 1990), 3.  All further references are to this 
edition and will be given by page number in the text. 
308 Though as I’ve said, it is not an entirely closed circuit since the dog’s urinary compliance is still left in 
doubt by the poem’s conclusion. 
309 Trask argues that this scene with the merchants is like most of the instances of discipline in the story in 
that these merchants are always in danger of slipping out of Anna’s verbal control.  As he says, “if Anna 
‘always conquered,’ that conquest nonetheless needs continual backing.”  While I agree that that model of 
discipline operates in other parts of the story (namely, that sexuality confounds or exceeds discipline), I 
read this opening passage differently than Trask.  This passage is unique in the story precisely because the 
tradesmen do not slip.  We have no evidence that they will backslide as other characters in the story do.  
Instead, I read this opening as the ideal operation of Anna’s discipline, a discipline that fails in various 
other ways throughout the story.  The tradesmen do not seem in danger of being disobedient for “the good 
Anna always conquered” them.   The irony, of course, is that their strict obedience does not allow for the 
erotic play of discipline and is thus ultimately less erotically satisfying for Anna.  Trask, Cruising 
Modernism, 98. 
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need to be, or so Anna thinks, constantly supervised and corrected.  For example, the 
narrator explains that “this one little house was always very full with Miss Mathilda, an 
under servant, stray dogs and cats and Anna’s voice that scolded, managed, grumbled all 
day long” (3).  Anna is, in short, the center of management in the story.  In matters of 
sexuality, however, Anna must “scold” and “manage” only to find herself left “troubled.”  
Interactions that do not involve the sexual, such as Anna’s encounters with the 
merchants, generally fall in line with the behaviorist/experimental ideal of “Pissez.”  In 
matters of domestic sexuality, though, Anna’s management is unable to effect the 
complete submission she tries so hard to achieve.  She manages and corrects, but her 
discipline ultimately is impermanent. 
 Stein thus both reveals Anna’s disciplinary obsession and yet also shows how that 
discipline is continually confounded by sexuality.  Anna’s underservant Sallie, for 
example, proves unruly despite Anna’s repeated remonstrations: 
‘Sallie! can’t I leave you alone a minute but you must run to the door to see the butcher 
boy come down the street and there is Miss Mathilda calling for her shoes.  Can I do 
everything while you go around always thinking about nothing at all?  If I ain’t after you 
every minute you would be forgetting all the time, and I take all this pain, and when you 
come to me you was as ragged as a buzzard and as dirty as a dog. (4) 
 
Sallie the servant girl is subject to Anna’s uninterrupted surveillance (“can’t I leave you 
alone a minute” and “if I ain’t after you every minute”) and scolding, so much so that she 
cannot even take a moment to admire the butcher boy.  Yet she is constantly backsliding, 
always evading the limits of Anna’s discipline, always demanding more correction, more 
training.  Sallie in short requires discipline in excess.  Her sexuality disrupts Anna’s 
discipline, a phenomenon that links the servant girl with the household dogs.  Sallie’s 
previous, untrained existence, for example, had left her “dirty as a dog.”  It is that 
moment of being untrained that Anna recalls when Sallie inevitably disobeys.  All of 
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Anna’s efforts are to condition Sallie not to be “dirty as a dog” but to obey and ignore the 
butcher boy in favor of obedience to her law.  It is only through the repeated failure of 
that discipline to take hold, however, that Anna is able to reap the perversely pleasurable 
reward of repetitious discipline.310  For “truly she loved it best when she could scold” 
(23). 
 The dogs in the house similarly elude Anna’s control over their sexuality.  The 
passage that follows Anna’s scolding of Sallie is a by-now familiar disciplining of the 
dog, Peter: 
‘Peter!’ – her voice rose higher – ‘Peter!’ – Peter was the youngest and the favorite dog, - 
‘Peter, if you don’t leave Baby alone,’ – Baby was an old, blind terrier that Anna had 
loved for many years, – ‘Peter if you don’t leave Baby alone, I take a rawhide to you, you 
bad dog.’  (4) 
 
Again, as with Sallie, Anna compels repeatedly, as in the doubling of “Peter, if you don’t 
leave Baby alone,” and yet she is unable to achieve the idealized unity of word and 
causality that “Pissez” imagines.  We learn that the dogs “all were under strict orders 
never to be bad one with the other” and that “the good Anna had high standards for 
canine chastity and discipline” (4).  These high ideals of chastity, though, are repeatedly 
frustrated by both the servant girl and the pets.  Even Anna’s threats of physical violence, 
“I take a rawhide to you,” are defied by the “bad” or “dirty” dog. 
 The threat of violence here, of taking a rawhide to the dog’s backside, and 
implicitly a suggestion of beating the servant girl through her identification in the text 
with the bad or dirty dog, unites the text’s discipline with the spectacle of beating.  And 
                                                 
310 In Discipline and Punish, Foucault describes the pleasure that the analyst derives from her position of 
authority in being able to always subject the patient to more and more correction.  Something analogous is 
happening with Anna in the pleasurable position of master, a position that is, as we know, perverse insofar 
as it does not seek its own effacement in end pleasure, i.e., sexual release, orgasm. 
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beating, as Eve Sedgwick argues, makes the backside an important cultural and psychic 
emblem as a kind of metonymy for discipline.  According to Sedgwick: 
The aptitude of the child’s body to represent, among other things, the fears, furies, 
appetites, and losses of the people around it, back to themselves and out to others, is 
terrifying perhaps in the first place to them, but with a terror the child itself learns with 
great ease and anyway with a lot of help. And this leakage or involuntarity of meaning, 
the seat of this form of vulnerability, is easily located in the behind.  One has, after all, 
behind one, by this time, something significant: the place that is signally not under one’s 
own ocular control and also the site, by “no accident,” of the memorializing outer works 
of an earlier struggle, bowel training, over private excitations, adopted controls, the uses 
of shame, and the rhythms of productivity.311 
 
The behind is thus loaded with an “involuntarity of meaning,” signifying doubly in spite 
of itself a space in which one is able to enact discipline, via beating, and yet also “behind 
one,” a “place that is signally not under one’s own ocular control.”  The behind is 
therefore that site which, like the dog, is most subject to the harshest form of discipline – 
the rhythmic stroke of physical violence – and simultaneously always suspect, always 
threatening to slip away from discipline.  As Sedgwick says in a footnote to her article, 
“the near impossibility for the adult European female body of maintaining the twentieth-
century disciplinary ideal of constant total muscular control, over the ambulatory rear-
end, makes it especially ‘meaningful’ as the locus – forever hidden from one’s own eyes 
– of an always potentially discrediting scandal.”312  The “ambulatory rear-end” is the site, 
then, like the canine, of both control over the body and of slipping out of control into 
“potentially discrediting scandal.” 
 Freud, of course offers another vocabulary for understanding disciplinary 
character through an erotic conception of the rear.  According to Freud, the urge to 
mastery in this kind of will to power is a response to the environment produced through a 
                                                 




failure to resolve the anal-sadistic stage of normal psychic development.  For Freud, the 
subject’s repeated management of those around her is a manifestation of the persistence 
of the anal component instinct (Trieb), a leftover or surplus attached to the ass that 
nevertheless enables the subject to disavow an interest in anality.  As he says in 
“Character and Anal Erotism,” 
Anal eroticism is one of the components of the [sexual] instinct which, in the course of 
development and in accordance with the education demanded by our present civilization, 
has become unserviceable for sexual aims.  It is therefore plausible to suppose that these 
character-traits of orderliness, parsimony and obstinacy, which are so often prominent in 
people who were formerly anal erotics, are to be regarded as the first and most constant 
results of the sublimation of anal erotism.313 
 
Freud suggests, then, that the pleasure the child receives in the anal stage, a pleasure that 
arrives with the child’s discovery of the erogenous potential of the anal zone (as Freud 
puts it, an erotogenic zone is a “seat of excitement”), becomes “unserviceable” through 
normal development.  Sedgwick too rightly points out that the legacy of the control one 
learns to exert over one’s backside is one that has lasting cultural and psychic 
significance.  For the stages of psychosexual development are “normally passed through 
smoothly, without giving more than a hint of their existence.”314  However, “the phase of 
genital primacy must be preceded by a ‘pregenital organization’ in which sadism and anal 
erotism play the leading parts.”315  The normal anal-sadistic phase child resolves the 
component instinct (Trieb) and passes through it to normal sexual maturity in the form of 
                                                 
313 Sigmund Freud, “Character and Anal Eroticism,” in The Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, trans. James Strachey, 24 vols. (London: Hogarth Press, 1953-74), 
9:171.  Such a person: orderly, parsimonious and obstinate, would of course colloquially come to be called 
“anal,” that is, a “tight ass.” 
314 Sigmund Freud, “Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality,” in The Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, trans. James Strachey, 24 vols. (London: Hogarth Press, 1953-74), 
7:198. 
315 Sigmund Freud, “On the Transformation of Instincts With Special Reference to Anal Eroticism,” in 
Collected Papers of Sigmund Freud, trans. Joan Riviere, 5 vols.  (New York: Basic Books, 1959), 2:164. 
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genital organization.316  As Gayle Rubin puts it, “the child is thought to travel its 
organismic stages until it reaches its anatomical destiny and the missionary position.”317 
 It is important to note, however, that it is “education” that anal pleasure 
“unserviceable” in “our present civilization.”  Education disrupts the cycle of perverse 
anal pleasure and reroutes the child onto its anatomical (in fact, cultural) destiny.318  
Education, or training, is precisely the trope Sedgwick invokes in her description of an 
anal eroticism based both on correction through beating and the education of one’s 
behind in “toilet training.”  To put it another way, the anal adult has been disciplined out 
of anal eroticism only to find pleasure in a different kind of discipline: the sadistic control 
she learns to exert over objects.  Yet as Freud says, for the subject who has merely 
sublimated rather than resolved the anal drive, discipline returns in the form of 
“orderliness, parsimony and obstinacy,” all characteristic of the good Anna.  Anal 
eroticism thus disappears in its overt form only to reemerge covertly in sadistic 
discipline.  In this way, the erotic potential of anality is heightened for the anal erotic at 
                                                 
316 For Freud’s extended explanation of the component instincts, see Three Essays on the Theory of 
Sexuality (1905).  The “sadistic” portion of the anal-sadistic phase, it is important to note, is when the child 
begins to view its feces as a “gift” and may often “refuse” to give that gift to its mother, thereby 
discovering the erotogenic potential of retaining its feces so as to stimulate the anal erotic zones.  As Freud 
describes it in a later piece, “On the Transformation of Instincts With Special Reference to Anal Erotism” 
(1916), “its fæces are the infant’s first gift, a part of his body which he will give up only on persuasion by a 
loved person, to whom, indeed, he will make a spontaneous gift of it as a token of affection, since as a rule 
infants do not soil strangers.”  The child’s decorous attitude toward strangers therefore increases the value 
of the precious fæces as a “token of affection.  Freud, “On Transformation,” 168. 
317 Gayle Rubin, “The Traffic in Women: Notes on the ‘Political Economy’ of Sex,” in Toward an 
Anthropology of Women, ed. Rayna R. Reiter.  (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1975), 184. 
318 Lacan famously extrapolates on Freud’s maxim “anatomy is destiny” in his example of the two children 
on the train stopping at a station and peering out the windows at the lavatory doors.  From their respective 
positions, the boy claims that they have arrived at “Ladies” while the girl claims they are at “Gentlemen.”  
With this example Lacan shows that “the signifier in fact enters the signified - namely, in a form which, 
since it is not immaterial, raises the question of its place in reality.”  Just as the signifiers “ladies” and 
“gentlemen” have materially entered the signified, so too do signifiers of sexual difference enter, invest, the 
anatomical signified.  One’s destiny, then, is not based on anatomy in some natural, biological sense, but 
rather biology is overwritten by the symbolic such that one’s destiny is contingent upon one’s entry into the 
symbolic order.  See Jacques Lacan, “The Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious,” in  Ecrits: A 
Selection, trans. Bruce Fink (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 2002), 143.  
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the same time that a deep sense of shame and guilt about the original anal zone are 
installed in the subject through the “education demanded by our present civilization.”  As 
Freud says, “reaction-formations, or counter-forces, such as shame, disgust and morality, 
are created in the mind.  They are actually formed at the expense of the excitations 
proceeding from the erotogenic zones, and they rise like dams to oppose the later activity 
of the sexual instincts.”319  For the subject overly invested by anality, then, we see that 
counter-forces, counter-disciplines, in the form of a superego that reprimands and 
corrects, come to foreclose on anal erotism through shame, disgust or morality.  For “the 
organic sources of anal eroticism cannot be exhausted by the establishment of genital 
organization,”320 they need a counter-discipline to check their progress.  Such a counter-
discipline in this case, however, involves a psychic sleight-of-hand that nevertheless 
leaves a trace of its origin in an aversion to the ass.321 
 Stein, however, was certainly no Freudian and she was unlikely to have been 
familiar with the complex theories of anality that Freud spun out.  Yet it does seem that 
Stein does independently reach some of the same conclusions about the etiology of 
anality as Freud does.  We need only look to Anna’s corrections of the dog Peter to see 
her disgust at the “immorality” of the dog’s sex from behind.  As we saw, for example, 
Anna has high standards for “canine chastity and discipline,” standards that, when 
frustrated, lead her to label transgressors “bad dog” (Peter) or “dirty as a dog” (Sallie).  
When Peter does “misbehave,” it is registered as “a sad disgrace [that] did once happen to 
                                                 
319 Freud, “Character,” 171. 
320 Freud, “On the Transformation,” 165. 
321 Anna indeed has an explicit aversion to stimulating her own backside directly.  For example, we learn 
that “no argument could bring her to sit an evening in the empty parlour, although the smell of paint when 
they were fixing up the kitchen made her very sick, and tired as she always was, she would never sit down 
during the long talks she had with Miss Mathilda” (13).  Anna resists the overt physical stimulation of the 
backside that would come from sitting on it and instead reroutes her desire for anal stimulation into 
discipline. 
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the family” (4), a sad disgrace in the text given the morality that bristles at the image of 
doggy-style sex, that is, sex from behind.  The response in the text to sublimated anal 
instinct (Trieb), then, is that “cleanliness, orderliness and trustworthiness give exactly the 
impression of a reaction-formation against an interest in what is unclean and disturbing 
and should not be part of the body.”322  The lady does it seems protest too much, even to 
the point of threatening to beat Peter with a rawhide.  Anna’s reaction-formations against 
the scandal of doggy-style sex reveal precisely “an interest in what is unclean,” that is, a 
preoccupation with the behind and the disorderliness it represents that drives her to stamp 
it out all around her and yet to derive intense pleasure from that very act of banishing it. 
 Such abjection of anality for Anna, as well as for the apparently sympathetic 
narrator, makes more legible the overlapping categorization of the servant girl Sallie and 
the dogs.  For instance, “Anna was a mother now to Sallie, a good incessant german 
mother who watched and scolded hard to keep the girl from any evil step.  Sallie’s 
temptations and transgressions were much like those of naughty Peter and jolly little 
Rags, and Anna took the same way to keep all three from doing what was bad” (9).323  
Sallie’s transgression, we see, is “much like” the transgressions of the dogs.  There is 
                                                 
322 A detailed exposition of Anna’s cleanliness, orderliness and trustworthiness is outside the scope of this 
paper.  Such an exposition is also clearly not my purpose here insofar as I do not wish to argue merely that 
Anna herself is an anal pervert but rather than anality is the larger condition of the text as a whole with 
Anna’s idiosyncrasy as a symptom of that global perversion.  It is my opinion, however, that one could 
easily see evidence of each of these characteristics in Anna even if we were to look only at the opening 
encounter with the tradesmen.  Freud says that anal erotics “are noteworthy for a regular combination of the 
three following characteristics.  They are especially orderly, parsimonious, and obstinate. … ‘Orderly’ 
covers the notion of bodily cleanliness, as well as that of conscientiousness in carrying out small duties and 
trustworthiness.  Its opposite would be ‘untidy’ and ‘neglectful.’  Parsimony may appear in the exaggerated 
form of avarice; and obstinacy can go over into defiance, to which rage and revengefulness are easily 
joined.”  Were we to put Anna on the couch, it would not take long to identify these traits in her as a 
reaction-formation against the behind.  Freud, “Character,” 172, 169. 
323 The way in which Anna’s discipline and moral attitudes come to inhabit the narrator’s voice here, as in 
many places in the text, suggests that the erotic economy of the text itself is tied to the issue of anal 
eroticism.  For it is not simply that Anna herself is an anal pervert, but rather that there is a kind of primary 
process anality that runs throughout the text. 
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always the danger, then, of the servant girl offering her behind to the butcher boy, of 
being too much like the “dirty dog.”  For while the dogs provide a model of obedience 
when they comply with Anna’s incessant scolding, they also provide a model for slipping 
back out of control, for eluding Anna’s “orderliness,” for going back for more doggy-
style sex.  For the dog, like the girl, can be trained to not take it from behind, yet there is 
always the danger that the “ambulatory rear-end” will lapse back into coitus a tergo with 
all the scandal that entails.324  To be a “good girl” in “The Good Anna” is thus to be like 
the dogs but not too much like the dogs.  For “Anna had always a firm old world sense of 
what was the right way for a girl to do” (13).  And for Anna, “a girl was a girl and should 
always act like a girl” (13), except when that girl is acting like a “good dog.” 
 Anna’s reiterated discipline and the category of perversion, however, (as well as 
the corresponding support and approval the narrator seems to give to it) might not 
initially seem related outside of a rigidly Freudian reading of sadistic discipline.  We 
must recall, however, that “what Anna seeks is not domestic fulfillment but a continual 
administration of the disorderly creatures – the ‘stray dogs and cats and people’ as Stein 
refers to them.”325  As Chessman puts it, “happiness occurs in Anna’s world when she 
can scold” and yet “it is precisely because her ‘babies’ do not always ‘lie still’ that she 
has a story at all.”326  Anna herself is, of course, a “good girl,” and yet her frustrated 
attempts to discipline and to adjust ironically allow a displaced form of anal eroticism, an 
anal-sadistic management that will always be available because its objects will never fall 
                                                 
324 The dog Peter is, of course, a male dog that would presumably be the active rather than the receptive 
sexual partner.  As a metonymy for the behind, however, doggy-style sex need not be strictly or logically 
operating with Peter as the receptive partner.  As we know from Freud, the unconscious easily allows 
logical mistakes or contradictions to exist side-by-side without their losing any of their psychic efficacy.  
The unconscious knows no contradiction. 
325 Trask, Cruising Modernism, 99. 
326 Chessman, The Public is Invited to Dance,  27, 31. 
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irrevocably into line.  And though “to [Anna’s] thinking, in her stubborn, faithful, german 
soul, this was the right way for a girl to do,” that right way is dependent upon the refusal 
of everyone else to subscribe to its tenets (19). 
 Thus far we have been following a specific narrative thread in “The Good Anna,” 
that of the story’s perverse use of the trope of discipline and disobedience.  This perverse 
discipline, however, is not limited to some unique pathology in the character of Anna.  To 
the extent that we can speculate about the genealogy of Stein’s body of work, this story is 
an early theorization, I contend, of the author’s role as text maker.  And it is played out in 
the style of the story in what DeKoven identifies as the stylistic bizarreness of its tone 
and temporality.  These two stylistic qualities utilized in this text in an early form will 
come to dominate Stein’s work in a more advanced and fully realized way in later texts.  
At this point, however, the style seems to reproduce the perverse tension of making do 
and failing for which the story of Anna and her dogs serves as a parable. 
The story’s tone is the first stylistic element that most readers probably notice and 
which is often off-putting to many because of its unfamiliarity.  Ruddick pins 
responsibility on an “obtuse narrator, one who cannot quite get a grasp on the material.  
The narrator seems to wish to point the story in particular directions, but keeps losing the 
thread.”327  DeKoven agrees, noting the “avuncular simplicity, the cheerful 
straightforwardness of the narrator’s tone” but arguing that “while the narrative voice of 
Three Lives is consistently innocent, straightforward, mildly jolly, and approving, the 
content is often grotesque, sinister, ridiculous.”328  As a consequence it is difficult to get a 
sense of any moral position in the story since the narrative voice is so consistently jolly, 
                                                 
327 Ruddick, Reading Gertrude Stein, 33. 
328 DeKoven, A Different Language, 29. 
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even in the face of tragedy and bad behavior.  Moreover, as Chessman explains, “the 
potential for intimacy appears … in the relation between the narrator and the characters. 
… Anna’s voice mingles with the narrator’s to such an extent that the two voices often 
cannot be distinguished from each other.”329  For instance, this description of Anna’s 
opinion of her friend Mrs. Drethen’s family is a typical stylistic mingling of the narrator’s 
voice and her subjects: “It was a family life the good Anna very much approved and also 
she was much liked by them all” (29).  The rhythms of the language and its meek tone 
remind one of the gentle immigrant woman and her own accented speech.  Notice for 
instance the broken construction “it was a family life the good Anna very much 
approved,” a formulation that suggests a speaker who hasn’t got a masterful grasp of 
English quite yet.  The overly complex sentence takes the place of any number of simpler 
and more direct descriptions and is resonant of a literal translation from another language.  
The paratactic joint of the “and” likewise implies an incomplete mastery of the speaker’s 
language.  The tendency occurs often as in “it was some months now that Anna had been 
intimate with Mrs. Drethen,” a similar sounding translation from another language (29).  
Yet it is perhaps the narrator’s frequent depiction of a scene in what could be Anna’s own 
terms that best verifies Chessman’s point.  “This slackness and neglect in the running of 
the house,” the narrator complains, “and the indifference in this mother for the training of 
her young was very hard for our good Anna to endure.  Of course she did her best to 
scold, to save for Mrs. Lehntman, and to put things in their place the way they ought to 
be” (24).  In her tone the narrator is virtually arguing Anna’s point of view, 
sympathetically critiquing “the slackness and neglect” of the Lehntman house while 
endorsing Anna’s struggle to “put things in their place the way they ought to be.”  The 
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mingling of Anna’s voice with the narrator’s implicates the style in advancing the 
thematic agenda.  For instance, Chessman points out that “the energy and persistence of 
[Anna’s] voice may intimate an interest in such goings-on that is not purely moral.  Anna 
appears secretly, and perhaps unconsciously, to relish the deviance of her charges. … 
Immediately after her reprimands, a series of stories about the dogs and their wickedness 
appears.  The narrator, who merges here with Anna, shows evident delight in this 
recounting.”330  The narrator herself, then, shares too in the pleasure of surveillance and 
correction.  The prurient interest in her voice belies the wider perversity of the story and 
implicates the process of storytelling itself, its very style, in the perverse goings-on. 
 This stylistic trend is manifested as well in the abnormal temporality of Three 
Lives.  As Dekoven says, “there is no climax, no denouement: just a simple, static even, 
with all the participants acting in characteristic ways.  Crucially, development is replaced 
by repetition.”331  We have seen this sort of perversion before, one that is characteristic of 
Freud’s understanding insofar as perversions, unlike normal genital heterosexuality, do 
not work towards their own effacements.  And this sort of perversion is exactly what 
happens in the story since the dog is “prized not because he is uniformly obedient but 
because his stretches of disobedience render him liable to continual correction, to a more 
or less constant ‘adjustment’ to the rules of the house.”332  The behaviorist ideal of 
“Pissez” or even of the merchants of Bridgepoint would be ultimately unsatisfying for the 
true pervert because there is no disobedience and hence no possibility for reiterated 
pleasure, for constant adjustment.  In the unrealized fantasy of “Pissez,” there is only an 
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end to pleasure rather than the continuous present of a pleasure without end.333  That 
parable of repetitiousness, though, is precisely the stylistic strategy of the entirety of 
Three Lives.  Paul Morrison explains the significance of such a move, noting that, “the 
normative teleology is endangered by any teleology that is simply for pleasure, any 
teleology that replaces the end-pleasure of normative procreative sexuality.  Fore-
pleasure is thus perverse as is any other economy [including narrative ones] in which 
pleasure does not work towards its own effacement.”334  The stylistic temporality of 
Three Lives, then, is by definition perverse because it denies us the standard, mature, 
heteronormative narrative pleasure of the novel and gives us instead an immature one, 
one that is for pleasure and for(e) play. 
 Stein will later come to define this stylistic strategy as what she calls the 
“continuous present.”  Ruddick makes a compelling argument that Stein’s work in Three 
Lives and its use of this style marks a transition point for her in which Stein both shows 
her debt to James and moves away from him toward a more Freudian model of the mind.  
As Ruddick says, “James had come to represent to her everything she questioned about 
the nineteenth century, and as she went about ‘killing the nineteenth century’ through a 
modernist literary practice, Stein pulverized the ideals that had once drawn her to James 
but now repelled her.”335  So while “Stein used James to hurtle herself into a modernist 
literary practice that was more modern than James,”336 her work in Three Lives straddles 
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a dualistic conception of an opposition between James and Freud.337  It is here that I take 
exception with Ruddick’s thesis.  While Stein does seem to theorize in the story some of 
the same ideas about mental functioning as Freud, her style refuses the normalizing and 
diagnostic imperative that is inherent to much of psychoanalysis.  As Morrison argues, 
the type of style Stein begins to produce here does not comply with the narrative 
demands of healthy, adult sexuality.  It is instead a static, “immature,” and playful 
embrace of the now, of the continuous present.  And to that extent it is a critique of 
Freud, a resistance to the Freudian expectation that as we mature we resolve our language 
into more adult modes of communication.  Stein’s stylistic innovations do owe much to 
the contributions of Jamesian notions of psychology, yet they simultaneously seem to 
move toward an understanding of sexuality that is gleefully polymorphously perverse. 
The idea of the continuous present itself, which is so vital to the psychic economy 
of Three Lives, is one that Stein introduces explicitly in her lecture “Composition as 
Explanation” (1926).  In describing the process of composing the Three Lives, Stein says 
that “the composition forming around me was a prolonged present.”338  She continues: “I 
created then a prolonged present naturally I knew nothing of the continuous present but it 
came naturally to me to make one, it was simple it was clear to me and nobody knew why 
it was done like that, I did not myself although naturally to me it was natural.”339  The 
prolonged present she describes echoes the kind of perverse narrative teleology, on a 
formal level, that Morrison describes.  It is a formal teleology that does not move toward 
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its conclusion, towards futurity, towards the end.340  It is, rather, a string of present 
moments.  We conclude one present moment, “end it,” enjoy the pleasure of that end, and 
move on to another moment.  As Dekoven describes it, Stein “manipulates the prose 
surface in Three Lives in order to render directly what she calls a ‘continuous present’: a 
notion of time, derived from William James and akin to that of Henri Bergson, as a 
continuous process or succession of steadily shifting present moments rather than a linear 
progress or march from past through present to future.”341  Wayne Koestenbaum has 
applauded this feature of Stein’s writing as enabling readers to savor the present of each 
moment and then to move on to another pleasurable moment, a stream of prolonged, 
perverse, endless readerly pleasure.  As he says, “you are permitted to forget a Stein 
sentence the moment you finish reading it.  Her writing perpetually toys with its own 
erasure: thus it always promises the reader relief from having to memorize, to learn, to 
sift.”342  Hence, stylistic perversion.  Stein “writes against maturity, against development.  
Her writing is ‘a rested development.’  She rests – naps, dreams, - by enjoying the 
arrested state of going nowhere.”343  In this way Stein has tapped into the perverse logic 
of both Jamesian psychology and Freudian psychoanalysis in that the experience of a 
stream of moments (the Jamesian theory of consciousness) is directed at the anti-phallic 
pleasure of the now, not the phallic pleasure of climax or futurity.  Stein, in fact, reminds 
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us that her technique is one of “a continuous present and using everything and beginning 
again.  In [Three Lives] there was elaboration of the complexities of using everything and 
of a continuous present and of beginning again and again and again.”344  “Beginning 
again and again and again” is often taken by critics to describe the style of Stein’s 
notorious The Making of Americans.  However, “beginning again and again and again” is 
just what Three Lives does: always a new present, a new beginning, a stream of ends.  
Stein stylistically embraces the unruliness both of a tone that is too close to its subjects 
and a temporality she explains she doesn’t understand.  For the rigid rules of narrative she 
substitutes the anti-mature pleasure of play.  Stein celebrates, then, not the figure of the 
pathetic, immature Freudian homosexual but a pair of figures far more perverse and 
playful – the dog and the dog lover.  
Contrary to what many have described as Stein’s aversion to or even ignorance of 
psychoanalysis, I argue that Stein’s text enacts a sort of partial agreement with the 
psychoanalytic understanding of the sort of anal pleasure I have been talking about.  But 
Stein wants to do something radically different from Freud too.345  Kathryn Bond 
Stockton describes a similar process at work in Toni Morrison’s Sula in which she claims 
that Morrison “debases” Freud, taking what she can that is useful about the mode of 
thinking that he set in motion but inverting its value system so as to elevate what 
Stockton calls “bottom values.”346  Stein embraces a similar system of values that allows 
                                                 
344 Stein, “Composition,” 499. 
345 As such it marks a project akin to what Jose Esteban Munoz will describe as “disidentification,” that is 
neither identification nor refusal but a strategic response that renovates certain aspects of a discourse as a 
political tool for the minoritarian subject.  It is, as Munoz says, “a third way of dealing with dominant 
ideology, one that neither opts to assimilate within such a structure nor strictly opposes it; rather, 
disidentification is a strategy that works on and against dominant ideology.”  Jose Esteban Munoz, 
Disidentications: Queers of Color and the Performance of Politics (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1999), 11. 
346 Kathryn Bond Stockton, Beautiful Bottom, Beautiful Shame (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 67-
198 
her to be “alive to certain pleasures (and certain kinds of sex) that only one’s stepping 
aside from conventional values can produce.”347  It is both a tremendously risky and 
tremendously rewarding position to take.  By partaking of the waste, of the supposedly 
perverse and immature and excessive uselessness that culture excludes, one gains access 
to a debased pleasure that is otherwise unavailable.  So when Ruddick points out that 
Stein’s happy description of her style as “dirty” and “repetitive” is part and parcel with 
her growing acceptance of her dirty lesbianism, I argue that that dirt is what Stein likes.  
For she enjoys her style precisely to the degree that it is dirty and repetitive, much like 
the behavior of any old dog. 
Stein explores this fascination in what I would suggest is her great meditation on 
waste, Tender Buttons.  That text, so often noted for Stein’s recycling of the waste of 
language’s units into a wholly new kind of poetry, does not so much represent directly 
but rather uses linguistic trash to discover a novel aesthetic experience.  To the degree 
that Tender Buttons is a celebration of the pleasure of waste it is, I argue, continuous with 
the political, erotic, and aesthetic project I have been describing.  For example, in a 
section titled “DIRT AND NOT COPPER,” Stein writes that “dirt and not copper makes 
a color darker.  It makes the shape so heavy and makes no melody harder.”348  The lines 
do not denote anything in any conventional sense and it is nearly impossible to discern 
what the author’s attitude is toward what she is describing.  Is it a good thing, for 
instance, that dirt and not copper makes a color darker or is it a bad thing?  Rather than 
trying to translate Tender Buttons, however, we can understand it as playing with dirt, 
with the exhausted remains of the literary.  For Stein uses literature’s left-overs for her 
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and her readers’ aesthetic and erotic pleasure, a pleasure many have tried to define by de-
trivializing its play.  Margaret Dickie, for example, in an essay tellingly entitled 
“Recovering the Repression in Stein’s Erotic Poetry,” argues that “Stein’s persistent use 
of the word ‘dirt’ in ‘Objects’ suggests that she had ambivalent feelings about her ‘not 
ordinary’ life” and that “the persistence of ‘dirty’ and ‘dirt’ admits into the erotic 
experience of this text a severe and unbalancing judgment.”349  In effect, Dickie argues 
that Tender Buttons is a text that registers Stein’s response to her lesbianism, a response 
that Dickie sees as tainted by feelings of dirtiness.  I argue instead that that dirtiness is 
itself a celebration, a creative embrace of the values of the dog in which dirt is not 
something to be ashamed of but something to enjoy. 
This is what Stein is getting at, I think, in Tender Buttons when she says, “Pain 
soup, suppose it is a question, suppose it is butter, real is, real is only, only excreate, only 
excreate a no since.  A no, a no since, a no since when, a no since when since, a no since 
when since a no since when since, a no since, a no since when since, a no since, a no, a 
no since a no since, a no since, a no since.”350  What Stockton calls “bottom values” Stein 
refers to as “pain soup,” the nourishment of the debased.  And after that pain soup comes 
advice to “excreate, only excreate a no since,” a portmanteau of create but also excrete 
and ex-create.  For Stein the work of art comes from the bottom and its author does not so 
much make it as unmake it just as Stein unmakes the rules of narrative and even of 
signification and opts instead for the bottom’s values, which read to many a resistant 
reader as “no since” – nonsense.  It is that strange, polymorphous perversity of Stein’s 
                                                 
349 Margaret Dickie, “Recovering the Repression in Stein’s Erotic Poetry,” in Gendered Modernisms: 
American Women Poets and Their Readers, eds. Margaret Dickie and Thomas Travisano (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996), 13. 
350 Ibid., 38. 
200 
text that paradoxically insulates her from the charges of manifest homosexuality that have 
dominated Stein criticism for so long.  By debasing her text stylistically through a 
celebration of culture’s waste – unproductiveness, excretion, immaturity, insubordination 
– Stein really does not exude an especially lesbian identity at all, but instead creates a 
playful authorial persona that wants nothing to do with deciding a sexual identity.  As 
Edleman points out, style does not as a rigidly psychoanalytic definition might have it 
register an erotic cathexis it does not transmit via text some real historical agent’s erotic 
desire.  Instead, as Stein knows, style performs one, a performance that is partial and is 
revocable, that cares not about showing the truth of the author’s sexual identity or her 
feelings about it but rather the delightful, at once totally alien, and reassuringly familiar 












The voice of the present, if it is to be known, must be caught at the risk of speaking in 
idioms and circumlocutions sometimes shocking to the scholar and historians of logic. 
Hart Crane, “General Aims and Theories” 
 
Any individual, no matter how revolutionary he claims to be, who does not consider the 
position from which he himself speaks, is a counterfeit revolutionary. 
Roland Barthes, “The Fatality of Culture, the Limits of Counterculture” 
 
 
The ongoing task of producing a progressive literary criticism, to which I have 
often referred in this work, demands that we challenge our assumptions about what we 
think we know about literature and to humbly accept, as responsible critics, that our own, 
even long-established, protocols may – and often do – from time to time prove to have 
politically problematic implications that we have yet to recognize.  It is far too easy to 
embrace the conceited stance of textual mastery that ensures, as we have seen, the 
operations of power in a culture that is as dedicated as our own to the mechanisms of 
normalization and to the asymmetrical application of power over the discursively 
vulnerable.  But we must labor against this tendency that often seems to be built into 
literary criticism, created as it is by narcissistic human beings, and to struggle as much as 
we can to deliver critique from our own worst tendencies in favor of making not just 
critique but the wider world a better and more humane place for all. 
That goal is not an easy one to achieve since so much of modern Western culture, 
including as we have seen certain aspects of literary criticism itself, is allied in favor of 
the status quo.  Indeed it may even seem impossible to overturn that discourse given the 
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tremendous odds so often marshaled against a progressive critical agenda.  “Politics,” Lee 
Edelman explains, “however radical the means by which specific constituencies attempt 
to produce a more desirable social order, remains, at its core, conservative insofar as it 
works to affirm a structure, to authenticate social order.”351  The spirit and goals of 
progressive critique, then, are not fulfilled by mere political rhetoric, conservative or 
liberal, because as Edelman explains, all political rhetoric serves to affirm structures of 
domination that preexist and are independent of any specific political movement.  Instead 
of proposing a strictly political rhetoric or simply agitating for a particular political 
purpose, I mean this project to work toward the vital goal of denaturalization that Roland 
Barthes describes in the opening pages of Mythologies, by addressing 
A feeling of impatience at the sight of ‘naturalness’ with which newspapers, art and 
common sense constantly dress up a reality which, even though it is the one we live in, is 
undoubtedly determined by history.  In short, in the account given of our contemporary 
circumstances, I resented seeing Nature and History confused at every turn, and I wanted 
to track down, in the decorative display of what-goes-without-saying, the ideological 
abuse which, in my view, is hidden there.352 
 
In my view it is this still unfinished project described by Barthes that is the essential labor 
ahead for any work that aims to operate under the sign of progressive critique – to 
describe what is still hidden in the ideological construction of what goes without saying, 
affirming not the social structure but cutting through its obfuscations and imagining its 
structuring grammar differently. 
 Within the broader outlines of this progressive project lies the domain of 
sexuality, that subjectivizing principle that is, as Edelman suggests, at the heart of the 
social order’s self-affirming figuration of itself to itself.  Sexuality is that field of 
subjectivity and category of analysis that literary criticism is predictably defensive about, 
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even in its most politically “liberal” moments.  But we must press literary criticism to 
move beyond what has remained its relation to homosexuality as variously either 
acknowledged, tolerated, accepted, or even “celebrated” in the name of diversity of 
human experience.  What is needed instead of such socially defensive lip-service is a 
radical and (what can only be) voluntary critical re-orientation of literary criticism from 
within, a part of which is a long overdue self-analysis of its own critical terms and 
methods; one of these re-evaluations (of style) I have undertaken in the preceding pages.  
For literary criticism as we know it has been far from unaffected by the normalizing 
protocols of modern Western culture.  As Foucault argues in The Use of Pleasure, one of 
our culture’s prime directives is to cause “individuals to recognize themselves as subjects 
of a ‘sexuality,’ which was accessible to very diverse fields of knowledge and linked to a 
system of rules and constraints.”353  Literary criticism, as one of those “very diverse 
fields of knowledge,” has participated in this project, even at those times when it has 
claimed to resist it, insofar as it has been complicit by not turning a more critical eye 
toward the tools it uses – like style – that are structured by a will to knowledge about 
sexuality.  To the degree that literary criticism retains style in its current form (and by no 
means should we assume that it is the only category that is tainted in this way), it takes 
part in a deeply troubling “hermeneutics of desire” that “individuals [are] led to practice, 
on themselves and on others,” and for “which their sexual behavior was doubtless the 
occasion, but certainly not the exclusive domain.”354 
 Nearly two decades ago, Eve Sedgwick made the case for the vital importance of 
hetero/homo definition to our culture and yet despite the broad influence her work has 
                                                 
353 Michel Foucault, The Use of Pleasure: Volume 2 of The History of Sexuality, trans. Robert Hurley (New 
York: Vintage, 1990), 4. 
354 Ibid., 5. 
204 
had upon what will surely be generations of critics, the full import of what she has to say 
has not yet seeped all the way down to genuinely transform our literary critical practice.  
In Epistemology of the Closet, Sedgwick explains that “new, institutionalized taxonomic 
discourses – medical, legal, literary, psychological – centering on homo/heterosexual 
definition proliferated and crystallized with exceptional rapidity in the decades around 
the turn of the century, decades in which so many of the other critical nodes of the culture 
were being, if less suddenly and newly, nonetheless also definitively reshaped.”355  What 
Sedgwick anticipates here is the critical need for those counter-discourses that seek to 
complicate or overturn the culture’s structuring hetero/homo division to also look inward 
and see how they too have been caught by the riptide of this cultural reshaping.  It is not 
enough, then, for literary criticism to point out instances of homophobia, for its own basic 
methodology – in the form of its sexualized understanding of style – is implicated in that 
same cultural logic.  For while “modern Western culture has placed what it calls sexuality 
in a more and more distinctively privileged relation to our most prized constructs of 
individual identity, truth, and knowledge, it becomes truer and truer that the language of 
sexuality not only intersects with but transforms other languages and relations by which 
we know.”356  As a language that, as we have seen, intersects in myriad ways with 
sexuality, literary criticism has likewise become transformed itself, transformed in way 
that we allow to remain in the dark at our own peril. 
 I do not mean to conclude on an ominous note, for while I do consider literary 
criticism and popular culture’s understanding of style and sexuality to be a serious and 
urgent matter, I also have faith that it is not a lost cause to hope it can be different.  For 
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like Sedgwick, though I have looked to the past for examples of the practice that I am 
describing and criticizing, I also hope “to denaturalize the present, rather than the past – 
in effect to render less destructively presumable ‘homosexuality as we know it today.’”357  
It is true that we can’t change the past but we also need not allow history to be for us, like 
for Stephen Dedalus, a nightmare from which we cannot awake.  What we can do is to 
progress forward, to open our eyes to our critical presumptions and to use our newfound 
knowledge as a way of thinking style and sexuality in a new and non-disciplinary way.  
For we can, as Barthes says, challenge what goes without saying and we can think and 
say it differently, not from within the phobically protected sanctum of common sense but 
from outside in the sight of a renewed kind of critique.  In order to do that with style, 
however, we must “stand detached from it, bracketing its familiarity, in order to analyze 
the theoretical and practical context with which it has been associated.”358  Only then, I’d 
wager, can we successfully rethink the sexual politics of style and, as Barthes says, bring 
about a revolution. 
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